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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided and published twenty-four
insurance-related appeals between June 2005 and May 2006 from cases
originating in seven federal district courts.1 Like petitioners in prior years, the
overwhelming majority of the 2005-2006 appellants petitioned the court of
appeals to reverse or vacate district courts' adverse summary judgments as
well as the lower courts' allegedly questionable interpretations of various
insurance contracts.2 Again, most of the controversies involved familiar
1. The Fifth Circuit reported the following twenty-four insurance-related cases: Texaco
Exploration & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Eng'rd Prod. Co., 448 F.3d 760 (5th Cit. May 2006); St. Paul Surplus
Lines Ins. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 445 F.3d 820 (5th Cir. Apr. 2006); Wallace v. La. Citizens
Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006); Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Navratil, 445 F.3d 402 (5th
Cir. Mar. 2006); Motiva Enters., LLC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006);
Dale v. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006); EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines
Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. Jan. 2006); Stewart v. W. Heritage Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. Jan.
2006); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. Jan. 2006); Gallup v. Omaha Prop.
& Cas. Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. Dec. 2005); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Co., 429 F.3d 120 (5th
Cir. Oct. 2005); Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 428 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. Oct. 2005); Int'l Ins.
Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. Sept. 2005); Minter v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 423 F.3d 460
(5th Cir. Aug. 2005); Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. Aug.
2005); Thyssen, Inc. v. Nobility Mv, 421 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005); Riverwood Int'l Corp. v.
Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005); Coleman v. Sch. Bd. of Richland Parish, 418
F.3d 511 (5th Cir. July. 2005); Wentwood Woodside I, LP v. GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corp., 419 F.3d
310 (5th Cir. July 2005); Lifecare Hosps., Inc. v. Health Plus of La., Inc., 418 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. July 2005);
Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. July 2005); Wright v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. June 2005); United Teacher Assocs. Ins. Co. v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co.,
414 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. June 2005); La. Patients' Comp. Fund Oversight Bd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 411 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. June 2005).
2. See Lifecare Hosps., 418 F.3d at 419.
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procedural and substantive questions of law.3 But the Fifth Circuit also
decided many questions of fact. Furthermore, several preemption questions
and disputes over subject matter jurisdiction appeared among the decisions.4
More significant, the Fifth Circuit decided numerous class action disputes
during the 2004-2005 term.5 This term, however, the appellate court resolved
and published only one class action or class certification dispute.6 To be sure,
that was an unexpected result as Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005 that, by all objective measures, will generate a lot of substantive
and procedural controversies and uncertainties.7 On the other hand, given the
severe after-effects of Tropical Storm Allison and Hurricane Katrina, the court
of appeals resolved significantly more flood-related insurance disputes during
this session.8 Regardless of the ancillary procedural issues, the underlying
3. See id.
4. See Wallace, 444 F.3d at 699.
5. See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2004-2005 Disposition of
Insurance Decisions: A Survey and Statistical Review, 38 TEx. TECH L. REV. 821, 903 (2006).
6. See Wallace, 444 F.3d at 697.
7. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (2006).
In enacting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Congress provided a fundamental redefinition
of federal jurisdiction over state law class actions. The legislation arose from a congressional
determination that state courts are not the best forum for deciding class cases with substantial
out-of-state effects. The new Act broadens jurisdiction per se, but then retracts some of the
breadth by providing for federal courts to "decline to exercise" jurisdiction under many
circumstances.
Jerry Hartzell, North Carolina Observations on Federal Jurisdiction Under the New Class Action Fairness
Act, THE N.C. STATE B. J., Fall 2005, at 12.
Traditionally, rules governing federal jurisdiction have at least had the appearance of being
relatively clear, and have been interpreted relatively consistently.... In contrast, the new class
action federal jurisdiction statute is quite complex, and its structure and syntax seem to be
modeled after the Internal Revenue Code. Class actions based on state law will (with some
exceptions) be subject to federal jurisdiction so long as $5 million or more is in controversy, and
so long as there is some minimal element of diversity. The diversity element will be far less
meaningful than formerly, satisfied if any plaintiff is a citizen of a state different than any
defendant. The Act creates exceptions to this grant of federal jurisdiction.... [T]he Act also
creates another category of cases as to which federal judges are required to "decline to exercise"
jurisdiction, and it creates yet another category of cases as to which federal judges may decline
to exercise jurisdiction, prescribing multi-factor tests for each. These rules are too intricate to
permit reasonable summary.
id. at 14.
8. See infra Part II.B.
The first tropical storm of the season was churning off the coast of Texas and Louisiana late
Tuesday, packing heavy rain and wind gusts clocked at more than 60 mph. Tropical Storm
Allison.. prompt[ed] forecasters to warn of flash floods.... A tropical storm is a cyclone with
sustained winds of 39 to 73 mph and is capable of becoming a full-fledged hurricane. Allison
formed over a large swath of the Gulf of Mexico.
John Tedesco, Tropical Storm Makes Waves, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, June 6, 2001, at 1 A.
A weak Hurricane Katrina drenched densely populated South Florida... Flooding was a major
worry... Sam Miller, executive vice president of the Florida Insurance Council, an industry
trade group, said insurers are expecting a 'two-punch hit' from Katrina, with the more-severe
blow coming if the storm comes ashore again in the state's Panhandle region. Four hurricanes
last year caused about $23 billion in insured losses, and Hurricane Dennis inflicted additional
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substantive conflicts in those cases concerned whether insurers breached some
alleged duties under flood insurance contracts. 9
The specific procedural questions before the Fifth Circuit were the
following: (1) whether the National Insurance Flood Act preempts insured
flood victims from commencing state law actions against property insurers,
(2) whether an "Other Assured" clause in a builder's risk property insurance
contract allowed the insurer-an alleged subrogee-to collect damages under
the contract's subrogation clause, (3) whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act
reverse preempts the Federal Arbitration Act and prevents the forced
arbitration of a coverage dispute under an underinsured motorist clause,
(4) whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act prevents various state
insurance commissioners from suing the Vatican for allegedly violating the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and other common law
rules, (5) whether state regulators may initiate a direct action against a medical
malpractice insurer who allegedly fraudulently adjusted and settled medical
malpractice claims, (6) whether the federal district court properly stayed an
action in which the sole, bankrupt shareholder of an insured corporation sued
the liability insurer for refusing to defend or indemnify the corporation after
a patron filed a wrongful-death action against the corporation, and (7) whether
a professional liability insurer may commence a legal malpractice action
against an insurance defense law firm after the insurer settles an underlying
lawsuit but before an appeal of an adverse jury verdict in the underlying suit.'0
Petitioners asked the Fifth Circuit to decide three less litigated substantive
questions: (1) whether a health insurer has a contractual duty to reimburse a
healthcare provider for the costs of treating a terminated employee, a
participant under an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
group medical plan, (2) whether an insurer engages in fraudulent conduct by
failing to disclose all material information before selling Medicare Supplement
and Select Insurance contracts to another insurer, and (3) whether, under a
service agreement, a subcontractor has a duty to indemnify the contractor's
liability insurer after the insurer settles the contractor and subcontractor's
employee's personal injury claim."
For sure, the court of appeals spent the overwhelming majority of its time
and resources answering the familiar and frequently litigated substantive
questions of whether insurers were liable for refusing to pay first party
losses of nearly $1 billion last month, according to Insurance Services Office Inc., an insurance-
consulting firm. In response, several small insurers left Florida this year, and some of the largest
carriers are dropping policyholders or no longer issuing new policies. Floridians also are facing
double-digit percentage increases on homeowners' policies, and some mobile-home owners have
been unable to find coverage in the private market.
Chad Terhune, Katrina Begins March, Florida Braces, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2005, at A2.
9. See infra Part ll.B.
10. See infra Parts ll.B-C, IV.A.3-4, IV.C.2.
11. See infra Parts ll.A.l-2, IV.A.8.
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coverage and indemnification claims in a timely manner and whether insurers
were liable for a "bad-faith" or negligent refusal to defend insureds against
third party claims.
12
Parts I through HI present a more comprehensive analysis of relevant
facts and questions appearing in the twenty-four published insurance
decisions. 3 Furthermore, following the practice appearing in previous
reviews, the author conducted a content analysis of the decisions, generated
some percentages, and performed a limited empirical analysis of the findings. "
Therefore, in Part V, several tables appear illustrating the types of legal
questions, theories of recovery, types of plaintiffs and defendants, types of first
and third party victims, and types of insurance contracts appearing in the
various controversies. 5
12. See, e.g., DeLeon v. Lloyd's London, Certain Underwriters, 259 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001);
see infra Parts I.B.3, lI.C.2-3, IV.A-C.
Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code requires the prompt payment or resolution of claims
according to a defined timetable. This timetable is only triggered by the filing of a "claim,"
defined as "a first party claim made by an insured or a policyholder under an insurance policy
or contract or by a beneficiary named in the policy or contract that must be paid by the insurer
directly to the insured or beneficiary."
DeLeon, 259 F.3d at 354; see Parts H.A-C and accompanying text; see also Gen. Star Indem. Co. v. Vesta
Fire Ins. Corp., 173 F.3d 946, 949-50 (5th Cir. 1999).
Texas law recognizes only one tort duty in the context of third party claims against an insured,
that being the duty owed by a primary insurer to its insured, as set forth... in the landmark case
of G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1929, holding approved). In Stowers, the Texas Commission of Appeals held that an insurer
which, under the terms of its policy, assumes control of a claim, becomes the agent of the insured
and is held to the degree of care and diligence that an 'ordinarily prudent person would exercise
in the management of his own business.' Although Stowers focused specifically on an insurer's
obligation to settle within the limits of its policy, the duty owed by an insurer to its insured has
because been broadly interpreted by the Texas Supreme Court to include the full range of
obligations arising out of an agency relationship. A breach of the Stowers duty... gives rise to
a cause of action in negligence against that insurer.
General Star Indem. Co., 173 F.3d at 949-50.
13. See infra Parts I-rn.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
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II. FIRST PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS-STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS
AND DECISIONS
A. Health Insurance
1. Whether Under Louisiana Law a Health Insurer Has a Duty to
Reimburse a Healthcare Provider for the Costs of Treating a Terminated
Employee Who Was Still a Member of an ERISA Group Medical Plan
In 1994, an article appeared in the Wall Street Journal and the title asked:
"Who Pays the Doctor if You're Too Sick to Work?"' 6 Here are the relevant
points that appeared in the article:
Susan Marchand, like a lot of Americans, thought the most valuable
thing about having health coverage from her employer was that she'd be
protected if she suffered a catastrophic illness or injury.
But... the 47-year-old... bank employee became too disabled to work
because of a back injury and multiple sclerosis .... [Six months later Susan's]
employer terminated her health coverage.
Chances are, your employer would do the same.
Most small- and medium-size employer health plans cut off coverage
soon after an employee becomes too disabled to work. And in a major shift,
even large employers that have traditionally provided medical benefits to
disabled employees until they reach age 65are also dropping coverage.
For those whose employers don't provide medical coverage after they
become disabled and who aren't yet eligible for Medicare, one stopgap option
is "COBRA" coverage. Under federal law, people who work at companies
with more than 20 employees have the right to continue coverage under their
employer's health plan for 18 months after they terminate employment (29
months for disabled employees), provided they pay the premiums themselves,
plus a surcharge for disabled people that brings the total cost to 150% of the
group plan cost. 7
Like Susan's employer, the employer in Lifecare Hospitals, Inc. v. Health
Plus of Louisiana, Inc. also terminated a seriously ill employee. 8 The
employee did not pay the necessary premiums immediately after his
termination to justify his continued medical coverage under the employees'
benefit plan.' 9 Yet, the Fifth Circuit ordered the insurer to reimburse the
16. Ellen E. Schultz, Who Pays the Doctor if You're Too Sick to Work, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9,1994,
at C1.
17. Id.
18. Lifecare Hosps., Inc. v. Health Plus of La., Inc., 418 F.3d 436, 437 (5th Cir. July 2005).
19. Id. at 437-38.
[Vol. 39:843
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healthcare provider who treated the terminated and allegedly uninsured
employee.20  How did the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reach that
bewildering conclusion?
First, consider the pertinent facts in Lifecare Hospitals. Custom-Bilt
Cabinet & Supply, Inc. employed James Sloan.2 Health Plus of Louisiana,
Inc. is a private health insurer that sells health plans or "employees' benefit
plans" to employers. 22 In April 2000, Custom-Bilt and Health Plus entered
into a Group Service Agreement (Custom Plan), under which Health Plus
agreed to provide medical services for Custom-Bilt employees.2 3 "Health Plus,
through its contracted physicians and hospitals, arranged for medical services
to be provided to Custom-Bilt's employees in accordance with terms outlined
in the plan. 24 James Sloan participated in the plan.25
ERISA regulates the Custom Plan and similar employees' benefit plans. 26
In particular, ERISA outlines various rights and obligations of parties
---employees, beneficiaries, employers and administrators-associated with
an employee benefit plan.27 More significant, Congress amended ERISA by
20. Id. at 443.
21. Id. at 437.




26. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1132(a) (2000).
Congress enacted ERISA to protect the rights of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit
plans. Importantly, ERISA preempts the application of state law remedies when an employee seeks redress
under an employee benefit plan. See § 1144.
§ 1144. Other laws
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application.
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities.
[(2)](B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title,
which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established
primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under
such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust
company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or
banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance
companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies.
Id.
27. See § 1001. ERISA complainants may commence a number of contract- and tort-based actions
in a court of law to secure various remedies. For an excellent review of various actions sounding in contract
law, see Professor George Flint's analysis and general discussion in ERISA: Reformulating the Federal
Common Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN DtEGo L. REv. 955, 956-57 (1995).
Under state contract law, litigants developed four recovery theories. Under contract law's
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:843
enacting the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(COBRA)."8  COBRA was a congressional response to ","reports of the
growing number of Americans without any health insurance coverage and the
decreasing willingness of ... hospitals to provide care to those who cannot
afford to pay."'' 29 Thus, COBRA attempts "to preserve employees' medical
insurance as they move from job to job" and prevent the loss of insurance
coverage that could accompany any changes in employment.30
On July 16, 2001, Sloan became seriously ill.3' Later that month,
healthcare personnel transferred Sloan to Lifecare Hospital-a long term acute
care hospital.32 Sloan stayed there until December 12, 2001." Also, in July
2001, Sloan's wife, Beatrice, went to Custom-Bilt's office to ask about her
husband's insurance benefits.34 She met with Francis Caldwell, presumably
someone in the personnel or human resources office. 5 At that time, Caldwell
stressed the importance of her husband exercising his right and purchasing
COBRA health insurance coverage.36 Before ending the meeting, Caldwell
secured a COBRA enrollment form, along with instructions, and gave it to
Mrs. Sloan.37
gratuity theory, courts treated the employer's promise to pay benefits as a future gift ....
Second, under the bilateral contract theory, the participant's continued employment
constituted consideration for the employer's promise to pay the benefit....
Third, under the unilateral contract theory, the participant's benefit constituted deferred
compensation, retention of which would result in unjust enrichment of the employer....
Fourth, under the estoppel theory, the court held that the participant's right to a plan benefit
arose because of his reliance on the promise of benefits in continuing his work with that
employer.
George Flint, ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 955, 956-57 (1995).
28. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82
(1986).
29. Lifecare, 418 F.3d at 441 (citing Brock v. Primedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir.1990)).
30. Teweleit Hosps. v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 1005, 1006, 1008-09 (5th
Cir.19 9 5); see also McGee v. Funderburg, 17 F.3d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir.1994) ("ERISA, as amended by
COBRA, is remedial legislation which should be liberally construed to effectuate Congressional intent to
protect employee participants in employee benefit plans."); accord Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust,
746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir.1984); Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 n.54 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
31. LifecareHosps.,418F.3dat438.
He was. . . diagnosed with Guillain-Barrd Syndrome, a life-threatening disorder, considered a
medical-emergency, in which the body's immune system attacks part of the peripheral nervous
system. The syndrome is characterized by a rapid onset of paralysis sometimes leading to virtual
total paralysis. As was the case in Sloan's situation, the breathing muscles often become so








During James Sloan's tenure at Lifecare Hospital, Custom-Bilt officially
terminated Sloan's employment on August 13, 2001.38 After learning about
Sloan's termination of employment, Health Plus, the insurer, terminated
Sloan's healthcare coverage effective August 31, 2001.39 Once more, in late
November 2001, Custom-Bilt gave additional written information to the
Sloans regarding James Sloan's rights under COBRA. 4° The employer also
gave James a second COBRA election form.4'
On December 17, 2001, nearly four months after losing his employment,
Sloan mailed his completed COBRA election form to Health Plus, along with
a payment for premiums for September through December. Lifecare, rather
than Sloan, paid the premiums of $180 per month, and the record indicates that
the insurer accepted the premiums.43
About a week later, on December 21, 2001, Lifecare submitted claims to
Health Plus.44 Those claims were for medical services that Health Plus
delivered to Sloan between September 1, 2001 and December 12, 2001.
Health Plus denied the claims.46 The insurer alleged that Sloan was no longer
a Health Plus member because Sloan did not make a timely election of
continued coverage under COBRA.47
Unsatisfied, Lifecare Hospital filed a suit in equity against Health Plus in
the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.48 In the
indemnification action, Lifecare alleged that Sloan made a timely election and
that Health Plus was obligated to pay $252,154.56 for Sloan's unpaid medical
expenses. 49 The district court found that, as a matter of law, Custom-Bilt's
attempt to inform Sloan of his right to continued medical coverage under
COBRA in July 2001 was insufficient.50 Granting Lifecare's motion for
summary judgment, the court found that Sloan did not receive valid notice
until November 2001.51 Consequently, Sloan's COBRA election in December
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Before the Fifth Circuit, Health Plus argued that employers are required
only to make a good faith effort to provide employees adequate notification of
their COBRA rights.' 4 Certainly, the insurer acknowledged that the Custom
Plan was silent regarding the exact deadline for a member to select continued
coverage under COBRA.55 But, Health Plus stressed that the COBRA statute
provides a sixty day default election period 6.5  Health Plus argued that Mrs.
Sloan received notice to exercise her husband's COBRA rights in July 2001."T
The Sloans, however, did not purchase COBRA coverage in a timely manner
-within sixty days of Sloan's termination.58 Therefore, from the insurer's
perspective, James Sloan was not a Custom Plan member after August 31,
2001, and Health Plus should not be accountable for his medical expenses.59
Contrarily, Lifecare insisted that Custom-Bilt did not give Sloan any
timely or adequate notice regarding his COBRA rights and the employer did
not make a good faith attempt to do so.' Lifecare asserted that Sloan did not
receive adequate notice until December 2001 and that his right to purchase
COBRA coverage began on that date.61 Thus, from Lifecare's perspective,
Sloan's election was timely because he elected to continue COBRA coverage
within sixty days of being notified in December.62
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by examining the plain language of
COBRA's "election period" provision-section 1165(1), which reads as
follows:
The term "election period" means the period which-
(A) begins not later than the date on which coverage terminates
under the plan by reason of a qualifying event,
(B) is of at least 60 days' duration, and
(C) ends not earlier than 60 days after the later of-
(i) the date described in subparagraph (A), or
54. Id. at 440.
Lifecare and Health Plus focus[ed] their arguments primarily on whether Mrs. Sloan's July
meeting with Caldwell, a Custom-Bilt representative, met the minimum statutory requirements
for notification of COBRA rights. Health Plus assert[ed] that because the July notice was
adequate, Sloan had until October 31, 2001 to elect COBRA continuation coverage, thus, his





58. Id. at 439.






(ii) in the case of any qualified beneficiary who receives
notice under section 1166(4) of this title, the date of
such notice.63
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the statute's plain language requires at
least a sixty day COBRA election period, to be measured from the later of
either the qualifying event date or the date when the beneficiary receives
notice of his COBRA options.64 But the court found that "the statute does not
mandate any outer boundary for the election period."65 Stated a bit differently,
a COBRA employee "must have a minimum election period of at least 60 days
but the statute is silent with respect to the maximum length of an election
period."66 Among other things, this means that participants in an ERISA plan
may "choose to have an election period of any length, so long as it is at least
60 days long. 67
The Fifth Circuit declared that the Custom Plan "did not limit the election
period in any way. '68 The court of appeals found no maximum election period
and no immediate deadline for James Sloan to elect COBRA coverage. 69 The
statute left it to the contracting parties to limit the election period, and the
Custom Plan stated that "Health Plus [was] only responsible for a terminated
employee's health care expenses for eighteen months after termination, subject
to certain limiting conditions."7 ° And, Sloan could choose COBRA coverage
at any time within the eighteen-month period allowed for continuation
coverage.7
Furthermore, assuming that Mrs. Sloan's meeting in July 2001 with
Caldwell was an adequate notification of COBRA rights, Sloan's election in
December 2001 was still timely because no sixty-day deadline existed.72
Therefore, the court concluded that Health Plus had to reimburse Lifecare for
the cost of medical services delivered to Sloan.73 The Fifth Circuit also found
that Custom-Bilt did not have to indemnify the insurer, Health Plus, for
Sloan's medical expenses. 74 The court concluded: "Even assuming Custom-
Bilt failed in its July attempt to fulfill its contractual and statutory duty to
notify, its failure did not harm Health Plus.
75
63. Id; 29 U.S.C. § 1165 (2000).
64. Lifecare Hosps., 418 F.3d at 441.
65. Id.
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Without doubt, the court of appeals reached the correct conclusions. But
note: Lifecare's complaint was an action in equity for indemnification;
consequently, both the lower and appellate courts' tasks could have been
considerably easier. Lifecare only wanted a declaration of Health Plus's
contractual obligations under a contract.76 Yet, the district court entertained
the parties' various motions for summary judgment-a needless and, arguably,
harmful practice that occurs all too often in equitable actions. This writer has
criticized the widespread and careless use of summary judgments in equitable
trials in which litigants only want a declaration of rights and obligations.77
Why? Like the federal district and appellate courts in the present case, federal
and state courts spend an inordinate amount of precious and limited judicial
resources deciding whether to award summary judgments, an exercise that
focuses primarily on questions of fact rather than questions of law.7 8
Whether an insurer has a duty to indemnify or make reimbursements
under a contract is generally viewed as a question of law. 79 But in the present
case, both courts spent valuable resources on a relatively inconsequential
question of fact: Whether James Sloan satisfied the requirements under
76. Id. at 438 ("Health Plus, through its contracted physicians and hospitals, arranged for medical
services to be provided to Custom-Bilt's employees in accordance with terms outlined in the plan.").
77. See Willy E. Rice, Questionable Summary Judgments, Appearances of Judicial Bias, and
Insurance Defense in Texas Declaratory-Judgment Trials: A Proposal and Arguments for Revising Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure 166a(a), 166a(b), and 166a(I), 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 535, 638-39 (2005).
Texas's trial judges participate in another unsettling practice. Instead of conducting full-blown
declaratory-judgment trials, trial judges regularly grant or deny summary-judgment motions
without giving intelligible, meticulous, or studious explanations of their rulings. As a
consequence, Texas's appellate courts must spend an enormous amount of time and limited
judicial resources exploring various plausible theories to determine whether an unexplained
summary-judgment ruling was sound or erroneous.
Texas's courts of appeals must engage in such costly, wasteful, and unnecessary conduct
whenever a party challenges any unfavorable summary-judgment ruling because the Texas
Supreme Court has been consistently clear regarding one particular summary-judgment issue:
When a trial court does not specify the ground for a summary judgment, the appealing party may
proffer multiple theories to establish that the judgment was erroneous. In other words, to
generate more costs and ensure that appellate courts consume even more judicial resources, an
appellant may present an assortment of reasons to explain why a summary judgment was
unwarranted.
Id.
78. Lifecare Hosps., 418 F.3d at 439-40.
79. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pine Bluff Sand & Gravel Co., 89 F.3d 243, 245-46 (5th Cir.
1996) ("Newberg filed this diversity action in federal district court, seeking recovery, pursuant to the
indemnification provision of the Subcontract Agreement .... [Qluestions of law are reviewed de novo.").
"[Q]uestions of law are reviewed de novo." American Economy avers that the district
court applied an incorrect standard when it determined that it had a duty to indemnify the
Church. American Economy contends that this error stemmed from the district court's incorrect
assumption that the duty to indemnify is inexorably linked to the duty to defend. American
Economy asserts that the district court assumed that it had the duty to indemnify the Church
because of its duty to defend the Church.
Am. States Ins. Co. v. Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russ., 335 F.3d 493, 495 & n.2
(5th Cir. 2003).
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COBRA's election period.80 The Fifth Circuit overlooked the important
points.8' Louisiana's equitable estoppel and waiver-of-rights rules are clear:
When applicants for insurance pay their premiums and the insurer accepts
those premiums, the insurer may be estopped from asserting that the applicants
are not covered under an insurance contract. 82
In fact, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies and prevents an insurer
from denying coverage, even if an insured pays his premiums late.83
Furthermore, if an insurer accepts the applicant's premiums, the applicant may
argue waiver.8' Thus, a court may conclude that the insurer waived its right
to demand a timely submission of a completed and signed application. 85 The
Fifth Circuit, in particular, should have considered and applied these doctrines.
In the process, the appellate court would have saved valuable time and
resources.
2. Whether Under Texas Law an Insurer Commits Fraud by Failing to
Disclose all Material Information Before Selling Medicare Supplement and
Select Insurance Contracts to Another Insurer
The litigants in United Teacher Associates Insurance Co. v. Union Labor
Life Insurance Co., are insurers who were allegedly parties to a sales
contract. 86 United Teacher Associates Insurance Company (United Teacher)
80. Lifecare Hosps., 418 F.3d at 439-43.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Harding v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 188 So. 177, 182 (La. Ct. App. 1939).
[R]etention of the premium and failure to reject within a reasonable time may imply an
acceptance.... Even though it be true that technically no contract has been made because the
offer tendered has never been accepted, it is evident that there may be situations in which
substantial harm may come to the applicant by reason of the failure of the insurer to act with
reasonable promptness upon the tendered application.
Id.
83. See, e.g., Maddox v. Keen, 756 So.2d 1279, 1283 (La. Ct. App. 2000).
In Louisiana, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to situations [when] an insurer's custom
of accepting overdue premiums reasonably leads an insured to believe his policy will remain in
effect even though he has not paid the premiums when due .... The doctrine of equitable
estoppel is designed to prevent a miscarriage of justice by preventing one from taking a position
contrary to his prior acts, admissions, representations, or silences when another has changed his
position in detrimental reliance thereon.
Id. The following conditions must be present to establish equitable estoppel: "(1) there must be a habit or
custom of accepting overdue premiums; and (2) the insured must reasonably believe that by reason of this
custom the insurer will maintain the policy in effect without prompt payment of the premiums." Ledent v.
Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co., 723 So.2d 531, 536 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
84. Maddox, 756 So. 2d at 1284-85.
85. Cf. Bush v. Liberty Indus. Ins. Co., 130 So. 839, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1930) (holding that
acceptance of premiums which were in arrears for approximately sixteen weeks and without requiring
compliance with other provisions of the policy operated as an insurer's waiver of rights).
86. United Teacher Assocs. Ins. Co. v. Union Labor Life Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. June
2005).
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is the alleged purchaser, with its principal place of business in Texas.87 Union
Labor Life Insurance Company and its subsidiary, Union Standard of America
Life Insurance Company (collectively UnionUnion-USAUSA), are the alleged
sellers.8" Union-USA's principal place of business is in Florida. 89 The alleged
buyer commenced a common law fraud action against the seller, and the latter
filed an action in equity against the alleged buyer seeking declaratory relief
and specific performance. 90
Union-USA sold individual Medicare Supplement9 and Medicare Select
insurance contracts (collectively Medicare Block), to senior citizens in
Florida. 92  But the insurer wanted to sell its business to a willing buyer.93
Before selling the Medicare Block business, however, the Florida Department
of Insurance (FDI) issued two consent orders that restricted Union-USA's
87. Id. at 561.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 562-63.
91. See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Medigap (Supplemental Insurance) Policies,
http://www.medicare.gov/medigap/default.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). The following information
appears on the website of the Department of Health and Human Services:
A Medigap policy is health insurance sold by private insurance companies to fill in the "gaps"
in the Original Medicare Plan coverage. Medigap policies help pay some of the health care costs
that the Original Medicare Plan doesn't cover. If [an individual participates in an] Original
Medicare Plan and [has] a Medigap policy, then Medicare and [the] Medigap policy will pay .
[their respective] shares of covered health care costs.
Medigap policies must follow [f]ederal and [s]tate laws ... [They] must be clearly identified
... as "Medicare Supplement Insurance."
Generally, when [an individual buys] a Medigap policy [that person must have already
purchased] Medicare Part A and Part B. . . . In addition, [the individual] will have to pay a
premium to [a] Medigap insurance company.
Id.
92. United TeacherAssocs., 414 F.3d at 561-62; see State of New York, Information for Medicare
Beneficiaries, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/caremain.htm#subsel (last visited Mar. 14,2007). At the website,
the following description of Medicare Select insurance contracts appears:
Medicare Select is a type of Medigap policy that requires insureds to use specific hospitals and
in some cases specific doctors (except in an emergency) in order to be eligible for full benefits.
Other than the limitation on hospitals and providers, Medicare Select policies must meet all the
requirements that apply to a Medigap policy. Medicare Select policies may have lower
premiums because of this requirement.
When [one uses] the Medicare Select network hospitals and providers, Medicare pays its
share of approved charges and the insurance company is responsible for all supplemental
benefits in the Medicare Select policy. In general, Medicare Select policies are not required to
pay any benefits if [one does] not use a network provider for non-emergency services. However,
Medicare will still pay its share of approved charges no matter what provider [one uses].
The availability of Medicare Select coverage is limited to the geographic areas of the state
serviced by the particular policy's network of hospitals and doctors.
New York State, Information for Medicare Beneficiaries, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/caremain.htm#subsel
(last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
93. United Teacher Assocs., 414 F.3d at 562.
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ability to increase the rate of premiums for the Medicare Block.9 4 On May 27,
1997, Union-USA accepted the consent order restricting premium increases for
two years on Medicare Select policies in Florida.9 5 On June 18, 1999, Union-
USA embraced the FDI's second order that allowed a 12% premium rate
increase on the Medicare Supplement policies in force before the effective date
of the consent order, but restricting future rate increases unless Union Labor
could satisfy certain conditions. 96
About five months after accepting the consent orders, Union-USA
decided to sell its business-all Medicare Block insurance policies.97 Union-
USA assembled a team of representatives to respond to prospective
purchasers' requests for information and inquiries.98 Jennifer Lazio, Union-
USA's associate actuary, headed the team.99 Larry Doze, President of United
Teacher, requested information about the proposed sale.' ° Lazio responded
and sent Union-USA's rate-filing information regarding the 1998 Medicare
Supplement policies and an actuarial memorandum about the Medicare Select
policies.' 0 '
During that initial interaction, however, Lazio did not mention the
consent orders. 0 2 As part of his "due diligence investigation," Doze
subsequently requested other documents and information to assess Medicare
Block's profitability. 10 3 But Larry Doze never requested any information
about the consent orders or about impediments to future rate increases."
Consequently, the president of United Teacher never received any information
about FDI's intervention and oversight.'0 5 On the other hand, during the
negotiations between Doze and Lazio, the latter disclosed that FDI had
recently approved a 12% and an 8% increase in premiums for Medicare-
Supplement and Medicare-Select insurance, respectively.' °6 But again, Union-
USA's associate actuary never disclosed to United Teacher's president that
consent orders governed those rate increases.'0 7
94. Id.
95. Id. at 561 & n. I ("'Trend' increases are increases based solely on the growth in claims from year
to year because of medical inflation, the increased utilization of medical services, and general inflation.
They do not take into account the actual experience of a line of business.").
96. Id. at 561 n.2 ("In Florida, an insurer must issue at least 500 new policies to get 'partial
credibility,' and at least 2,000 new policies to get 'full credibility,' in order to obtain future rate increases
based on the actual experience of a line of business.").
97. Id. at 561.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 562.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 561-62.
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United Teacher decided to purchase the Medicare Block in November
1999, using a letter of agreement and promising to consummate a formal
written agreement." In August 2000, however, United Teacher reversed its
decision."° Nine months passed before the alleged buyer rejected the offer."0
Therefore, on December 6, 2000, Union-USA commenced a breach-of-
contract action against United Teacher in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia (D.C. Lawsuit)."
On October 4,2001, the parties settled the D.C. Lawsuit with Union-USA
agreeing to pay United Teacher $2.5 million." 2 In return, United Teacher
agreed to acquire the Medicare Block insurance policies." 3 The parties signed
the Medicare Block Agreements (Agreements) on October 4, 2001, but the
closing date was October 15, 2001. 14 Still, during the settlement negotiations,
Union-USA did not reveal the FDI's consent orders."' On October 22, 2001,
Lazio participated in a conference call to United Teacher, and during that
session, she disclosed information about the 1999 consent order for the first
time without prodding." 6
After learning of both consent orders, United Teacher understood the full
impact and significance of the consent orders from a business perspective." 7
Therefore, on December 18, 2001, United Teacher contacted Union-USA." 8
During that exchange, the alleged buyer announced that it would rescind the
Agreements. " And on that very day, United Teacher filed a lawsuit against
Union-USA in a Texas state court alleging common law fraud against the
seller. 20 In the complaint, the alleged buyer-insurer petitioned the state court
to rescind the Agreements.'
In state court, United Teacher argued that Union-USA failed to disclose
material facts about its Medicare Block business before the sale. 22 Claiming
a diversity of citizenship, Union-USA removed the lawsuit to the U.S. District










117. Id. at 561-63. "On October 22, 2002, nearly a year after it learned about the 1999 consent order,
United Teacher, which was investigating a discrepancy in the Medicare Select line's lifetime loss ratios,
learned for the first time of the 1997 consent order." Id. at 562.
118. Id. at 563.
119. Id.






amended its complaint and requested damages.' 24 Countering, Union-USA
filed a declaratory judgment action, petitioning the district court to declare that
the Agreements were valid. 25 The latter insurer also asked the court to compel
United Teacher's specific performance under the Agreements. 1
26
Following a bench trial, the district court found that United Teacher did
prove a prima facie case of fraud. 12 7 To reach that conclusion, the lower
federal court found the following: (1) Under Texas law, a duty to disclose
only arises if "a confidential or fiduciary relationship between the parties"
exists; and (2) "no confidential or fiduciary relationship existed between
United Teacher and Union-USA."'' 28 In its amended findings, the district court
addressed Union-USA's declaratory judgment action and request for specific
performance. 129 The District Court for the Western District of Texas declared
that "the Agreements 'are valid and binding, and that [United Teacher] must
perform its obligations thereunder. ' " 130 United Teacher appealed the district
court's amended and final judgment.' 3'
Also, United Teacher allegedly failed to pay the assessed damages and
failed to perform all necessary tasks to effectuate the district court's order.'
132
Therefore, citing 28 U.S.C. § 2202, Union-USA filed a motion to reopen and
for further declaratory relief.'33 Again, Union-USA encouraged the district
court to force United Teacher to pay its debts and obligations under the
agreements. 134 The court summarily denied the motion. 135 Union-USA
appealed the denial to the Fifth Circuit, where the court of appeals





127. Id. at 563.
128. Id.; see also Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 936 S.W.2d 438,444-45 (Tex. App.
-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied) (requiring proof of a confidential or fiduciary relationship);
Travel Music of San Antonio, Inc. v. Douglas, No. 04-00-00757-CV, 2002 WL 1058527, at *4 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio, 2002) (requiring proof of a confidential or fiduciary relationship).




On May 7, 2004, Union-USA demanded that United Teacher immediately pay all amounts due
and owing to Union-USA under the Agreements and take steps to consummate the transfer of
the Medicare Block. According to Union-USA, the amount due and owing at that time was
$8,393,660 (for insurance losses and expenses associated with the policies that United Teacher
had agreed to assume.
Id.
133. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (2000). Section 2202 allows a petitioner to secure additional declaratory
relief, by request the relief in a motion. § 2202. The statute states: "Further necessary or proper relief based
on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse
party whose rights have been determined by such judgment." Id.
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On appeal, United Teacher cited the Fifth Circuit's holding in Union
Pacific Resources Group, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. and argued that a duty
to disclose can exist in Texas absent a fiduciary or confidential relationship
between the parties.137 Therefore, from United Teacher's perspective, Union-
USA had a duty to disclose the consent orders, because the district court made
an "Erie guess" and incorrectly concluded that the holding in Rhone-Poulenc
conflicted with settled Texas law.'38
To counter, Union-USA cited the ruling in Bradford v. Vento, which the
Texas Supreme Court decided three weeks after the Fifth Circuit's ruling in
Rhone-Poulenc.139  Put simply, in Bradford, the Supreme Court of Texas
conclusively established that a duty to disclose does not exist in Texas absent
a confidential or fiduciary relationship.'4° Union-USA also presented other
Fifth Circuit and Texas intermediate appellate courts' rulings, before and after
Bradford, stating that no duty to disclose exists absent a fiduciary or
confidential relationship. 141
To resolve United Teacher's fraud claim, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the case did not turn on whether a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed
between the two insurers. 142 Instead, the court of appeals found that United
Teacher did not meet its burden and prove a prima facie case of fraud. 143 To
prevail in Texas, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant "misrepresented
137. Id. at 564 (citing Union Pac. Res. Group, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 247 F.3d 574, 586 (5th
Cir. 2001).
A duty to speak arises by operation of law when (1) a confidential or fiduciary duty relationship
exists between the parties; or (2) one party learns later that his previous affirmative statement
was false or misleading; or (3) one party knows that the other party is relying on a concealed fact
... and does not have an equal opportunity to discover the truth; or (4) one party voluntarily
discloses some but less than all material facts, so that he must disclose the whole truth, i.e., all
material facts, lest his partial disclosure convey a false impression.
Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 247 F.3d at 586.
138. United Teacher Assocs., 414 F.3d at 56-64 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938)) ("In order to determine questions of state law, federal courts look to final decisions of the state's
highest court.").
139. Id. (citing Bradford v. Vento, 48 S.W.3d 749, 760 (Tex. 2001)).
140. Id. at 555-56.
[l]n support of [their] claim, Union-USA cites the following language from Bradford: Several
courts of appeals have held that a general duty to disclose information may arise in an arm's-
length business transaction when a party makes a partial disclosure that, although true, conveys
a false impression. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 551 also recognizes a general
duty to disclose facts in a commercial setting. In such cases, a party does not make an
affirmative misrepresentation, but what is said is misleading because other facts are not
disclosed. We have never adopted section 551.
Id. (quoting Bradford, 48 S.W.3d at 760) (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 565; see Coburn Supply Co. v. Kohler Co., 342 F.3d 372, 377 (5th Cir. 2003); Imperial
Premium Fin., Inc. v. Khoury, 129 F.3d 347, 352-53 (5th Cir.1997); Bay Colony Ltd. v. Trendmaker, Inc.,
121 F.3d 998, 1004 (5th Cir. 1997); Travel Music of San Antonio, Inc. v. Douglas, 2002 WL 1058527, at
*4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, writ denied); Engstrom v. First Nat'l Bank of Eagle Lake, 936 S.W.2d
438, 444-45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
142. United Teacher Assocs., 414 F.3d at 567.
143. Id.
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a material fact," (2) the defendant knew the material representation was false
or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth, (3) the defendant
made the false material representation with the intent that it should be acted
upon by the plaintiff, and (4) the "plaintiff justifiably relied on the
representation and thereby suffered injury."' 44
In particular, United Teacher failed to prove the third element-
fraudulent intent. 145 And the appellate court declared that whether the
complaining insurer styled the cause of action as fraud by nondisclosure or
fraud by affirmative misrepresentation was irrelevant:
Courts in Texas have consistently held that fraud by nondisclosure or
concealment requires proof of all of the elements of fraud by affirmative
misrepresentation, including fraudulent intent, with the exception that the
misrepresentation element can be proven by the nondisclosure or
concealment of a material fact in light of a duty to disclose. 46
Addressing Union-USA's concerns, the Fifth Circuit found that the
district court abused its discretion when that court denied Union-USA's
section 2202 motion for further declaratory relief.147 Union-USA had a right
to file a section 2202 motion for further relief, to effectuate the district court's
144. United TeacherAssocs., 414 F.3d at 566 (citing Ernst & Young, L.L.P. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001)).
145. Id. at 567.
United Teacher alleges that Union Labor knew the consent orders were material and
intentionally concealed them from United Teacher during negotiations .... United Teacher
points to Union Labor's insistence on performing the 2001 Florida rate filing, which, if
performed by United Teacher, would have led to its discovery of the consent orders. United
Teacher argues that Union Labor's failure to send the 2001 filing information to Doze promptly
after he requested it is further evidence of Union Labor's intent to conceal the consent orders.
However, Union Labor explained that it performed the 2001 Florida rate filing because it had
access to the necessary information and that when Doze later requested the filing information,
it was not readily available because an outside consultant had actually prepared the filing....
United Teacher has presented evidence that Union Labor may have intended to conceal the
consent orders, but Union Labor's explanations for its allegedly suspicious behavior are
plausible. United Teacher has failed in its burden of proof and persuasion.
Id.
146. Id. at 567-68. United Teacher contended that the court's "finding is not dispositive of its claim
of fraud by nondisclosure because the district court's analysis regarding intent only applied to fraud by
affirmative misrepresentation." Id. In support of this claim, United Teacher argued "that it need not prove
intent in order to establish fraud by nondisclosure, because intent is irrelevant when an affirmative duty to
disclose exists and was violated." Id. The court disagreed: "Because the intent prong is the same in Texas
for fraud by affirmative misrepresentation as it is for fraud by nondisclosure or concealment, the district
court's finding of a lack of fraudulent intent would apply equally if the district court had found that a
common law duty to disclose the consent orders existed." Id. at 568. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that
United Teachers fraud by nondisclosure claim stood little chance of success because United Teacher failed
to challenge the district court's finding of a lack of fraudulent intent in not disclosing the consent orders.
Id. In light of that fact, the court did not find it necessary to consider the "question of whether a duty to
disclose can exist in Texas absent a confidential or fiduciary relationship." Id.
147. Id. at 574.
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prior declaratory judgment and secure damages. 148 The court of appeals also
found that the district court's prior declaratory judgment "conclusively




1. Whether the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 Preempts an
Insured Flood Victim's Filing a Class Action Suit Against
Property Insurers in a Louisiana Court
The procedural conflict appearing in Wallace v. Louisiana Citizens
Property Insurance Corp. is an excellent example of class action controversies
that will flood federal courts in the near future, given Congress's recent
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). 15° Although
Congress enacted the new legislation ostensibly to "assure fair and prompt
recoveries for class members" and to ensure that federal courts exercise
diversity jurisdiction and consider interstate cases of national importance, the
litigation in Wallace strongly suggests that CAFA will undermine or slow
prompt recoveries for class members.' 5 '
In Wallace Several insurers doing business in Louisiana-Louisiana Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty
Insurance Company, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Corporation
(LCPIC), and ANPAC Louisiana Insurance Company (collectively, Insurers)
-sold flood insurance to various property owners.152 When Hurricane Katrina
devastated parts of Louisiana and caused flood damage, however, the Insurers
refused to pay claims.153 Therefore, one class of property owners sued the
Insurers in a then-pending class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Louisiana-the Chehardy action. 54 Another class of
disgruntled insureds filed a class action suit against the Insurers in a Louisiana
148. Id. at 571.
149. Id. at 574.
150. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2006); Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697, 698
(5th Cir. Mar. 2006).
151. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat 4, 5; Wallace, 444 F.3d at 700.
Sec. 2 (b) of CAFA states:
The purposes of this Act are to-
(1) assure fair and prompt recoveries for class members with legitimate claims;
(2) restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by providing
for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction; and
(3) benefit society by encouraging innovation and lowering consumer prices.
119 Stat 5.
152. Wallace, 444 F.3d at 698.
153. Id. 698-99.
154. Id. at 699.
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state court-the Wallace action."5 ' The Insurers removed the Wallace action
to the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, asserting that the
latter district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy." 6
The Insurers argued that they met the requirements of section 1441(1)(B)
of the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act (MMJTA) because they
were also parties to the Chehardy action, a separate class action based on
section 1369 that arose from the same peril-Hurricane Katrina."57 To support
that assertion, the Insurers cited section 1441(e)(1)(B), which reads in
pertinent part:
[A] defendant in a civil action in a State court may remove the action to the
district court.., if... the defendant is a party to an action which is or could
have been brought ... under section 1369 in a United States district court and
arises from the same accident as the action in State court, even if the action
to be removed could not have been brought in a district court as an original
matter. 15
8
Two relevant subsections are under section 1369. 59 The first section,
1369(a), provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
involving minimal diversity between adverse parties that arises from a single
accident, where at least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at a
discrete location, if:
(1) a defendant resides in a State and a substantial part of the
accident took place in another State or other location, regardless
of whether that defendant is also a resident of the State where a
substantial part of the accident took place;
(2) any two defendants reside in different States, regardless of
whether such defendants are also residents of the same State or
States; or
(3) substantial parts of the accident took place in different
States."6
The other section, 1369(b), places limitations on district courts' jurisdictions
and reads:
The district court shall abstain from hearing any civil action described in
subsection (a) in which:
155. Id. 698-99.
156. Id.
157. Id.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1441(e)(1)(B) (Supp. 2003).
158. Id. § 1441(e)(1)(B).
159. Wallace, 414 F.3d at 698-99.
160. § 1369(a).
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(1) the substantial majority of all plaintiffs are citizens of a single
State of which the primary defendants are also citizens; and
(2) the claims asserted with be governed primarily by the laws of
that State. 161
The Insurers observed that both the Wallace and Chehardy actions
involved insurance claims and damages associated with Hurricane Katrina.
1 62
Therefore the Insurers claimed that because section 1369(a) allowed the
district court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over those claims, section
1441(e)(1)(B) allowed the other district court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the Wallace action. 163
After entertaining the Insurers' argument, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana remanded the Wallace action to the Louisiana
state court." To justify the remand, the district court concluded that section
1369(b)'s mandatory abstention provisions prevented a federal court from
hearing the Wallace action. 65 The Insurers appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
arguing that the district court erred when the court read § 1369(b)'s
"mandatory abstention provisions" into section 1441 (e)(1)(B)-the MMTJA's
removal statute. 166
At the outset, the Fifth Circuit considered the language appearing in
section 1447(d):
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is
not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case
to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this
title shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
167
161. § 1369(b).





167. Id. Section 1447 outlines the applicable procedures after a case has been removed to federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2000). In its entirety, the statute states:
(a) In any case removed from a State court, the district court may issue all necessary
orders and process to bring before it all proper parties whether served by process issued
by the State court or otherwise.
(b) It may require the removing party to file with its clerk copies of all records and
proceedings in such State court or may cause the same to be brought before it by writ of
certiorari issued to such State court.
(c) A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject
matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal
under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded. An order remanding
the case may require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney
fees, incurred as a result of the removal. A certified copy of the order of remand shall
be mailed by the clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon
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The court of appeals also examined the Supreme Court's decision in Things
Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca and stressed that federal courts' powers to
review a remand order are limited under section 1447(d). 68 But, the Insurers
argued that a recently enacted provision of CAFA gave the court of appeals
authority to hear the appeal.'69 Of course, the Insurers were referring to 28
U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(1) of CAFA, which reads:
[Section 1447] shall apply to any removal of a case under this section, except
that notwithstanding [28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)], a court of appeals may accept an
appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying a motion to
remand a class action to the State court from which it was removed if
application is made to the court of appeals not less than 7 days after entry of
the order."'"7
The court of appeals, however, refused to embrace the Insurers'
argument.'7 ' The court of appeals correctly observed: The legislative history
of CAFA indicates that Congress "enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) to ensure
expeditious review of remand decisions in class action suits brought under the
new legislation."' 72 Applying the plain meaning test and carefully reviewing
the phrase "'any removal of a case under this section,"' the Fifth Circuit
declared that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(1) only permits the removal of class
actions under CAFA.173
But the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not end its analysis at
that point. 74 The appellate declared that it still could exercise jurisdiction over
the present case under section 1291, which reads in pertinent part:
proceed with such case.
(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be
reviewable by appeal or otherwise.
(e) If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would
destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and
remand the action to the State court.
Id.
168. Wallace, 444 F.3d at 699 (citing Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127
(1995)).
169. Id.
170. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1453(c)(1) (West 2006).
171. Wallace, 444 F.3d at 700 ("We disagree that § 1453(c)(1) confers appellate jurisdiction over
the instant appeal.").
172. Id.
173. Id. at 700 (quoting CAFA §1435(c)(1)). "The application of § 1453(c)(1) is therefore limited
to the context of CAFA. [T]hus no nexus with CAFA [exists] that would justify the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction under § 1453(c)(1). Accordingly, we lack appellate jurisdiction under § 1453(c)(1)." Id; cf
Transp. Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 337 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. 1960) (reiterating that courts must
give words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when no ambiguity exists).
174. Wallace, 444 F.3d at 700.
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The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of
the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court
of the Virgin Islands, except [when] a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court.'75
Citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., the Fifth Circuit noted that
"the Supreme Court has recognized a narrow class of collateral orders which
do not meet [the] definition of finality, but which are nevertheless immediately
appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. ' ' 176 More relevant, the court of appeals
observed that the Insurers "expressly disavowed any reliance on CAFA" and
based their notice of removal solely on 28 § 1441(e)(1)(B)-the mandatory
abstention provision of the Multiparty Multiform Trial Jurisdiction Act.
177
Also, abstention suggests that "subject matter jurisdiction [exists,] but for
some other policy reason, a court refrains from exercising that power to hear
the merits of a case."'
178
Furthermore, an "abstention-based remand order does not fall into either
category of remand order described in [28 U.S.C.] § 1447(c), as it is not based
on lack of subject matter jurisdiction or defects in removal procedure."'' 79
Therefore, in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Quackenbush, the Fifth
Circuit declared that it had jurisdiction to review the remand order given that
abstention was involved. 80
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
176. Wallace, 444 F.3d at 701 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712).
"Though ordinarily, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) bars consideration of a remand order, the Supreme Court has
instructed us that the § 1447(d) limitation on appellate review of remands 'must be read inpari materia with
28 U.S.C § 1447(c)."' Id. (quoting Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712).
177. Id. ("Section 1369(b) is an abstention provision. It assumes subject matter jurisdiction under
§ 1369(a), but abstains [when] the 'substantial majority' of the plaintiffs and the 'primary defendants' are
citizens of the same state and the claims at issue are "governed primarily by the laws of that State.").
178. Id. at 701 (citing Eng. v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964)).
"Abstention 'accord[s] appropriate deference to the respective competence of the state and federal court
systems' while 'recogniz[ing] that abstention does not, of course, involve the abdication of federal
jurisdiction.' Id. (quoting Eng., 375 U.S. at 415-16).
179. Id. at 700 (quoting Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712).
180. Id. at 701-02.
Because the district court based its remand on abstention principles, we have appellate
jurisdiction to hear this appeal from the district court's remand order under [28 U.S.C. §11291.
On the merits of their appeal, Petitioners argue that the district court erred by applying [28
U.S.C §1 1369(b) to a case removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e)(1)(B). Although the district
court recognized that Farm Bureau removed under § 1441(e)(1)(B), the court did not determine
whether the defendants met the requirements of § 1441(e)(1)(B), instead stating that even if the
defendants could meet those requirements, the abstention provisions of 1369(b) prevented the
case from being heard in the federal courts.
The district court misapplied mandatory [28 U.S.C. §] 1369(b) abstention to the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction established by section 1441(e)(1)(B). Section 1369(b) applies only
to original jurisdiction under section 1369(a).
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2. Whether the National Insurance Flood Act Preempts Insured Flood
Victims' Commencing State Law Actions Against Property Insurers in
Texas and Louisiana Courts
Two of the Fifth Circuit's more poorly reasoned and unclear decisions
appear in Wright v. Allstate Insurance Co. and in Gallup v. Omaha Property
& Casualty Insurance Co. 8' In each case, a controversy involved flood
insurance.182 And, in both cases, the central procedural question is whether
flood victims may commence state law actions against flood insurers in federal
courts.8 3 More important, because the Fifth Circuit cited Wright's less than
stellar decision to craft and justify an even worse and unintelligible conclusion
in Gallup, the two decisions are discussed together.
Although some insurers sell flood insurance in the United States' private
markets, the price of that product is nearly prohibitive for the average
homeowner.' 84 Therefore, among other reasons, Congress enacted the
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA).88 The Act established the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and FEMA, an agency of the
Department of Homeland Security, administers the program. 8 6 The NFIP has
two components: a flood insurance program and a unified national plan for
flood management.87
In 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) gave the primary responsibility for operating the NFIP
to FEMA.18 8 To achieve the intended goals, FEMA enacted regulations and
created the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP).' 89  The agency also
encouraged private insurers-so-called "Write Your Own" (WYO) insurers-
to market and sell the flood insurance contracts.' 9° More significant, WYO
insurers sell the SFIP contracts in their own names.'19
Id.
181. Gallup v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. Dec. 2005); Wright v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. June 2005).
182. Wright, 415 F.3d at 385; Gallup, 434 F.3d at 342.
183. Wright, 415 F.3d at 385; Gallup, 434 F.3d at 342.
184. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2000).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. § 4001(b), (c).
188. § 4071.
189. 44 C.F.R. §§ 61.4(b), 61.13(d) (2006).
190. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4071(a)(1), 4081(a).
191. See United Policy Holders, Insurance Advice - Flood Insurance, http://www.unitedpolicyholders
.org/claimtips/tipflood.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2006). FEMA reimburses the benefits that the private
insurers pay under flood insurance policies using funds from the U.S. Treasury. See id.
Many insurers subcontract all policy administration and claims handling to outside
companies. It is not uncommon for the private insurer whose name appears on the policy, and
from whom the insured purchased the insurance to have nothing whatsoever to do with the
policy or the claim handling. As such, tremendous authority for the administration of the
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In addition, WYO insurers are responsible for adjusting, settling, paying,
and defending all claims arising under SFIP contracts. 192 FEMA's regulations,
however, establish the rates and premiums for SFIP contracts. 193 Also, given
that the NFIP is a federally-administered program, funds from the federal
treasury support the program.' 94 But again, FEMA developed the SFIP
contracts and WYO insurers cannot waive or modify those terms.195 Today,
consumers purchase nearly all residential flood insurance under the NFIP.' 9
Against that background, consider the brief reported facts in Wright.97
Dr. Thomas Wright lived in Houston, Texas.'98 To insure his residential
property, Wright purchased a SFIP insurance contract from Allstate Insurance
Company-a WYO flood insurer. 99 After Tropical Storm Allison struck
Houston in 2001, a flood damaged Wright's home; therefore, he filed a SFIP
claim.2" Allstate's claims adjuster, Jack Gardner of Pilot Catastrophe
Services, visited Wright and inspected his flood-damaged home.2"' Gardner
determined that Wright lost $125,840.23.20 Wright, however, hired his own
certified public insurance adjuster and received a different estimate,
$233,497.59.203 Although Wright and Allstate's representatives continued to
squabble about the "true" value of the property loss, they were unable to settle
the dispute amicably.2'
Under FEMA regulations, insureds must file a proof-of-loss form (POL)
with a WYO insurer before receiving proceeds under a SFIP insurance
contract.205 Wright, however, refused to sign a proper POL outlining
Gardner's estimate.2° Instead, Wright submitted a POL form, in which the
phrase "to be determined" appeared where the cost of repairs, cash value,
depreciation, and net amount claimed should have appeared.27 Ultimately,
Allstate rejected Wright's claim, citing the insured's failure to cooperate under
policies and the handling of claims has been delegated to obscure companies, some of whom are
merely data processing businesses.
Id.
192. See Gallup v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 341, 342 (5th Cir. Dec. 2005).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 4015.
194. §4011.
195. See 44 C.F.R. §§ 61.4(b), 61.13(d) (2006).
196. United Policy Holders, Insurance Advice - Flood Insurance, http://www.unitedpolicyholders
.org/claimtips/tipflood.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
197. Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384, 385-87 (5th Cir. June. 2005).












the terms of the flood-insurance contract and failure to file a proper and timely
POL.2 °a
Wright commenced a lawsuit against Allstate in the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas. 209 The disgruntled insured raised several Texas
common law actions, sounding in contract and in tort: breach of contract,
fraud, and negligent misrepresentation.210 Wright also filed a statutory action,
under the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.21' In
addition, the law in Texas is clear: Every insurance contract has an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.212 Therefore, Wright claimed that
Allstate breached that common law duty of good faith and fair dealing.21 3 But,
in Wright's complaint, this claim or allegation appeared as if it were a cause
of action--one containing specific elements and requiring proof of a prima
214facie case. As discussed more fully below, however, neither the district
court nor the Fifth Circuit appreciated this important point; and consequently,
their analyses were less than ideal.215
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed every
cause of action and claim, except the cause of action for breach of contract.
216
The district court found that federal law preempts the tort-related state law
actions.21 7 To defend itself against Wright's breach-of-contract action, Allstate
argued that Wright failed to file a proper and timely POL claim. 218 But the
district court held that Allstate was equitably estopped from asserting that




211. Id.; see TEX. Bus.& COM. CODEANN. §§ 17.46and 17.50 (Vernon 2002) (listing deceptive acts
and consumer's remedies, respectively); see also Vail v. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129,
135 (Tex. 1988) (stating that in order to establish statutory violations under the DTPA and under Art.
541.060(a) and Art. 542.003 of the Texas Insurance Code, an insured needs to prove the same elements
necessary to establish that the insurer's common law duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach of that
duty).
212. See Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 697 & n.5 (Tex. 1994).
Because its inception, the duty of good faith and fair dealing has only been applied to protect
parties who have a special relationship based on trust or unequal bargaining power.... In the
insurance context, this special relationship arises out of "the parties' unequal bargaining power
and the nature of insurance contracts which would allow unscrupulous insurers to take advantage
of their insureds.... This Court in Arnold stated: "While this court has declined to impose an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract, we have recognized that a duty
of good faith and fair dealing may arise as a result of a special relationship between the parties
governed or created by a contract."'
Id. (quoting Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987)).
213. Wright, 415 F.3d at 386.
214. See generally id.
215. See id; see also infra pp. 117-27.
216. Wright, 415 F.3d at 386.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id; see also Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 515-16
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attorneys' fees, after Wright failed to prove that the flood caused all of his
damages. 2 0 Both parties appealed.22'
Allstate raised two arguments before the Fifth Circuit. 222 The insurer
asserted that federal district courts may not apply the doctrine of equitable
estoppel against a WYO insurer in light of the present facts and that Wright
did not prove the elements of equitable estoppel.223 Citing similar facts and its
decision in Gowland v. Aetna, the Fifth Circuit embraced Allstate's
arguments. 224 The appellate court stated: "Here, as in Gowland, we find the
doctrine of equitable estoppel inapplicable. The Supreme Court has made
clear that 'judicial use of the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant
respondent a money remedy that Congress has not authorized.-'
21
Therefore, in reversing the district court's finding in favor of Dr. Wright,
the Fifth Circuit concluded:
[When] federal funds are implicated, the person seeking those funds is
obligated to familiarize himself with the legal requirements for receipt of
such funds.... Under these circumstances, and in light of our previous case
law, we hold that the district court erred in estopping Allstate from asserting
Wright's failure to file an adequate POL as a basis for denying his claim. 226
(Tex. 1998) (concluding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires the defendant to prove the following
elements: "(1) a false representation or concealment of material facts, (2) made with knowledge, actual or
constructive, of those facts, (3) with the intention that it should be acted on, (4) to a party without knowledge
or means of obtaining knowledge of the facts and (5) who detrimentally relies on the representations");
Rendon v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Amarillo, 60 S.W.3d 389, 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, pet.
denied) (noting that estoppel may be invoked in two ways-when a defendant conceals necessary facts or
when the defendant engages in conduct that induces the plaintiff to rely to his detriment).
220. Wright, 415 F.3d at 386-87.




We previously considered the application of equitable estoppel against a WYO in Gowland.
There, the insureds, like Wright, argued that their WYO should be equitably estopped from
asserting their failure to file a POL as a basis for denying their claim. We declined to so hold,
stating that: "Although the Gowland policy was written by Aetna, a private insurance company,
payments made to that policy are a 'direct charge on the public treasury.' When federal funds
are involved, the judiciary is powerless to uphold a claim of estoppel because such a holding
would encroach upon the appropriation power granted exclusively to Congress by the
Constitution."
Id. (quoting Gowland v. Aetna, 143 F.3d 951, 954-55 (5th Cir. 1998)).
225. Id. at 387 (citing Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 426 (1990)).
226. Id. at 388. "'Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with
scrupulous regard for the requirements of law .... [T]hose who deal with the Government are expected to
know the law and may not rely on the conduct of Government agents contrary to law."' Id. (quoting Heckler
v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 63 (1984)). The Fifth Circuit declined to hear
the arguments regarding the damage award after deciding the district court erred in not allowing Allstate to
assert Wright's failure to file a POL as a basis for denying the claim. Id. at 391.
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On appeal, Wright argued that federal law did not preempt his state law
tort actions and that the allegation that Allstate breached the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.227 Thus, the insured asserted that the district
court's ruling was erroneous and that the district judge reached that allegedly
incorrect conclusion by citing the Fifth Circuit's decisions in West v. Harris
and Spence v. Omaha Indemnity Insurance Co.
2 28
In West, the court of appeals declared that federal rather than state law
governed a flood insurance dispute in which attorneys' fees were the focus of
interest.229 In Spence, the Fifth Circuit held that state law statute of limitations
were determinative for an insured's state law tort actions against a WYO
insurer.23° So, in the present case, the district court interpreted the West and
Spence decisions to mean that federal law did not preempt Wright's state law
actions and claims. 23' But, the Fifth Circuit stated that the district court's
reading of Spence was incorrect.232 Instead, the rule in Spence is this one: The
NFIA preempts the filing of state law tort claims in federal courts.233
As mentioned at the outset, the Fifth Circuit cited its decision in Wright
to decide a similar procedural controversy in Gallup.234 Bo and Susan Gallup
227. Id.
228. Id. at 389 (citing Spence v. Omaha Indem. Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 1993); West
v. Harris, 573 F.2d 873, 883 (5th Cir. 1978)).
229. West, 573 F.2d at 881. To justify that conclusion, the Fifth Circuit stated that "the flood
insurance program was a 'child of Congress, conceived to achieve policies which are national in scope, and
the federal government participates extensively in the program both in a supervisory capacity and
financially."' Id. (citation omitted).
230. Id.
The issue in Spence was a narrow one: whether federal or state law determined the statute of
limitations for bringing state law claims against a WYO. While we held that state law would
govern the statute of limitations for state law tort claims, we did not foreclose the possibility of
field or conflict preemption. Rather, our holding was premised on the fact that '[t]he NFIA
contains no express preemption provision' and '[n]either [the insurer] nor the federal
government as amicus suggests preemption of the state law fraud claim.'
Id. (citing Spence, 996 F.2d at 797 n.20); see also Wright, 415 F.3d at 389 n.3.
We endorsed the latter view in an unpublished decision, Richmond Printing LLC v. Dir. Fed.
Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 72 Fed. Appx. 92 (5th Cit. 2003). There, we reconciled West and
Spence as distinguishing between state law claims tied to the contract itself, which are
preempted, and extracontractual tort claims, which are not. We went on to hold that, while the
insured's state law claims against the WYO in that case were not preempted by federal law, they
were impossible of success.
Wright, 415 F.3d at 389 n.3.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. To reinforce its position, the Fifth Circuit cited decisions from other federal circuits and
stated: "We join these circuits in holding that state law tort claims arising from claims handling by a WYO
are preempted by federal law." Wright, 415 F.3d at 390. See C.E.R. 1988, Inc. v. The Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 386 F.3d 263, 265-66 (3rd Cir. 2004) (granting summary judgment on the ground that federal law
preempted state law claims); Gibson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 943, 948-50 (6th Cir. 2002)
(concluding that the NFIA preempted a state statutory action).
234. Gallup v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 341, 342 (5th Cir. Dec. 2005).
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(the Gallups) are the insured plaintiffs in the latter case. 23' The Gallups reside
in Covington, Louisiana, and purchased insurance from Omaha Property &
Casualty Insurance Company (Omaha).236 Like Allstate, Omaha is a WYO
insurer under the NFIP. 237
In 2002 and 2003, the Gallups purchased a SFIP contract from Omaha to
cover their house and its contents.238 On December 24, 2002 the plaintiffs'
property flooded (Flood I).239 The Gallups filed a POL with Omaha claiming
$210,000 in damages (Insurance Claim I).240 Omaha, however, only paid
$9,000, which covered the cost of replacing the soil beneath the Gallups'
home.24" '
In June 2003, the Gallups suffered another flood (Flood I).242 This flood
severely damaged the Gallups' house and caused part of the house to sag,
thereby undermining the piers that elevated the house.243 The homeowners
filed a second POL and asked Omaha to pay approximately $209,000, the total
replacement value of the house less the deductible (Insurance Claim Hl).24
Omaha denied the second claim after attempting unsuccessfully to settle
Insurance Claim I for a nominal sum.245
In December 2003, the Gallups filed a lawsuit against Omaha in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.' 6 The complaint
contained several mixed causes of action and allegations.247 First, citing the
insurer's failure to pay proceeds to satisfy Insurance Claim I, the Gallups filed
the following causes of action against Omaha: a federal common law breach
of contract and a statutory bad faith breach of contract under Louisiana Civil
Code Article 1997.248 And citing Omaha's denial of Insurance Claim II, the
disgruntled homeowners filed the following causes of action against the WYO
insurer: (1) a federal, common law breach of contract (2) a statutory bad faith
breach of contract under Louisiana Civil Code article 1997 and (3) a statutory















248. Id. (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1997 (1985)) ("An obligor in bad faith is liable for all the
damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his failure to perform.").
249. Id. (citing LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1997 and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220 (2006)). The
statute reads in pertinent part:
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More important, citing both Insurance Claims I and II, the Gallups also
alleged that Omaha breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing under federal common law. 250 But to repeat, this is only an allegation
and not a cause of action.25' So, we ask: To collect damages for this alleged
breach of covenant, which cause(s) of action did the Gallups advance? And
did that cause(s) of action sound in tort or in contract? Did the district court
and Fifth Circuit address this latter issue? Put simply, the answer is no. 2
Omaha filed a motion to dismiss in the federal district court, arguing that
an express preemption provision in the SFIP insurance contracts preempted the
Gallups' state law claims.253 The district court, however, found that Congress
did not authorize FEMA "to preempt the application of state laws to extra-
contractual claims. ''25 Therefore, finding that preemption was inconsistent
with the purposes of the NFIA, the district court denied Omaha's motion to
dismiss the Gallups' statutory bad faith breach of contract claim under
Louisiana Civil Code article 1997.255
A. An insurer, including but not limited to a foreign line and surplus line insurer, owes to his
insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims
fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the
claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable for any damages
sustained as a result of the breach.
B. Any one of the following acts, if knowingly committed or performed by an insurer,
constitutes a breach of the insurer's duties imposed in Subsection A:
(5) Failing to pay the amount of any claim due any person insured by the contract within sixty
days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the claimant when such failure is arbitrary,
capricious, or without probable cause.
(6) Failing to pay claims pursuant to R.S. 22:658.2 when such failure is arbitrary, capricious,
or without probable cause.
C. In addition to any general or special damages to which a claimant is entitled for breach of the
imposed duty, the claimant may be awarded penalties assessed against the insurer in an amount
not to exceed two times the damages sustained or five thousand dollars, whichever is greater.
Such penalties, if awarded, shall not be used by the insurer in computing either past or
prospective loss experience for the purpose of setting rates or making rate filings.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220 (2006).
250. Gallup, 434 F.3d at 343.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 344.
253. Id. at 343.
254. Id. at 343-44; see also, 44 C.F.R. pt. 61, App. A(l), Art. IX (2001). Effective December 31,
2000, FEMA proposed an amendment to the SFIP, which added the following language to Article IX of the
standard flood insurance policy:
IX. What Law Governs?
This policy and all disputes arising from the handling of any claim under the policy are
governed exclusively by the flood insurance regulations issued by FEMA, the National
Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 4001, et seq.), and Federal
common law.
44 C.F.R. pt. 61, App. A(1), Art. IX.
255. Gallup, 434 F.3d at 343-44.
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On the other hand, the district court granted Omaha's motion to dismiss
the homeowners' statutory bad faith adjustment action under Louisiana
Revised Statute Section 22:1220.256 To justify that ruling, the district court
found that 42 U.S.C. § 4072 governs all causes of action premised on a
violation of a flood insurance contract.257 In addition, the district court granted
the insurer's motion to dismiss the Gallups' "federal common law claims for
breach of good faith and fair dealing ...because [those] claims could be
asserted under Civil Code article 1997."258 The parties appealed their
respective adverse rulings.'9
As mentioned earlier, the Fifth Circuit cited its decision in Wright to
resolve the procedural conflict in Gallup.2 6° Again, in Wright, the court of
appeals declared that federal law preempts state law tort claims arising from
a WYO insurer's alleged misconduct under the NFIA.26' Therefore, in light
of Wright, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Gallup district court erred when
it denied Omaha's motion to dismiss the Gallups' statutory bad faith breach
of contract under Louisiana Civil Code article 1997.262 Contrary to the lower
court's ruling, the NFIA preempted all of the Gallups' tort-based and contract-
based causes of action.263 Furthermore, the NFIA preempted the homeowners'
claims or allegations premised on Omaha's alleged breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.2"
Once more, the Fifth Circuit's rulings in Wright and Gallup are
problematic for two important reasons. First, they conflict. The Wright panel
did not permit the insured to commence tort-based state law actions against
Allstate, a WYO insurer; but the Wright panel certainly allowed the insured
to file a breach-of-contract action against Allstate.265 In fact, in Wright, the
256. Id.
257. Id. at 344. Section 4072 of the NFIA allows suits against FEMA for claims on flood policies:
Adjustment and payment of claims; judicial review; limitations; jurisdiction
In the event the program is carried out as provided in section 1340 [42 U.S.C. § 40711, the
Director shall be authorized to adjust and make payment of any claims for proved and approved
losses covered by flood insurance, and upon the disallowance by the Director of any such claim,
or upon the refusal of the claimant to accept the amount allowed upon any such claim, the
claimant, within one year after the date of mailing of notice of disallowance or partial
disallowance by the Director, may institute an action against the Director on such claim in the
United States district court for the district in which the insured property or the major part thereof
shall have been situated, and original exclusive jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon such court
to hear and determine such action without regard to the amount in controversy.
42 U.S.C. § 4072.
258. Gallup, 434 F.3d at 344.
259. Id. at 343-44.
260. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
261. Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co, 415 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. June 2005).
262. Gallup, 434 F.3d at 345.
263. Id. To reiterate, the statute permits an insured to commence a bad faith breach-of-contract cause
of action, unlike § 22:1220, which allows a tort-based and arguably a contract-based cause of action. Id.
264. Id. at 344.
265. Wright, 415 F.3d at 385. The following justices comprised the Fifth Circuit Wright panel:
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Fifth Circuit panel even'allowed Allstate to raise the doctrine of equitable
estoppel, which is a defense to a breach-of-contract action and a source of
major contention in Wright.266
However, in Gallup, a different Fifth Circuit panel declared that the NFIA
preempts all of the insureds' state law actions-both tort-based and contract-
based actions.267 In light of the conflict between the Wright and Gallup panels,
what is the current law of the Fifth Circuit? Which case controls? And even
assuming that Wright presents the superior holding, a second problem exists:
in both Wright and Gallup, the insureds accused the WYO insurers of
breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.268
The latter is only an allegation rather than a cause of action.
Consequently, to collect damages, plaintiffs must cite a viable cause of action
and prove the breach-of-an-implied-covenant claim along with other
elements. 269  The important question is which cause of action is the more
appropriate theory of recovery to secure damages-actions sounding in tort,
actions sounding in contract, or actions sounding in both.
A clear majority of jurisdictions have embraced this common law rule:
Every contract-including insurance contracts-contains an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. 27° And when there is an alleged breach of that
covenant, the insured or insurer may commence a lawsuit that sounds either
in tort, contract, or both.27' To be sure, Louisiana courts have embraced and
applied this rule.272 For example, in Hogan v. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Co., a Louisiana court of appeals stated:
Circuit Justices Garwood, Garza and Benavides. Id. The case originated in Texas. Id.
266. Id.
267. Gallup, 434 F.3d at 344-45. The following justices comprised the Fifth Circuit Gallup panel:
Circuit Justices Davis, Smith and Dennis. Id. The case originated in Louisiana. Id.
268. Id.; Wright, 415 F.3d at 385-86.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 213-19.
270. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACrs § 205 (1981). This section states:
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance
and its enforcement.
Good faith performance. Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in
performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. . . . A complete
catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are among those which
have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence
and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms,
and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance.
Id. at § 205 & Comment d.
271. Cf Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1036-37 (Cal. 1973) (reaffirming that an
insurer has a duty of fairness and good faith to its insured and that courts impose this duty, the breach of
which sounds in both contract and tort, because "[tihere is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in every contract [including insurance policies] that neither party will do anything which will injure the right
of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement") (citing Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d
198, 200 (Cal. 1958)).
272. See Hogan v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 649 So. 2d 45, 52 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
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It is well-settled under California law that, if an insurer fails to deal fairly and
in good faith with [its] insured by refusing, without proper cause, to
compensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy .... this conduct may
give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. 73
Also, on several occasions, the Texas Supreme Court ruled and
reaffirmed its ruling that an insurer's breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing allows the insured to commence a cause of action that
sounds in tort.274 On other occasions, the Supreme Court of Texas has allowed
insureds to commence a contract-based cause of action against insurers when
the latter allegedly breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.275 In Union National Life Insurance Co. v. Crosby, the Mississippi
Supreme Court also held that "a breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing
arises from the existence of a contract between parties," but a suit for
breaching the covenant sounds either in tort or contract, or in both.276
Therefore, whether a breach arises from a duty of good faith and fair
dealing or from a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
the states in the Fifth Circuit allow complaining parties to commence a cause
277of action sounding in contract. in Wright and Gallup, the court of appeals
273. Id. An insured may also commence a contract base action in Louisiana, because Hogan cited
Brandt v. Superior Court, 693 P.2d 796,798 (Cal. 1985), which cited Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co. 510 P.2d
1032, 1036 (Cal. 1973) which declared that the breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
sounds in both contract and tort. See id.
274. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 904 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1995) (reaffirming that an
"insurer's failure to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured [allows the insured to commence] a cause
of action that sounds in tort, [which] is distinct from the contract cause of action for the breach of the terms
of an underlying insurance policy." (citing Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987); Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 212-13 (Tex. 1988); Viles v. Sec. Nat'l Ins.
Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990)).
275. At. Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Butler, 137 S.W.3d 199, 222-23 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004,
pet. denied). Regarding a first party lawsuit filed by an insured against an insurer based on an agreed
judgment, "the insurer's contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing only extends to signing of the agreed
judgment; consequently, any cause of action that the insured may have against the insurer based on the
agreed judgment sound in contract, not in tort." Id. (citing Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Boyte, 80
S.W.3d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 2002); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Tex. 1997)); see
also United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Pennington, 810 S.W.2d 777, 783 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ
denied).
In order for a tort duty to arise out of a contractual duty ... ,the liability must arise "independent
of the fact that a contract exists between the parties": the defendant must breach a duty imposed
by law rather than by the contract. If the defendant's conduct would impose liability on him
only because it breaches the parties' agreement, the claim is contractual. The [Texas Supreme
Court] also looked to the nature of the plaintiff's loss in determining whether the claim sounded
in contract or tort. "When the only loss or damage is to the subject matter of the contract, the
plaintiff's action is ordinarily on the contract." Economic loss to the subject matter of the
contract does not give rise to tort liability."
Pennington, 810 S.W.2d at 783 (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Delanney, 809 S.W.2d 493,494 (Texas 1991)).
276. United Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 870 So. 2d 1175, 1182 (Miss. 2004).
277. See id.
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did not address this critical issue.278 Consequently, the Fifth Circuit's
procedural rulings against the homeowners were arguably unfair. But more
important, a failure to thoroughly review this issue and the accompanying rules
seriously undermined the quality of the analyses in both cases.
3. Whether Under Texas Law an Excess Flood Insurer Has a Duty to
Indemnify an Insured for Flood-Related Damages Assuming that the
Insured Mistakenly Insured Against the Wrong Peril
The Fifth Circuit's final flood-insurance decision appears in Wentwood
Woodside I, LP v. GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corp.2 7 9 Wentwood
Woodside I, L.P. (Wentwood) is a single-asset limited partnership organized
under the laws of Texas. 28 ' Although the precise organizational structure is
unclear, Wentwood is affiliated with and under the common control of several
other single-asset partnerships.2"' These entities own more than fifty apartment
buildings across the country. 28 2 Seven single-asset partnerships are located in
Houston, Texas, and each one owns an apartment complex in Houston.2 3
More specifically, Wentwood Hartford D Partners (Wentwood Hartford)
owns the Wentwood Hartford apartments (Hartford Complex) and Wentwood
St. James, L.P. (Wentwood St. James) owns the Wentwood St. James
apartments (St. James Complex).2 4 Wentwood purchased Woodside Village
Apartments (Woodside Village) in Houston.2 5 Pinnacle Realty Management
Company (Pinnacle) is a management company with its principal place of
business located in Tacoma, Washington.286 At all relevant times, Pinnacle
managed Woodside Village and the other seven Houston properties. 87
Column Financial and an unidentified New York common law trust-a
real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC)-are commercial lenders.2 8
278. See discussion supra Part Dl.C.
279. Wentwood Woodside I, LP v. GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp., 419 F.3d 310, 311 (5th Cir.
July 2005).








288. See Column Financial, http://www.columnfinancial.com/MyColumn/info/view.aspx (last visited
Mar. 14, 2007). Since its founding in August 1993, Column has been in the commercial real estate loan
origination business:
Our primary business is to originate, underwrite and close commercial mortgage loans. Loans
are funded directly by Column. The closed mortgage loans are then aggregated into pools and
securitized. Credit Suisse provides underwriting, rating agency, structuring and distribution
expertise for Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities.... Column provides a local presence
to enable borrowers and mortgage bankers to originate individual loans. We have 16 production
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Without knowing more, the two financial service companies are affiliated. 289
More significant, neither the REMIC nor Column Financial is a federally
regulated lending institution. 290 As sole grantor, Wentwood executed a deed
of trust with Column Financial, the deed of trust beneficiary.29' On December
30, 1996, the partnership secured a $5,950,000 commercial loan from the
lender to finance the purchase of Woodside Village.292
GMAC Commercial Mortgage Corporation (GMAC) (presently doing
business as Capmark) manages one of the world's largest servicing portfolios
thereby allowing its clients to outsource all of their commercial loan servicing
needs or select specific services to be performed either in the client's or
GMAC's name.293 Therefore, the partnership selected GMAC to service
Wentwood's deed-of-trust mortgage on the Woodside Village apartments.294
Under the deed of trust, Wentwood had an express contractual duty to
purchase adequate flood insurance to cover the Woodside Village
apartments. 29' And given that GMAC serviced the loan, GMAC had a
contractual duty to ensure that Wentwood insured the property against a
specific peril-floods.2
As discussed above, Congress enacted the NFIA and established the
NFIP.297 FEMA, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security,
administers the program. 98 Among other responsibilities, FEMA categorizes
geographical areas from high to low risk, based on an area's likelihood of
flooding.z9 On April 20, 2000, FEMA determined that Houston, Texas was
located in a special flood hazard area (SFHA)-Flood Zone A.3°
Partially adhering to its contractual obligations, GMAC sent separate
letters to Wentwood Hartford and Wentwood St. James on September 19,
offices throughout North America to provide local services to borrowers.... Column has closed
in excess of 6,400 commercial mortgage loans, with an aggregate principal balance of over $79
billion.
Id. "The trustee for the REMIC is LaSalle Bank of Chicago. LaSalle merely holds the REMIC's assets in
trust[, but LaSalle] is not the lender and is not at risk in the event of default by any of the REMIC's debtors,




292. Id. The record is unclear, but the New York common law trust likely initially acquired the debt
and continued to carry the commercial loan. Id.
293. See Capmark, http://www.capmark.com/capmark/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2007).
294. Wentwood, 419 F.3d at 312 n.l. 'The mortgage documents of the seven other Houston
properties are not in the record. An affidavit of Wentwood's attorney states, 'on information and belief,'
that each of the eight separate loans on the eight separate Houston properties is included in the same REMIC
and that all loans in the REMIC are serviced by GMAC." Id.
295. Id. at 312.
296. Id.
297. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2000).





2000.01 GMAC reported that FEMA rezoned its properties-Woodside
Village and Wentwood St. James-and that its complexes were currently
located in a SFHA. s02 GMAC also told Wentwood Hartford and Wentwood
St. James to purchase flood insurance to cover its SFHA properties.03 GMAC
did not send a notification letter to Wentwood even though Woodside Village
was located in the same SFHA.3°
Although GMAC addressed the letters to Wentwood Hartford and
Wentwood St. James, the management company, Pinnacle, received the letters
at its headquarters in Tacoma, Washington.305 Later, Pinnacle forwarded the
two letters to Boreal Properties, L.L.C. (Boreal), Pinnacle's independent
contractor that co-managed the eight apartment complexes in Houston .30
Ultimately, Boreal' s risk manager, Janet Barnes, received the letters as she was
responsible for insuring the Houston properties. 3 7 But, no evidence that
Barnes purchased specified risk insurance to cover the properties located in the
SFHA existed.08 Additionally, in the letters, GMAC promised that it would
purchase, at the partnerships' expense, the specified-risk insurance to cover the
SFHA properties, however, GMAC did not.3°
Later in 2000, the consortium of partnerships, including Wentwood,
contacted another agent, Graoch Associates (Graoch).3 '0 Assuming that
primary insurance covered the apartment complexes, the partnerships
instructed Graoch to secure excess insurance for the properties.31' Graoch
retained the services of Lockton Companies, Inc. (Lockton), an insurance
brokerage firm, and instructed Lockton to purchase a single excess property
insurance policy that would cover every apartment complex, including the
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 312-13.





309. Id. at 312, 314; see, e.g., Poulton v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Cos., 675 N.w.2d 665, 670 (Neb.
2004) (observing that a property insurance contract can insure against "specific perils" or "named perils").
A specific perils policy "exclude[s] all risks not specifically included in the contract" ... and is
the converse of an all-risks or open perils policy, which provides coverage for all direct losses
not otherwise excluded .... Consequently, in order for there to be coverage for damage to
personal property under the [insurance contract], the damage to the personal property must arise
out of [the] listed perils.
Poulton, 675 N.W.2d at 670. "[Ulnder all-risks policies, 'all risks are included in the coverage unless
specifically excluded in the terms of the contract."' Id. (quoting 7 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla,
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 101:7, 101-17 to 101-18 (1997). "All-risks insurance is a special type of
insurance extending to risks not usually contemplated, and generally allows recovery for all fortuitous
losses, unless the policy contains a specific exclusion expressly excluding the loss from coverage." Id.
(quoting Jane Massey Draper, Annotation, Coverage Under All-Risk Insurance, 30 A.L.R. 5th 170 (1995)).
310. Wentwood,419F.3dat313.
311. Id. at 314.
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Woodside Village.31 2 Lockton contacted Royal Specialty Underwriting
(Royal) and purchased excess insurance from the insurer.3"3 Royal's standard
excess property insurance contract covered flood damage generally. 314 On the
other hand, the excess policy excluded property located in an SFHA.3' 5 To
circumvent that exclusion, however, a property owner could purchase "an
exception to the exclusion for an additional premium., 3
16
A Lockton representative and Richard McAdam, a property underwriter
for Royal, negotiated the terms of the excess insurance contract.3"7 During the
negotiations, McAdam asked specifically whether any of the partnerships'
properties were located in an SFHA.318 Lockton's representative only
identified three SFHA properties---one each in Ohio, North Carolina, and
Texas.319 Among the eight apartment complexes in Texas, Lockton's agent
only identified the Wentwood St. James complex in Houston.320 Lockton's
agent did not identify Wentwood's property, the Woodside Village.321
After reviewing Lockton's efforts and suggestions, Graoch decided to
purchase a one-year, excess insurance policy from Royal.322 The effective date
of coverage was November 27, 2000, but Woodside Village was not covered
under the excess policy for floods because "the premium... did not
incorporate the risk of insuring the Woodside Village against flood
damage.'"323 In its entirety, the "covered perils" provision in Royal's excess
insurance contract stated:
Perils Covered: All Risk including Flood and Earthquake except excluding
California Earthquake and excluding Flood in Zone A or V except at:
1) 2400 West Shore Blvd. Columbus, OH, 2) 215 Rippling Stream Rd.,
Durham, NC, 3) 9109 Fondron [sic] Road, Houston, TX.324
312. See generally Lockton: The Company, http://www.lockton.com/default.asp (last visited Mar.
14, 2007).
Lockton Companies is one of the largest, most respected and experienced insurance brokerage
firms in the country. We provide our clients with insurance, surety and risk management
services while maintaining a superior level of customer service. We also offer our clients
technologically advanced resources and global capabilities. We work to anticipate needs of our
clients and offer proactive recommendations. These distinct characteristics put Lockton in a
class by itself.
Id.











324. Id. The Woodside Village Apartments are located at 2400 Hackett, Houston, TX 77008.
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A few months after purchasing the excess insurance, Graoch decided to
switch primary carriers.3" Therefore, representing the consortium of
partnerships, Graoch purchased a one-year, primary insurance contract from
Lexington Insurance Company (Lexington).326 The effective date for the
primary coverage was April 28, 2001 .327 The policy limit was $1,000,000.328
More relevant, the primary insurance contract fully insured the eight SFHA
properties, without exclusions, against floods. 329 Thus, when the hurricane
season began in 2001, Woodside Village had primary flood insurance, but it
did not have any coverage under an excess insurance contract.33°
On June 9, 2001, Tropical Storm Allison struck Houston, bringing
extensive flooding to the area, with Woodside Village Apartments sustaining
more than $4,000,000 in losses. 33' A few days after the storm, Wentwood filed
a notice-of-loss claim with Lexington, the primary insurer.332 Immediately,
Lexington paid the policy limit-$1 ,000,000. 333 Shortly thereafter, Wentwood
filed a second notice-of-loss claim with Royal, its allegedly excess insurer.334
Royal refused to pay, insisting that Woodside Village was located in an SFHA
and that Graoch did not purchase excess coverage for Woodside Village.335
About one year later, Wentwood filed a complaint in a Texas court
alleging that Royal breached an excess insurance contract and violated the
Texas Insurance Code.336 Wentwood also sued GMAC, listing multiple causes
of action.337 First, Wentwood filed a common law negligence action against
GMAC, arguing that GMAC breached an affirmative duty to notify Wentwood
if FEMA rezoned the Woodside Village property and listed it as an SFHA
property.338 Second, Wentwood filed a common law negligence action against
GMAC, claiming that GMAC was negligent per se for breaching a statutory
duty under 42 U.S.C. § 4012a of the NFIA. 3 3' Finally, Wentwood also sued
Pinnacle Realty, http://www.pinnaclerealty.com/Main/property-listings/property-detail.aspx?state=TX&
city=Houston (last visited Apr. 1, 2007).
325. Wentwood, 419 F.3d at 313-14.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 313.
328. Id.
329. Id.






336. Id. The decision does not identify the exact statute under the Texas Insurance Code. See id.
A fair reading of the decision suggests that Wentwood cited statutory violations under the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act and the Texas Insurance Code. See id.; TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46, 17.50
(Vernon 2002) (listing deceptive acts and consumer's remedies); TEx INS. CODE ANN. §§ 541.060(a),
542.003 (Vernon 2002) (formerly TEx INs. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 § 4(10), art. 21.21).
337. Wentwood, 419 F.3d at 314.
338. Id.
339. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 4012a outlines the amount and type of flood insurance purchase and compliance
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GMAC for allegedly breaching its statutory duty under 42 U.S.C. § 4012a to
obtain adequate flood insurance coverage for properties located in SFHAs.4 °
Royal removed the case to the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. 341 The district court granted Royal and GMAC's motions for summary
judgment. 34 2 The district court refused to embrace Wentwood's argument:
Wentwood's failure to purchase the appropriate type of excess insurance for
Woodside Village was a mistake; but an "errors and omissions" clause in the
Lexington primary insurance policy excused Wentwood's mistake.343
Wentwood appealed the case."
To determine whether Royal breached various contractual, tort-based, and
statutory duties, the Fifth Circuit examined the errors and omissions clause in
Lexington's primary insurance contract. 4 5 That provision reads: "Any
unintentional error or omission made by the Insured shall not void or impair
the insurance hereunder provided the Insured reports such error or omission
as soon as reasonably possible after discovery."'
Before the court of appeals, Wentwood argued that Royal incorporated
Lexington's errors and omissions clause into Royal's excess insurance
contract.347 To support that assertion, Wentwood cited the "maintenance of
requirements, and it states:
(a) Amount and term of coverage
After the expiration of sixty days following December 31, 1973, no Federal officer or agency
shall approve any financial assistance for acquisition or construction purposes for use in any area
that has been identified by the Director as an area having special flood hazards and in which the
sale of flood insurance has been made available under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
[42 U.S.C.A. § 4001 et seq.], unless the building or mobile home and any personal property to
which such financial assistance relates is covered by flood insurance in an amount at least equal
to its development or project cost (less estimated land cost) or to the maximum limit of coverage
made available with respect to the particular type of property under the National Flood Insurance
Act of 1968 [42 U.S.C.A. § 4001 et seq.], whichever is less: Provided, That if the financial
assistance provided is in the form of a loan or an insurance or guaranty of a loan, the amount of
flood insurance required need not exceed the outstanding principal balance of the loan and need
not be required beyond the term of the loan. The requirement of maintaining flood insurance
shall apply during the life of the property, regardless of transfer of ownership of such property.
42 U.S.C. § 4012a (2000).
340. Wentwood, 419 F.3d at 314.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 314-15.
Wentwood concedes... that the Royal policy.., did not identify the Woodside Village as a
property [that was exempted] from Royal's blanket exclusion from flood coverage of any
property in an SFHA .... Graoch never asked for SFHA coverage for the Woodside Village
and never paid for such coverage .... Wentwood contends, however, that this failure to insure
the Woodside Village was an oversight that is nullified by the Errors and Omissions clause of
Lexington's primary policy.
Id.





primary insurance" provision in the excess insurance contract, which reads in
pertinent part:
In respect of the perils hereby insured against, this Policy is subject to the
same warranties, terms and conditions.., as are contained in or as may be
added to the policy/ies of the primary insurer(s) prior to the happening of a
loss for which claim is made hereunder, and should any alteration be made
in the premium for the policy/ies of the primary insurer(s), then the premium
hereon shall be adjusted accordingly.34
After carefully reviewing both provisions, the Fifth Circuit panel
delivered an intelligible analysis and a correct decision regarding Royal's
alleged liability. First, the court of appeals observed that Wentwood' s agents,
Graoch and Lockton, were not the named insureds under the primary insurance
contract. 349 They negotiated and purchased the Royal excess insurance
contract on behalf of Wentwood. 350 Therefore, assuming that an error or an
omission had been committed, the Fifth Circuit found that someone other than
the insured made the mistake.35' But note: The appellate court found no error
or omission because Lockton knew Woodside Village was in an SFHA.352
The court of appeals also stressed that even assuming that Wentwood
committed an unintentional error or omission by failing to purchase a Royal
excess flood insurance policy to cover Woodside Village, the "maintenance of
primary insurance" clause in Royal's excess coverage policy incorporated
Lexington's error and omission clause only if Wentwood had insured against
flooding in an SFHA under Lexington's primary insurance contract. 353
Furthermore, the "Excess Physical Damages Schedule" in Royal's excess
policy clearly listed the covered perils, and the schedule did not include
"flooding of Woodside Village in a SFHA" as an insured peril. 35 4
Applying Texas's plain meaning rule, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling, stating: "[The] undisputed facts of this case establish





352. Id. Evidence existed that "Barnes did not know the Woodside Village was in an SFHA when
Graoch bought the policy, but there [was] no basis in the record for treating Barnes' knowledge, or lack
thereof, as equivalent to Graoch's or Lockton's knowledge." Id.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 315-16.
Nevertheless, even if we were to assume that the Errors and Omissions clause was incorporated
into the Royal policy with respect to the Woodside Village, it still would not apply. The Errors
and Omissions clause states that an unintentional error will not "void or impair the insurance
hereunder[.]" The errors and omissions clause, in other words, applies only to insured risks.
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Village. 355 Therefore, because Wentwood did not purchase "an exception to
the exclusion for an additional premium" and Royal's excess policy did not
incorporate Lexington's errors and omissions clause, the Fifth Circuit declared
that Royal had no duty to reimburse Wentwood for flood-related property
losses in a SFHA.356
Again, the district court granted GMAC' s summary judgment motion, but
on appeal, Wentwood argued that the lower court's adverse ruling was
unwarranted.35 7 Wentwood argued that GMAC had assumed a common law
duty to notify Wentwood of changes to FEMA's flood maps.358 Second,
Wentwood argued that GMAC' s failure to discharge an alleged statutory duty
under the NFIA gave rise to a cause of action under Texas law for negligence
per se.3 5
9
To support its first argument that GMAC breached a common law duty,
Wentwood cited § 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the
other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such
harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the
undertaking.3 °
Wentwood maintained that GMAC assumed a duty to notify the single-asset
partnership in September 2000, when GMAC sent separate letters of
notification to the other single-asset partnerships, Wentwood Hartford and
Wentwood St. James.36' Once more, those letters informed the latter two
partnerships that FEMA had rezoned the geographical location of their
respective properties.362
355. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Texas, 337 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. 1960) (reiterating
that courts must give words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when no ambiguity exists);
see also Sulzer Carbomedics, Inc. v. Or. Cardio-Devices, Inc., 257 F.3d 449, 457 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating
that an unambiguous contract "must be enforced as written, looking at the objective intent as manifested by
the language used, rather than interpreting it by attempting to divine the subjective intent of the parties."
(citing Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981))).
356. Wentwood, 419 F.3d at 316 ("In light of the conclusion that Wentwood never insured the
Woodside Village against flood damage, Wentwood's lawsuit is in effect an attempt to retroactively
purchase excess insurance for a loss that has already been realized.").
357. Id. at 317.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965); see, e.g., Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46
S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex. 2000); Colonial Say. Ass'n v. Taylor, 544 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Tex. 1976) (affirming
Texas' adoption of section 323).




The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed, stating that Wentwood's assertion
was inconsistent with the plain language in § 323.363 The court of appeals
found that GMAC did not assume a duty to render or undertake any
notification services for Wentwood's benefit.36 In addition, GMAC
indisputably gave notice to Wentwood Hartford and Wentwood St. James
about matters affecting their respective properties.365 From the Fifth Circuit's
perspective, those notices did not establish that GMAC created an affirmative
duty to notify Wentwood about matters that could affect Wentwood's
Woodside Village apartments.
36
Finally, the court of appeals considered Wentwood's negligence per se
and statutory actions under the National Flood Insurance Program. 367 At the
outset, the Fifth Circuit examined Texas's negligence per se rule.368 In Perry
v. S.N., the Texas Supreme Court declared: "The threshold questions in every
negligence per se case are whether the plaintiff belongs to the class that the
statute was intended to protect and whether the plaintiffs injury is of a type
that the statute was designed to prevent.' ' 369 But taken alone, those rules were
not helpful because the Texas Supreme Court and lower courts in Texas have
never addressed the question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 4012a protects a class of
persons like Wentwood and gives them the right to commence a private right
of action.37 °
To determine how the Texas Supreme Court would answer the question,
the Fifth Circuit decided to make an Erie guess.37 ' The court of appeals began
363. Id.
364. Id. (citing Torrington, 46 S.W.3d at 837 ("Texas['s] law generally imposes no duty to take
action to prevent harm to others absent special relationships or circumstances."); Fort Bend County Drainage
Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Tex.1991)).
365. Id.
366. Id. at 319-20. The Fifth Circuit found the following:
GMAC only notified the affiliated but nevertheless legally separate and distinct independent
partnerships, Wentwood Hartford and Wentwood St. James. Indeed, the letters GMAC sent
were addressed specifically to these two partnerships. The only grantor and the only debtor in
the deed of trust is Wentwood Woodside I, L.P. The only property covered by the deed of trust
is Woodside Village. The only indebtedness secured thereby is the $5,950,000 debt for the
Woodside Village acquisition. The deed of trust does not mention any other indebtedness, nor
any property other than Woodside Village, nor does it mention Wentwood Hartford or
Wentwood St. James or give any indication that Wentwood Woodside I, L.P., is a party of any
affiliated group of entities; neither Wentwood Hartford nor Wentwood St. James has any interest
in Woodside Village (so far as this record shows) or any liability on the indebtedness secured
by the deed of trust thereon; nor (so far as this record shows) does Wentwood Westside have any
interest in any of the properties owned by Wentwood Hartford or by Wentwood St. James or any
liability on any indebtedness secured by any such property.
Id.
367. Id. at 321.
368. Id.
369. Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tex. 1998).
370. Id. at 323.
371. See, e.g., Primrose Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 564-65 (5th Cir. 2004).
This court must predict how the Texas Supreme Court would decide this issue. In making an
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its analysis by examining federal courts' decisions generally and Fifth Circuit
decisions in particular.372 Among the federal courts considering this question,
the present Fifth Circuit panel found that Congress enacted section 4012a to
protect the federal treasury rather than a class of individual mortgagors like
Wentwood.373 Therefore, the court of appeals guessed that "the Texas
Supreme Court would construe 42 U.S.C. § 4012a in a manner consistent with
the unanimous conclusion of the federal judiciary" and that the Texas Supreme
Court would not treat mortgagors as a protected class.374 Consequently, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that section 4012a of the NFIA did create a private
right of action, one that would allow Wentwood to sue GMAC for negligence
per se under Texas law.375
C. Property Insurance
1. Whether Under Louisiana Law a Subcontractor Was an "Other Assured"
Under a Builder's Risk Property Insurance Contract Thereby Preventing
the Insurer-the Alleged Subrogee-from Citing the Subrogation
Clause and Collecting Reimbursements from the Subcontractor
Although multiple procedural questions were raised in Texaco
Exploration and Production, Inc. v. AmClyde Engineered Products Co., Inc.,
they are not complicated or novel. 376 The central insurance-related question
was whether an insurer has a contractual right to commence a subrogation
action against a subcontractor who was allegedly responsible for damaging an
insured's property.377 The facts in Texaco, however, are lengthy and
complicated; they explain in part the Fifth Circuit's poorly reasoned analysis
and arguably incorrect conclusions.378
"Erie guess" in a diversity case, this court will "seek guidance by looking to the precedents
established by intermediate state appellate courts only when the state supreme court has not
spoken on an issue." However, if "convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of
the state would decide otherwise," this court will not defer to the decisions of the intermediate
state appellate courts.
Id. (quoting Webb v. City of Dallas, 314 F.3d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 2002); Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent
Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 2002)).
372. Wentwood, 419 F.3d at 323.
373. See, e.g., Till v. Unifirst Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152, 159-61 (5th Cir. 1981);
Hofbauer v. Nw. Nat'l Bank, 700 F.2d 1197, 1201 (8th Cir. 1983); Arvai v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
698 F.2d 683, 684 (4th Cir. 1983); Mid-America Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. First Sav. & Loan Ass'n of South
Holland, 737 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1984).
374. Wentwood, 419 F.3d at 323.
375. Id. ("No error [was] shown in the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
GMAC.").
376. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Eng'rd Prods. Co., 448 F. 3d 760, 765 (5th Cir.
May, 2006).
377. Id.
378. See id. at 765-66.
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Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. and Marathon Oil Company
(Texaco) develop oil and gas fields.3 79 During the late 1990s, Texaco secured
an offshore federal lease on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)."' The lease
block is located in approximately 1750 feet of water off the coast of Alabama
and Louisiana.38 ' The development project is called Petronius. 382  Texaco
hired J. Ray McDermott, Inc. (McDermott) to develop the site.383 In the
construction of the Petronius compliant tower, McDermott mounted a crane,
manufactured by the defendant's predecessor, onto a barge.384 The crane was
to lift a section of the platform, the South Deck Module, onto the support
frame.385 During this process, the platform section fell to the ocean floor.386
The module was never recovered and the construction of the Petronius
compliant tower was delayed fifteen months.38 7
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (Underwriters) insured the
Petronius project as well as the lost South Deck Module under a builder's risk
property insurance contract.38 Several relevant sections appeared in the
insurance contract: a general conditions clause, a section that covers third party
legal and contractual liabilities, and a provision that covers physical damage.38 9
Texaco was a principal assured under the policy, and consequently,
Underwriters reimbursed to Texaco more than $72 million for the covered
losses, including the loss of the South Deck Module.3 '
Shortly thereafter, Texaco filed multiple negligence and products liability
actions against Clyde's successors, AmClyde and Halter, in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 39' Texaco argued that both were
responsible for causing the losses.392 Underwriters also commenced a
subrogation-of-rights action against AmClyde and J. Ray McDermott
379. Id.
380. Id. at 766.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 765.
The contract charged McDermott with the engineering design, drafting, fabrication, installation,
and construction of the Petronius compliant tower platform and its components, including the
foundation piles, tower, support frame, two deck modules (the North Deck Module and the South
Deck Module), and attendant drilling rigs at Viosca Knoll Block 786.
Id.
383. Id. at 765-66 ("The Petronius project was a $400 million deepwater drilling and production









392. Id. Although not relevant in this presentation, this suit proceeded under the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act and admiralty law. Id. Consequently subject matter jurisdiction and admiralty questions
arose. Id. at 766-67.
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International Vessels, Ltd (JRMIV), seeking indemni-fication for the
reimbursement that Underwriters paid Texaco under the terms of the builder's
risk policy.393 Underwriters did not sue McDermott because McDermott was
an additional named assured under the builder's risk policy.
394
But JRMIV claimed that it was an other assured or an additional assured
under the insurance contract because it was McDermott's affiliate or
subcontractor.395 Consequently, JRMIV argued that the waiver of subrogation
clause in the insurance policy barred Underwriters' suit against JRMIV.
396
Regarding Underwriters' subrogation claim, the district court granted
AmClyde's motion for summary judgment.397 The district found that
AmClyde was indeed an additional assured under the builder's risk policy;
therefore, the company was entitled to a waiver of subrogation.398 JRMIV also
moved to dismiss Underwriters' subrogation action, citing language in the
insurance contract. 399 The district court granted JRMIV's summary judgment
motion finding that JRMIV was also an additional assured.4 Consequently,
JRMIV was able to defend itself by asserting a waiver of subrogation."
Underwriters separately appealed the district court's summary judgment
to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.4 2 On appeal, Underwriters
argued: To qualify as an "other assured party" under the builder's risk policy,
AmClyde and JRMIV had to establish the presence of a written contract
between them and Texaco-the principal assured under the insurance
contract." 3 To determine whether Underwriters' argument was sound, the
Fifth Circuit examined the principal assured clause in the insurance contract. 4
That provision reads in relevant part:
The principal assureds are defined as
(1) Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. and/or Marathon Oil Company
Inc. and/or associated partners in the Petronius Project and/or as may
be agreed hereon.
(2) Parent and/or subsidiary and/or affiliated and/or associated and/or inter-
related companies of the above as they now exist or may hereafter be
constituted and their Directors, Officers and/or employees and/or other
participants as may be agreed.
393. Id.








402. Id. at 776.
403. Id. at 776-77.
404. Id. at 777 n.14.
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(3) Project managers, if applicable."°5
Then the Fifth Circuit compared the language in the principal assured
clause with that appearing in the other assured provision in the builder's risk
insurance contract. 4°6 The latter clause states:
J. Ray McDermott, Inc. and/or Gulf Island Fabrication, Inc. and/or W.H.
Linder & Associates, Inc. and/or Waldemar S. Nelson and Company, Inc.
and/or Project Consulting Services, Inc. and/or other contractors and/or sub-
contractors and/or suppliers and any other company, firm, person or party
with whom the Assured(s) in (1), (2) or (3) of this Clause have, or in the past
had, entered into written agreement(s) in connection with the subject matters
of insurance, and/or any works, activities, preparations etc. connected
therewith. 7
A fair reading of the principal assured clause would allow an objective
reader to conclude that Texaco was the named assured and that AmClyde and
JRMIV were not conclusively Texaco's subsidiaries, associates or affiliates."°1
At best, based on the reported facts, AmClyde and JRMIV were Texaco's
subcontractors or suppliers.' Therefore, under the principal assured clause,
AmClyde and JRMIV were not assureds, and they did not claim to be assureds
under that clause. °
AmClyde and JRMIV, however, asserted that they were assureds under
the other assured clause.4t" ' But an objective observer would note that property
insurance only protects the named assured's interest from covered risks, and
the builder's risk policy covered Texaco's property, not AmClyde's or
JRMIV's property.4 2 To qualify as an additional assured under a personal
property insurance contract, a contractor, subcontractor, or suppliers must have
an insurable interest in the property." 3 Louisiana's property insurance statute
is clear:
A. No contract of insurance on property or of any interest therein or
arising therefrom shall be enforceable except for the benefit of
persons having an insurable interest in the things insured.
405. Id.






412. See Miller v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 412 So.2d 662, 669 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (embracing the
principle that one's securing property insurance to protect one's own interest, and one's interest alone, does
not inure to the benefit of another).
413. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:614 (2004).
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B. "Insurable interest" as used in this section means any lawful and
substantial economic interest in the safety or preservation of the
subject of the insurance free from loss, destruction, or pecuniary
damage.414
Of course, with an insurer's consent, subcontractors-like AmClyde and
JRMIV-may secure an insurable interest in another person's property if
evidence exists to prove that the subcontractors have a substantial pecuniary
or economic interest in the safety or preservation of another's property.41 5 A
written contract between the contractors and subcontractors can provide
evidence of an insurable interest.4"6 Thus, in the present case from
Underwriters' perspective, the builder's risk policy required a written
agreement before AmClyde or JRMIV could become an other assured.
The Fifth Circuit, however, did not cite or consider Louisiana's insurable
interest rules.417 Instead, the court concluded:
The clear construction of the [other assured] provision provides a list of
categories of assureds, separating each category by the conjunction
'and/or'.... Under the unambiguous language of the Builder's Risk Policy,
a contractor or subcontractor may be an other assured, irrespective of the
written agreement qualification."'
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings, finding that
AmClyde and JRMIV were assureds, thereby barring Underwriters' equitable
subrogation suit against the two alleged tortfeasors.419
414. Id.
"Insurable interest" as thus defined by our state legislature is consistent with the universally
recognized rule to the effect that a policy of insurance on property is predominately a contract
of indemnity the purpose of which is to protect the assured against any loss he may sustain by
virtue of its loss, damage or destruction. The great weight of authority further recognizes and
holds that an interest in the property protected is essential to the existence of a valid insuring
agreement and additionally serves to differentiate an enforceable indemnity agreement from a
wagering pact which latter transaction is invalid and unenforceable for reasons obviously
prompted by public policy and good morals. It is also generally recognized and held the interest
of the insured sought to be protected must have for its object the obviation of pecuniary or
financial loss to or liability of the assured which would otherwise result from damage to or
destruction of the insured property. If the loss or damage to the insured property does not expose
the insured to either direct, immediate or potential loss or liability, the insured is without
insurable interest therein.
Rube v. Pac. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 131 So.2d 240, 243 (La. Ct. App. 1961).
415. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
416. Texaco Exploration, 448 F.3d at 776-78.
417. See id.
418. Id. at 777-78.
419. Id. at 779.
Underwriters next argue... that AmClyde is not a subcontractor and therefore cannot qualify
as an other assured. . . . The record reflects that AmClyde is a subcontractor to Texaco's
[Vol. 39:843
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To be sure, the Fifth Circuit could have reached the same conclusion
more convincingly and intelligibly simply by (1) citing, applying, and
discussing Louisiana's doctrine of ambiguity more carefully; (2) declaring that
the other assured clause was ambiguous, rather than unambiguous;
(3) construing the unclear language in the other assured provision against
Underwriters; and (4) ruling in favor of AmClyde and JRMIV.42° Instead, the
courts of appeals focused on whether AmClyde and JRMIV were contractors
rather than on whether they had an insurable interest in Texaco's property
under the law of Louisiana.42' As a consequence, the Fifth Circuit delivered
two highly questionable rulings in Texaco.
Petronius tower construction project. AmClyde and McDermott entered a written agreement
requiring AmClyde's provision of work to McDermott and covering the work provided by
AmClyde to the Petronius tower construction project. The record also reveals that subject to its
contract with McDermott, AmClyde provided... services to the Petronius construction project
.... In light of the contractual agreement between AmClyde and McDermott, in combination
with AmClyde's provision of work to the Petronius project itself subject to that contract,
including the very lift of the deck module most closely tied to the property loss at the heart of
this case, AmClyde is a subcontractor to the Petronius tower construction project.... Also, the
allegations in Underwriters' own complaint support in part that Underwriters understood
AmClyde's status as a subcontractor. . . . [W]e affirm the district court's conclusion that
AmClyde is an "other assured" under the Policy on the basis that AmClyde was a subcontractor.
The record reflects AmClyde's subcontractor status in form of a written agreement to provide
work to McDermott and AmClyde's actual provision of work, under contract with McDermott,
related to the Petronius tower construction project. As subcontractor, under the Policy's
unambiguous language, AmClyde is an other assured. The policy provides for waiver of
subrogation against any assured and any entity or person "whose interests are covered by this
Policy." Thus, AmClyde is entitled to the waiver of subrogation.
[W]e similarly affirm the district court's conclusion that JRMIV was an other assured
entitled to waiver of subrogation. JRMIV argued before the district court that Underwriters
could not proceed in subrogation against it because of express waivers of subrogation in the
Builder's Risk Policy and because JRMIV is an other assured against whom subrogation is
waived.... The court held that Underwriters expressly waived rights of subrogation against it
as an insured in the Builder's Risk Policy because JRMIV qualified as an insured subcontractor.
The court also concluded that JRMIV is an affiliate or contractor/subcontractor under the waiver
of subrogation provision for affiliate entities and is also therefore entitled to waiver of
subrogation.
The district court correctly dismissed Underwriters' subrogation claim against JRMIV.
We affirm the district court's dismissal of Underwriters' suit seeking subrogation against
AmClyde and JRMIV. Each entity is an other assured entitle to waiver of subrogation.
Id. at 781-83.
420. Id. at 777 ("[T]he district court applied Louisiana law, and the parties (did] not contest the
choice of law."); see also Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So.2d 1134,1138 (La. 2002)
(repeating that an "ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who furnished the
contract's text and in favor of the insured").
421. Texaco Exploration, 448 F.3d at 777.
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2. Whether Under Texas Law a Property Insurer Has a Duty to Indemnify
an Insured Condominium Association for Expenses Associated with Hail-
Related Losses and Damages
Ridglea Estate Condominium Ass'n v. Lexington Insurance. Co. (Ridglea
I) was among the cases reported and reviewed during the Fifth Circuit's 2004-
2005 session.422 The broad question in Ridglea I was whether a property
insurer had a contractual duty to indemnify an insured condominium
association after the association filed a notice-of-loss claim and asked the
insurer to pay.423 Four specific substantive issues were raised in Ridglea I.424
The Fifth Circuit decided three satisfactorily and remanded the case to the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Texas with instructions.425
Recently, after reviewing its analysis of the fourth sub-issue in Ridglea
I, the Fifth Circuit decided that its Erie guess of how the Texas Supreme Court
would decide the issue was less than sound.4 26 Therefore, during the 2005-
2006 term, the Fifth Circuit withdrew its opinion in Ridglea I and substituted
a slightly revised opinion in Ridglea Estate Condominium Ass'n v. Lexington
Insurance Co. (Ridglea I1).427 The analyses and holdings in the original and
substituted opinions are identical, except for the court's analysis surrounding
the fourth sub-issue.428 This survey briefly reviews the salient facts in the case
and discusses only the fourth issue that the appellate court remanded to the
district court in Ridglea I.
Ridglea Estate Condominium Association (Ridglea) manages and
represents the interests of condominium owners in Fort Worth, Texas.429 In
July 2001, an inspector examined the roofs on the condominiums and
discovered much destruction. 430 At that time, Chubb Custom Insurance
(Chubb) insured the property.431 Ridglea submitted a claim to Chubb four
months later-in November of 2001.432 Chubb inspected the roofs and
concluded that a hail storm probably caused the damage.433
422. See Rice, supra note 5, at 858-64.
423. Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co. (Ridglea 1), 398 F.3d 332, 332 (5th Cir.
2005).
424. Id.
425. Id. at 339.
426. Id. at 337.
427. See Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co. (Ridglea 11), 415 F.3d 474,475 (5th Cir.
July 2005).
428. Id.







Problematically, the only hail storm in greater Fort Worth had occurred
six years earlier--on May 5, 1995.434 Chubb told Ridglea to file a notice-of-
loss claim to Lexington Insurance Company because Lexington insured the
property from February 1995 to February 1996.41' Ridglea submitted a claim
to Lexington immediately, and Lexington's claims adjuster inspected the
damaged roofs.436 Ultimately, Lexington concluded that the financial loss did
not exceed Ridglea's deductible under Lexington's property insurance
contract. 437 In addition, Lexington could not uncover any evidence proving
conclusively that the losses occurred during the policy period.4 38 As a result,
Lexington denied Ridglea's claim on December 19, 2001-six years, seven
months, and fourteen days from the purported loss on May 5, 1995.439
Following a year of negotiations and Ridglea' s demand for $449,198.63
and attorneys' fees, Lexington denied the claim again. 44° Shortly thereafter,
Lexington commenced a declaratory judgment action in U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas.441 The property insurer asked the federal
district court to declare that Lexington had no contractual duty to indemnify
Ridglea for hail-related losses." 2 The district court dismissed the declaratory
judgment suit, realigned the litigants, and made Ridglea the plaintiff in a
direct-action suit against Lexington." 3
Although the opinion did not state precisely Ridglea' s theory of recovery
in the underlying lawsuit, a fair guess suggests that Ridglea sued Lexington for
a breach of contract.4" Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. 544
Granting Lexington's motion, the district court held that Ridglea's failure to
comply with the policy's notice-of-loss requirement barred the direct-action
suit.4' The district court found that Ridglea had a contractual obligation to
give "'prompt notice of the loss or damage"' before filing the lawsuit.447 The
lower court also concluded that Ridglea did not satisfy another condition
precedent before filing the underlying lawsuit in that the aggrieved insured had
a duty to contact Lexington and "provide, as soon as possible[,] a description






439. Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co. (Ridglea 11), 415 F.3d 474,475-76 (5th Cir.
July 2005).




444. See id. (explaining that Ridglea sued Lexington for damages on the insurance policy).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. (quoting Ridglea's insurance policy).
448. Id.
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To repeat, the property destruction occurred in May 1995.449 But Ridglea
did not send a notice-of-loss to Lexington until November 2001 .450 Therefore,
the district court found that those six-plus years prejudiced Lexington because
the hail damage and financial loss were not reported "within a reasonable
time.,4 ' Ridglea appealed the district court's adverse summary judgment
ruling.452
Before the Fifth Circuit, Ridglea argued that the District Court for the
Northern District of Texas committed four reversible errors: (1) declaring that
Lexington did not waive its right to raise the breach of notice affirmative
defense; (2) concluding that the notice requirement was void as a matter of
public policy; (3) failing to find ambiguity in the notice provision, which
would have allowed the court to construe the notice clause against Lexington
and in favor of Ridglea; and (4) holding that Lexington did not have to show
prejudice, thereby allowing the insurer to proffer breach of notice as an
affirmative defense. 53
The Fifth Circuit addressed and quickly decided the waiver, public-
policy, and ambiguity issues.454  A thorough discussion of those issues and
holdings appear in the 2004-2005 review of the Fifth Circuit's insurance
decisions.455  The Ridglea I court of appeals decided the three questions in
favor of Lexington.456 More specifically, in Ridglea I, the Fifth Circuit
declared that (1) Lexington did not waive the notice-of-loss requirement,
(2) the notice-of-loss provision was not void and unenforceable as a matter of
public policy, and (3) the notice-of-loss provision was not ambiguous in light
of Texas's doctrine of ambiguity.457 Put simply, in Ridglea I, the Fifth Circuit
embraced the district court's conclusion that Ridglea' s giving notice of a loss
449. Id.
450. Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co. (Ridglea 1), 398 F.3d 332, 333 (5th Cir.
2005).
451. Id. at 334.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Id. at 334-38.
455. See Rice, supra note 5, at 821.
456. Ridglea 1, 398 F.3d at 334-38.
457. Id. at 335-36.
In sum, because Ridglea gave its notice of damage after the period for prompt notice had
expired, Lexington's subsequent general denial of liability likewise came "after the time limited
for giving notice' and thus did not constitute a waiver of the defense of late notice.... Ridglea
contends that 'interpreting the notice provision as requiring notice once the insured discovers
a loss.., would certainly be reasonable."
Id. at 335-37. The Fifth Circuit dismissed this argument, citing a prevailing rule under Texas common law:
When an insurance contract does not define "prompt," courts must construe the term to mean that "notice
must be given within a reasonable time after [an] occurrence." Id. (citing Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Modem
Exp., Inc., 757 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ); see St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Tri-
State Cattle Feeders, Inc., 628 S.W.2d 844, 846 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref d) (stating, in dicta,
that "[a]n ambiguous clause in an insurance policy [must] be strictly construed in favor of the insured").
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six-plus years after the hail damaged the condominium roofs was simply
unreasonable.4 5
But as reported in the 2004-2005 review, the Ridglea I court of appeals
refused to dismiss Ridglea's fourth argument as quickly.459 Ridglea argued
that the district court's finding that Lexington had no duty to show prejudice
when Ridglea breached the notice-of-loss provision was reversible error.4"
The district court adopted Lexington's argument that proof of prejudice applies
only if the dispute involves liability insurance contracts. 61 Contrarily, Ridglea
stressed that Texas law requires an insurer to show prejudice, regardless of the
type of policy, if an insurer intends to use breach-of-notice as an affirmative
defense.4 2 In Ridglea I, the Fifth Circuit endorsed Ridglea' s argument.4 3 Of
course, the appellate court made a questionable Erie guess about how the
Texas Supreme Court would address the issue. 4 Furthermore, the panel
reached that conclusion after relying in part on its dubious opinion in Hanson
Production Company v. American Insurance Company and citing Hernandez
v. Gulf Group Lloyds.465
In Hanson, a different Fifth Circuit panel cited the Texas State Board of
Insurance's order and concluded that Texas law requires an insurer to show
prejudice if that insurer intends to raise breach-of-notice as a defense against
paying proceeds under certain types of insurance policies. 466  The orders,
however, only required mandatory endorsements in general liability and
automobile insurance contracts. 7  The endorsement stated that if an
"insured's failure to comply with the requirement [does not prejudice the
insurer,] any provision of this policy requiring the insured to give notice of...
occurrence or loss... shall not bar liability under this policy.
468
In Hernandez, the Texas Supreme Court held that a violation of a
condition precedent in an insurance contract cannot bar an insured's right to
recover insurance proceeds, unless the insurer establishes that the violation
materially prejudiced the insurer's rights under the contract. 9 Therefore,
458. Ridglea 1, 398 F.3d at 335.
459. See Rice, supra note 5, at 862.
460. Ridglea 1, 398 F.3d at 333.
461. Id. at 337; see Hanson Prod. Co. v. Am. Ins. Co., 108 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir.1997).
462. Ridglea 1, 398 F.3d at 337.
463. Id.
464. Id. ("When deciding questions of state law, [the Fifth Circuit] is bound by Erie to rule as it
believes the state's supreme court would." (citing Browning Seed Inc. v. Bayles, 812 F.2d 999, 1002 (5th
Cir.1987))); see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938).
465. Hemandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 691 (Tex. 1994); Hanson, 108 F.3d at 627.
466. Hanson, 108 F.3d at 629.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 629 (quoting Texas State Board of Insurance, Order No. 23080).
469. Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 693.
In determining the materiality of a breach, courts will consider, among other things, the extent
to which the non-breaching party will be deprived of the benefit that it could have reasonably
anticipated from full performance. The less the non-breaching party is deprived of expected
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embracing Hanson, with its heavy reliance on the Texas State Board of
Insurance's order, and the decision in Hernandez, the Ridglea I appellate panel
guessed wildly and crafted an exceedingly broad rule to govern Texas cases.47
The panel stated:
Given ... the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning, and the general principle
underlying that reasoning, we conclude that the prejudice requirement applies
equally to all insurance policies issued in Texas, including the property
insurance policy at issue here. As such, we hold that the district court erred
in holding that Lexington was not required to show prejudice in order to raise
breach of the policy's prompt notice provision as a defense.47" '
In Ridglea M, the Fifth Circuit panel withdrew Ridglea rs broad ruling
and substituted the following:
In Hernandez, the Texas Supreme Court held that an insured's violation of
a settlement-without-consent provision was not a bar to recovery under an
uninsured motorist policy, unless the insurer could show that it was
prejudiced by the violation. The court made no reference to the orders by the
Board of Insurance; instead, the court based its holding on general principles
of contract interpretation .... Given the method of the Texas Supreme
Court's reasoning, and the general principle underlying that reasoning, we
conclude that the prejudice requirement applies to the property insurance
policy at issue here. As such, we hold that the district court erred in holding
that Lexington was not required to show prejudice in order to raise breach of
the policy's prompt notice provision as a defense... We emphasize that our
holding is a narrow one. We do not read Hernandez as necessarily creating
a prejudice requirement for all insurance policies issued in Texas." '472
benefit, the less material the breach [and prejudice].
We conclude, therefore, that an insurer who is not prejudiced . . . may not deny
coverage ....
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONTRACTS § 241(a) (1981)) (citations omitted); see Jack v. State,
694 S.W.2d 391, 398-99 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (embracing a fundamental
principle of contract law that states that when one party to a contract commits a material breach of that
contract, the other party has no contractual obligations to perform); see also Hanson, 108 F.3d at 630-3 1.
The Fifth Circuit later declared in Ridglea that the Texas Supreme Court's reasoning in Hernandez was
straightforward: "(1) all insurance policies are contracts; (2) all contracts require material breach to excuse
non-performance; and, (3) for a breach to be material, it must prejudice the non-breaching party in some
way. Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co. (Ridglea 1), 398 F.3d 332, 338 (5th Cir. 2005)
(citing Hanson, 108 F.3d at 630-31 (citing Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 692)).
470. See id. at 334-38.
471. Id. at 338. "This is, of course, consistent with our decision in Hanson, [in which] we held that
surplus lines insurers, who are not subject to the mandatory endorsements required by the Texas Department
of Insurance, are nonetheless required to show prejudice in order to raise late notice as a defense." Id.
(citing Hanson, 108 F.3d at 629).
472. Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co. (Ridglea I1), 415 F.3d 474,480 & n.4 (5th
Cir. July 2005) ("We have previously held, for example, that an insurer may deny coverage under a claims
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For the reasons appearing above, the panel in Ridglea 11 vacated the
district court's summary judgment motion in favor of Lexington and remanded
the case, ordering the lower court to determine whether Ridglea's breach of the
prompt notice provision allowed Lexington to raise prejudice as an affirmative
defense and whether a trial on the merits was required, if questions of fact
exist.473
3. Whether Under Texas Law an Excess Insurer Has a Duty to
Indemnify an Insured Corporation for Financial Losses After
an Employee Embezzled Corporate Funds
Previously in this survey, a discussion of the conflict and legal issues in
Wentwood appears.474 In that case, one of the issues concerned the extent of
the insured's rights under the primary and excess insurance contracts.475 In
particular, the insured partnership in Wentwood argued that the excess insurer
incorporated the primary insurer's errors and omissions clause into the excess
insurer's property insurance contract.476  Similarly, in Times-Picayune
Publication Corp. v. Zurich American Insurance Co., a secondary question
also concerns whether an excess insurance contract incorporates language that
appears in a primary insurance policy.477
Differences exist between the two cases.478 In Zurich, the excess insurer
rather than the insured argued for incorporation.4 79 And, a "prior loss clause"
in the primary insurance contract, rather than an errors and omissions clause,
was the focus of attention in Zurich.480  Also like Wentwood, the central
substantive question in Zurich is was fairly familiar: whether an excess insurer
has a duty to indemnify an insured.8' But in the latter case, the facts are much
more tedious, extensive, and complex.4 2
First, the dispute in Zurich involves several corporate entities.4 3 The
Times-Picayune Publishing Corporation (Times-Picayune) is a Louisiana
corporation with its principal place of business in New Orleans.4" Times-
made liability policy without a showing of prejudice. Whether other types of policies likewise fall outside
the scope of Hernandez is a question we need not reach." (citing Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul
Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 653, 659 (5th Cir.1999) (other citations omitted))).
473. Id. at 480.
474. See supra text accompanying notes 195-263.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 195-263.
476. See supra text accompanying notes 195-263.
477. Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005).
478. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 195-263.
479. Times-Picayune, 421 F.3d at 331.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 330.
482. See id. at 329-30.
483. Id.
484. See The Times-Picayune, http://www.times-picayune.com/moreinfo.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2007).
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Picayune's primary business activities are gathering news and publishing
newspapers." 5 Federal Insurance Company (Federal), a property and casualty
insurer, is an affiliate of the Chubb Group.486 Federal is an Indiana corporation
with its principal place of business in Indianapolis. 7 Zurich American
Insurance Company (Zurich-American)-Zurich North America Commercial
-is a subsidiary of the Swiss insurance giant, Zurich Financial Services 4 8
Zurich-American is a leading provider of commercial property and casualty
insurance and offers a range of insurance coverage for businesses of all
sizes. 489 Zurich-American is a New York corporation.4' In this dispute,
Federal and Zurich-American are the primary and excess insurers,
respectively. 9
Times-Picayune purchased six primary insurance contracts from Federal
which insured against various perils, including acts of employee dishonesty.492
Under each contract, Federal agreed to compensate Times-Picayune for losses
identified within one year after the policy ended-the discovery period-and
losses that occurred before the policy period if Times-Picayune satisfied
certain conditions.493 In addition, each primary contract insured against losses
that occurred during the policy period and required Times-Picayune to file a
notice-of-loss or POL within 120 days of discovering the loss.49  Those
contracts covered a six-year interval from January 1, 1995 to July 1, 2001.
The policy limit in each primary policy was $1,000,000.496
On July 1, 1996, Times-Picayune also purchased a one-year, excess
property insurance contract from Federal along with the second primary
insurance policy.4 97 The excess contract insured against losses exceeding the
$1,000,000 policy limit in the primary contract.498 Among other perils, the
excess contract insured against acts of employee dishonesty and resulting
485. Id.
486. See Chubb Grove, Subsidiaries, http://www.chubb.com/corporate/chubb2403.html (last visited
Mar. 14, 2007).
487. See Chubb Group, Federal Insurance, http://www.chubb.com/international/hk/terms.htnl (last
visited Mar. 14, 2007).
488. See Zurich in North America, http:/Iwww.zurichna.comlzuslaboutus.nsf/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2007).
489. Id.
490. Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 328, 329 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005).
491. Id. at 329-30.
492. Id. at 329.
493. Id. at 329 & n.l. Each primary policy provided: "DISCOVERY PERIOD. This insurance does
not cover any loss, sustained by any insured, discovered later than one year following termination of this
insurance in its entirety." Id.
494. Id. at 329.
495. Id. "The first of these primary policies ran from January 1, 1995, to July 1, 1996, and each
subsequent policy was for a one year term beginning July 1, with the sixth and final primary policy running
from July 1, 2000, to July 1, 2001." Id.
496. Id.




economic losses. 499 The policy limit of Federal's excess insurance contract
was $1,500,000." 0 On July 1, 1997, Times-Picayune renewed the one-year
excess contract with Federal.5°' On July 1, 1998, however, the Times-
Picayune switched excess carriers and purchased a three-year, $1,500,000
policy from Zurich-American. 502 The contract began on July 1, 1998 and
terminated on July 1, 2001.503
From January 1995 to December 2000, a Times-Picayune employee,
Arthur Anzalone, embezzled $2,205,879 from the Times-Picayune.5 4 The
illegal activities occurred over six years, during the interval that Federal
insured the Times-Picayune under the six primary contracts against acts of
employee dishonesty and other perils.50 5 After discovering the employee's
theft, the Times-Picayune contacted Federal, filing a notice-of-loss and
presenting proof of the loss. °6 Asserting that the consecutive primary
insurance contracts covered the loss, the newspaper asked Federal to pay.5 7
Without admitting any liability, Federal settled the Times-Picayune's
claim in December 2000.508 The primary insurer paid the full policy limit-
$ 1,000,000.' 09 After the settlement, however, the Times-Picayune still had an
outstanding loss of $1,205,879.510 Therefore, the newspaper contacted Zurich-
American, asking the excess insurer to pay the remainder.5 ' The Times-
Picayune filed a timely notice and POL, but Zurich-American refused to
reimburse the newspaper.
On September 19, 2002, the Times-Picayune sued the excess insurer in
a Louisiana state court, advancing several theories of recovery sounding in tort
and in contract: (1) a common law breach of the excess insurance contract;
(2) a bad faith breach-of-contract; (3) a statutory violation of good faith for the








Over the course of his crime, Anzalone stole: $536,428 during the term of Federal's first
primary policy (1/1/95-711196); $268,871 during the second policy (7/1/96-7/1/97); $234,707
during the third policy (7/1/97-7/1/98); $330,647 during the fourth policy (7/1/98-7/1/99);










513. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220(A) (2004).
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violation for the insurer's failure to pay a claim promptly-within thirty days
after receiving a satisfactory POL;5 4 and (5) a breach-of-contract action for
breaching an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.515
The Times-Picayune also filed a declaratory judgment action, petitioning
the state court for equitable relief.516 Zurich-American removed the case to the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana claiming diversity of
jurisdiction." 7 The district court partially granted Zurich-American's motion
for summary relief, citing language in both contracts5"8
More specifically, Zurich-American's excess insurance contract did
contain a "prior loss" provision; therefore, the excess contract was silent
regarding excluding losses discovered within one year after the policy expired,
or to losses occurring before the policy period.519 But in its motion for
summary relief, Zurich-American cited the prior loss clause in Federal's
primary insurance contract.520 The excess insurer also cited the coverage
clause in the excess insurance contract, which stated: "'[C]overage under this
policy shall apply [after the required primary coverage has been exhausted] in
conformance with and subject to the warranties, limitations, conditions,
provisions, and other terms of the [p]rimary [p]olicy.' 521
Again, partially embracing the excess insurer's position, the federal
district court found, as a matter of law, that the excess insurance contract was
unambiguous.512 2 Therefore, it held Zurich-American liable only for losses that
the newspaper incurred during the three-year period when both the primary
and excess insurance contracts ran concurrently.523 Ultimately, the district
An insurer, including but not limited to a foreign line and surplus line insurer, owes to his
insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims
fairly and promptly and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the
claimant, or both. Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable for any damages
sustained as a result of the breach.
Id.
514. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:658(A)(1) (2004).
All insurers issuing any type of contract... shall pay the amount of any claim due any insured
within thirty days after receipt of satisfactory proofs of loss from the insured or any party in
interest.
Id.








523. Id. at 331.
The first... primary polic[y] ran from January 1, 1995, to July 1, 1996, and each subsequent
policy was for a one year term beginning July 1. [The] sixth... primary policy [covered the
period] from July 1, 2000, to July 1, 2001.... [O]n July 1, 1998, the Times-Picayune switched
excess carriers and bought a three-year, $1,500,000 policy from Zurich that was effective from
July 1, 1998 until July 1, 2001.
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court entered a final judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(), 5 2 4 citing just one of
Times-Picayune's theories of recovery, the breach-of-contract action . 25 The
district court concluded that Zurich-American had to pay just $60,000 rather
than $1,205,879.126 The Times-Picayune appealed.127
The only question before the Fifth Circuit had two prongs: (1) whether
Zurich-American had a duty to indemnify the Times-Picayune for all or a part
of the remaining uncompensated losses ($1,205,879) and (2) whether the
excess insurer had a duty to pay the newspaper $165,873-fourteen percent
(14.2%) of the $1,165,873 that the employee embezzled while the primary and
excess insurance contracts ran concurrently during a three-year period. 28
Again, citing the prior loss clause in Federal's primary insurance contract,
Zurich strongly asserted that it was liable only for losses exceeding $1,000,000
during the three-year life of its excess policy-July 1, 1998 to July 1, 2001.529
Alternatively, the excess insurer argued that it was not responsible for any
losses occurring before July 1, 1998 and that Anzalone never embezzled more
than $1,000,000-the policy limit in Federal's primary contracts-during the
years when the Times-Picayune also purchased excess insurance coverage
from Federal. 3°
To begin its analysis, the Fifth Circuit reviewed several provisions in
Zurich-American's excess contract. 3' First, the coverage clause stated:
The Underwriter shall provide the Insureds with insurance coverage during
the Policy Period [in] excess of the Underlying Insurance. Coverage under
this policy shall attach only after all of the Limit(s) of Liability of the
Underlying Insurance has been exhausted by the actual payment of loss(es).
Except as otherwise provided herein, coverage under this policy shall then
Id. During those three years, Federal insured the newspaper company under successive one-year primary
polices. Id.
524. Id. at 331. FED. R. Cv. P. 54(b) gives a court the authority to enter a final judgment when
multiple causes of action or parties are part of a lawsuit:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action.., or when multiple parties are
involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
FED. R. CrY. P. 54(b).




529. Id. at 330-31 & n.3. Anzalone embezzled $1,165,873 during this three-year period. Id. at 330.
Zurich-American argued that after subtracting Federal's $1,000,000, its remaining exposure under the
$1,500,000 excess policy was only $165,873 out of the total in embezzlement losses-$1,205,879. Id. The
excess insurer actually offered to settle for roughly $165,873 and paid $93,064 to the Times-Picayune. Id.
The excess policy had a $1,500 deductible. Id.
530. Id. at 330 n.2 (noting that the Times-Picayune did not carry excess insurance from January 1,
1995 to July 1, 1996).
531. Id. at 332.
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apply in conformance with and subject to the warranties, limitations,
conditions, provisions, and other terms of the Primary Policy as in effect the
first day of the Policy Period, together with the warranties and limitations of
any other Underlying Insurance. In no event shall coverage under this policy
be broader than coverage under any Underlying Insurance.532
The Zurich-American excess insurance contract also had a "drop-down"
clause.533 It outlined the factors that trigger the excess insurer's duty to
indemnify after the underlying primary insurance contract's policy limit had
been exhausted or reduced. 534 The drop-down clause stated in relevant part:
In the event.. . of the reduction or exhaustion of the Limit(s) of Liability of
the Underlying Insurance solely as the result of actual payment of [a covered
loss] thereunder, this policy shall: I) in the event of reduction, pay excess of
the reduced Limit(s) of Liability of the Underlying Insurance, and ii) in the
event of exhaustion, continue in force as primary insurance excess of the
retention applicable in the Primary Policy, which retention shall be applied
to any subsequent loss as specified in the Primary Policy.
Notwithstanding any of the terms of this policy which might be
construed otherwise, this policy shall drop down only in the event of
reduction of exhaustion of the Underlying Insurance by the actual payment
of loss and shall not drop down for any other reason including, but not limited
to, uncollectibility (in whole or in part) of any Underlying Insurance.535
As previously mentioned, a prior loss clause appeared in Federal's
primary insurance contract.53 6 It removed or reduced the primary insurer's
liability for losses occurring before the primary contract's effective date.
53 7
The prior loss clause read in pertinent part:
If you were continuously insured by a policy prior to this insurance providing
the same insurance as this policy, but cannot recover on a loss because that
policy was terminated and its discovery period has run out, we will cover
your loss provided:
1. this insurance would have covered your loss had it been in
effect at the time the acts that caused the loss occurred; and
2. you discovered the loss within one year after this insurance
is terminated.
We will not pay more than the Limit of Insurance for the loss under the prior
policy or under this insurance when it became effective, whichever is less.




536. Id. at 329.
537. Id.
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The amount we pay will be a part of this insurance, not in addition to it.53
Again, in the present case, the district court ruled that Zurich-American's
excess policy, with a $1,500,000 policy limit, covered only $165,873 of the
Times-Picayune's $1,205,879 losses. 539 And the district court ruled that the
fact that prior losses had exhausted the $1,000,000 limit in Federal's July 1,
2000 to July 1, 2001 primary insurance policy was irrelevant. 54° To reach that
finding, the district court largely ignored the drop down clause in Zurich-
American's excess contract, focused on the prior loss clause in Federal's
primary policy, and relied on an earlier Fifth Circuit ruling in First National
Bank of Amarillo v. Continental Casualty Co. 541
In Amarillo, an employee embezzled a bank's funds, thus creating a
dispute over whether an excess insurer had a duty to indemnify the insured
bank under the excess insurance contract.542 But the current Fifth Circuit panel
declared that Amarillo was not the controlling authority for two important
reasons. 543 First, the court of appeals decided Amarillo in 1934, four years
prior to the Supreme Court issuing its landmark decision Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins.544 The Erie Court held that federal courts sitting in diversity should
apply substantive state law and federal procedural law.545 Second, the appeal
in Amarillo originated from the Northern District of Texas, rather than from
a federal district court in Louisiana. 546 Therefore, from the court of appeal's
perspective, using "a pre-Erie Texas case... as controlling authority
respecting an insurance contract dispute under Louisiana law" is
inappropriate.5
47
To determine whether the district court correctly ordered Zurich-
American to pay $165,873, the Fifth Circuit first examined Louisiana's
doctrines for interpreting insurance contracts: (1) traditional rules of contract
construction,548 (2) the plain meaning rule, 49 (3) the doctrine of ambiguity,50
538. Id. at 329-30.
539. Id. at 331.
540. Id. at 334.
541. Id. at 335 (citing First Nat'l Bank of Amarillo v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 71 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1934)).
542. First Nat'l Bank ofAmarillo, 71 F.2d at 838-39.
543. Times-Picayune, 421 F.3d at 334.
544. Id. (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
545. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; Times-Picayune, 421 F.3d at 334 (noting that the Amarillo panel did not
cite any court decision, treatise, or other authority to support its conclusions, suggesting that the panel "was
simply elucidating a federal common law of insurance contracts, a law that has long because ceased to apply
to cases of this kind").
546. Times-Picayune, 421 F.3d at 334.
547. Id. at 334 & n.6. Until the district court resurrected it, Amarillo had only been cited by one other
case. Nat'l Sur. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 61 P.2d 1122, 1123 (1936).
548. See Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So.2d 1166, 1169 (La. 1996) (holding that "[a]n
insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using ordinary contract
principles").
549. See La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So.2d 759, 763 (La. 1994) (holding
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(4) the doctrine of reasonable expectation,5 ' and (5) the adhesion doctrine. 52
Then the Fifth Circuit carefully examined the pertinent language appearing in
the coverage cause, which stated: "The Underwriter shall provide the Insureds
with insurance coverage during the Policy Period excess of the Underlying
Insurance. Coverage under this policy shall attach only after all of the Limit(s)
of Liability of the Underlying Insurance has been exhausted by the actual
payment of loss(es)." '553
Put simply, Louisiana's plain meaning doctrine states: When interpreting
an insurance contract, courts must determine the parties' intent according to
"the general, ordinary, plain and popular meaning of the words" appearing in
the contract. 54 Therefore, after examining the clause, the Fifth Circuit
determined that only a single condition would trigger Zurich-American's duty
to pay-the exhaustion of the policy limit in the underlying primary insurance
contract.55 And the Fifth Circuit found that unambiguous language in the drop
down clause substantially reinforced that interpretation.6 Briefly put, the
latter clause stated that Zurich-American must keep the excess insurance in
force after the policy limit has been exhausted in the underlying primary
insurance contract.
5 57
Between July 1, 1998 and the discovery of Anzalone's embezzlement in
December of 2000, the Times-Picayune undisputedly lost $1,165,873.58 At
that time, Federal paid $1,000,000 and thereby exhausted the policy limit
under its primary insurance policy.5 59 Therefore, citing the plain and
unambiguous language of the insuring and drop down clauses in Zurich-
that the parties' intent must be determined in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain, and popular
meaning of the words used in the policy).
550. See Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So.2d 1134, 1138 (La. 2002) (repeating
that an "ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who furnished the contract's text
and in favor of the insured").
551. See La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 630 So.2d at 764 (holding that a court should construe an insurance
contract "to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties in the light of the customs and usages of the
industry").
552. Duncan v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 747 So.2d 656, 674 (La. Ct. App. 1999). "It is well settled that
... insurance policies are generally contracts of adhesion . I..." Id.
553. Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 328, 335 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005).
554. Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So.2d 1166, 1169 (La. 1996).
555. Times-Picayune, 421 F.3d at 335 ("The most straightforward construction of this clause is that
Zurich will pay for covered losses that the primary policy will not cover because it has been exhausted by
the actual payment of benefits.").
556. Id.
557. Id. at 335 n.7.
Zurich contends that the drop down clause has no application to this case because, by virtue of
its sub-clause (ii), the provision of the drop down clause stating that the Zurich policy will drop
down as primary coverage insurance in the event of exhaustion applies only to subsequent
losses. The plain language of the sub-clause (ii), however, is clear that what applies in the event
of subsequent losses is simply the retention applicable to the exhausted primary policy.
Id.




American excess insurance contract, the Fifth Circuit decided that Zurich-
American, now in the role of a primary insurer, was liable for the entire
amount of $1,165,873 that Anzalone embezzled between July 1, 1998, and
July 1, 2001 .560 The final question, therefore, became whether Zurich-
American was also liable for the outstanding $40,006.561
To answer that question, the Fifth Circuit examined the prior loss clause
in Federal's primary contract because the employee embezzled the $40,006
before Zurich-American's excess policy began on July 1, 1998.562 The court
of appeals found two relevant conditions in that clause: (1) "the insured must
have been 'continuously insured' by a substantively identical policy which the
district court read to mean ... a substantively identical excess policy," and
(2) insurance coverage only if the loss had "been in effect at the time the acts
that caused the loss occurred.
563
But the Fifth Circuit concluded that the "district court did not opt for the
simplest and most straightforward reading of Zurich's policy."564  The
appellate court found ambiguity in the prior loss clause and construed it
against the excess insurer. 65 For that reason, the Fifth Circuit declared that the
560. Id.
561. Id.
We turn to a final detail. The $1,000,000 payment by Federal under its primary policy
compensated the Times-Picayune for the first $1,000,000 of its total $2,205,879 embezzlement
losses incurred from 1995 through 2000. Anzalone, however, stole $1,040,006 thereof between
the beginning of... 1995 and the inception date of the Zurich excess policy on July 1, 1998.
Because [the employee embezzled an additional $40,006 over the $1,000,000 policy limit under
the primary contract before the inception date of Zurich-American's policy] on July 1, 1998, it




564. Id. at 337.
It is undisputed that all of the Times-Picayune's $805,299 in embezzlement losses from January
1, 1995 until July 1, 1997 were within the coverage of the Federal primary policy. It is also
undisputed that the Federal primary policy covered $194,701 of the Times-Picayune's losses
from July 1, 1997, to July 1, 1998, when the Zurich policy began.
Id.
565. Id. at 337-38.
[Clonsidering the Zurich policy as a whole, we cannot accept the district court's reading of the
third sentence of its insuring clause. The sentence in question plainly intends to of itself exclude
from the excess policy coverage of any loss excluded from (or not covered by or otherwise not
recoverable under) the primary policy, whether or not otherwise excluded by the excess policy
itself. But we cannot read that sentence as unambiguously of itself independently imposing a
limitation on coverage under the excess policy so as to exclude from the excess policy coverage
of losses that are within the coverage of and are not excluded by or otherwise not recoverable
under the underlying primary policy. The excess policy has no Prior Loss clause, and it contains
no provision excluding prior losses or limiting coverage to losses incurred after the effective date
of the policy. The underlying primary policies each do have a Prior Loss clause, and it does
provide coverage under those policies (subject to certain conditions, which are indisputably
satisfied respecting the Federal primary policy in effect from July 1, 2000, to July 1, 2001, as to
the entire $2,205,879 loss).
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prior loss clause in Federal's primary insurance contract did not support the
district court's partial summary judgment in favor of the insured.5" As a
result, the court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling and remanded
the case to the district court for additional proceedings.567
Ill. FIRST PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS-FEDERAL STATUTORY
CLAIMS AND DECISIONS
A. Automobile Insurance-Whether the McCarran-Ferguson
Act Reverse Preempts the Federal Arbitration Act and
Prevents the Forced Arbitration of a Coverage Dispute in
Mississippi Under an Underinsured Motorist Clause
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) permits an aggrieved party to file a
motion to compel arbitration when another party fails, neglects, or refuses to
comply with an arbitration agreement. 68  For centuries, however, English
common law was hostile to arbitration agreements and American courts
embraced such hostility when they adopted English rules. 569 Therefore,
Congress enacted the FAA and reversed longstanding judicial bias against
arbitration agreements.57° Presently, courts give arbitration agreements the
same protection as other valid and enforceable contracts.5
On the other hand, one might ask: Because arbitration contracts are
enforceable, are arbitration clauses also enforceable if state statutes outlaw
such clauses in insurance contracts or in endorsements? And if the answer is
yes, do state statutes preempt or reverse preempt federal laws, even though the
Id.
566. Id. at 338.
567. Id.
568. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such
agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action ... for an order directing that
such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days' notice in
writing of such application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be
made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure
to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings,
under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing
such arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or
refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default .... the court shall hear and
determine such issue.
Id.




latter are overwhelmingly superior to conflicting state statutes? 72 In American
Bankers Insurance Co. of Florida v. Inman, the Fifth Circuit answered these
questions.573
The facts in Inman are few and uncomplicated.5 74 American Bankers
Insurance Company of Florida (American Bankers) sold an automobile policy
to Jack Inman, a resident of Mississippi. 75 The policy limit for underinsured
motorist coverage was $100,000.576 During the policy period, the driver in
another vehicle struck Inman's motorcycle from the rear, and Inman was
severely injured.577 The other driver's liability insurer gave its policy limit of
578$10,000 to cover Inman's injuries.
Inman's injuries were quite extensive, requiring more money than the
$10,000. 5 7' Thus, he sent a demand letter to American Bankers, demanding
the entire $100,000 under the underinsured motorist provision. 8 ° American
Bankers denied the insurance claim and insisted that the motorcycle was not
insured when the accident occurred. 8  More relevant, Inman's insurance
contract contained an arbitration provision that required the insurer and insured
to arbitrate all disputes. 82 Perhaps believing that Inman would file a lawsuit
rather than enter arbitration, American Bankers filed a motion to compel
arbitration in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.5 83 The
insurer cited its rights under the FAA to justify its motion.5 84
Before this controversy, the Mississippi's legislature enacted section 83-
11-109, which states:
No such endorsement or provisions shall contain a provision requiring
arbitration of any claim arising under any such endorsement or provisions.
The insured shall not be restricted or prevented in any manner from
employing legal counsel or instituting or prosecuting to judgment legal
proceedings, but the insured may be required to establish legal liability of the
uninsured owner or operator.585
572. See Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir.1998) (observing
that "federal law [ordinarily] preempts conflicting state law").












585. MIss. CODE ANN. § 83-11-109 (1999).
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In light of the language appearing in section 83-11-109, the district court
denied American Bankers' motion to compel arbitration.586 The district court
found that the Mississippi statute reverse preempts the FAA.587 On the other
hand, the district court granted Inman's motion to dismiss, citing Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), because American Bankers failed to state a
cognizable claim upon which relief could be granted.588 The insurer
appealed.589
Before the Fifth Circuit, the central question was whether and how
section 83-11-109 reverse preempts the FAA.590 The insured cited the
McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA) and asserted that the MFA gives the State of
Mississippi authority to enact section 83-11-109 and to reverse preempt the
force and effect of the FAA.59' Stated another way, Inman maintained that the
MFA gives states the authority to regulate the business of insurance and forces
insurers and insureds to arbitrate issues involving the business of insurance.592
Contrarily, American Bankers asserted that compelling insurers and insureds
to perform under an arbitration clause-under an insurance contract-was not
the business of insurance.5 93 Therefore, from the insurer's perspective, the
FAA supersedes and is superior to section 83-1 1-109.194
First, the Fifth Circuit reviewed section 1012(b) of the MFA to find an
answer for the central question and resolve the dispute.595 That provision
provides in pertinent part: "No Act of Congress shall be construed to
invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose
of regulating the business of insurance.., unless such Act specifically relates
to the business of insurance .... 596 Stated more precisely, the reverse
preemption doctrine allows a state law to reverse preempt a federal statute only
if the following apply: (1) the federal statute does not expressly concern the
586. Inman, 436 F.3d at 493.
587. Id.
588. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) states:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
.. (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted .... If, on a motion asserting
the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided ....
FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
589. Inman, 436 F.3d at 493.
590. Id. at 492.
591. Id. (citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1101-15 (2000)).
592. Id.
593. Id. at 493. "American Bankers specifically challenge[d] the district court's conclusion that the
state law was enacted to 'regulate the business of insurance,' the second requirement of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act." Id.
594. Id.
595. Id. at 493.
596. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2000).
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business of insurance; (2) the state enacted a statute to purposefully regulate
the business of insurance; and (3) the federal statute "invalidate[s], impair[s],
or supercede[s]" the state statute.597
What is the "business of insurance"? The Supreme Court answered that
question in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno .5 98 The Court outlined
three factors and encouraged lower courts to consider each to determine
whether states' statutes and regulations involve the business of insurance. 99
These elements are: (1) "whether the practice in question has the effect of
transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk," (2) "whether the practice is an
integral part of the policy relationship between the insurer and the insured,"
and (3) "whether the practice is limited to entities within the insurance
industry."'  Of course, the Court stressed that no single factor, examined
alone, is determinative. ''6°
On appeal, American Bankers argued that section 83-11-109 does not
satisfy the test in Pireno, and therefore, it did not reverse preempt the FAA.6°2
The district court concluded otherwise, finding that Mississippi enacted section
83-11-109 specifically to regulate the business of insurance. 63 The lower
court found that the statute transfers or spreads risk, thereby satisfying the first
prong of the Pireno test, and that section 83-11-109 is an integral part of the
relationship between the insurer and insured, which satisfies the second
element.'
The Fifth Circuit embraced the District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi's findings and conclusions. 6°5 Focusing on the first prong of the
Pireno test, the court of appeals found that the Mississippi legislature enacted
the anti-arbitration statute to control the risks and harms-those that uninsured
and underinsured motorists might produce.6°6 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that section 83-11-109 "has the effect of transferring or spreading
a policyholder's risk. .. ."607 The appellate court also found that section "is
an integral part of the insurer-insured relationship," thereby satisfying the
second Pireno factor."° The Fifth Circuit observed that the statute "controls
how disputes regarding uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage will be
resolved" and helps insureds recover "'all sums which [they are] legally
597. Inman, 429 F.3d at 493 (quoting Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 590
(5th Cir. 1998)).
598. Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 120 (1982).
599. Id. at 129.
600. Id.
601. Id.
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entitled to recover as damages for bodily injury or death from the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.""°
Again, federal law ordinarily preempts conflicting state law, but the
McCarran-Ferguson Act allows a narrow exception for states that regulate the
business of insurance.61 ° In Inman, the Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that
Mississippi statute section 83-11-109 regulates the business of insurance.6 1
As a consequence, the statute reverse preempts the FAA.6t 2
B. Life Insurance-Whether the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act Prevents
Various State Insurance Commissioners from Suing the Vatican for
Allegedly Violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act and Other Common Law Rules in Mississippi
To be sure, the procedural conflict in Dale v. Colagiovanni is neither
novel nor complicated.6 3 But without a doubt, the underlying substantive
controversy in Colagiovanni is highly atypical for several reasons: (1) the
Vatican City State (Vatican) and its alleged agents are defendants; (2) several
state insurance commissioners are plaintiffs; and (3) as plaintiffs, the insurance
commissioners alleged that the Vatican looted various insurance companies
and forced those companies into receiverships.614
Assuming the reported facts and allegations are true, they are somewhat
unexpected, incomprehensible, and unsettling as one of the allegedly offending
parties was a jurist.615 When this controversy arose, Emilio Colagiovanni was
a Roman Catholic "monsignor. ''616 More precisely, Colagiovanni was an
emeritus judge.617 He sat on the Tribunale della Rota Romana (Rota)-one of
the Vatican's three courts of appeals.6 18 In addition, Colagiovanni was a
609. Id. (quoting Standard Sec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. West, 267 F.3d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 2001)).
610. Id. at 493 (citing Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir.1998))
"Ordinarily, federal law pre-empts conflicting state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause-U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2. The McCarran-Ferguson Act reverses that effect in the narrow range of cases involving state
regulation of the insurance industry." Id.
611. Id.
612. Id.






[The Tribunal of the Roman Rota] is a court of appeal from local Tribunals, and a court of first
instance where there is no competency with local Tribunals. For example, any matter concerning
a bishop would have to be dealt with by the Roman Rota rather than the Bishop's own tribunal.
In addition, certain matrimonial matters must come to the Roman Rota rather than the local
tribunal (e.g., those involving Royalty! The annulment of the marriage of Caroline of Monaco
had to be dealt with by the Vatican, not by the marriage tribunal of the Archdiocese of Monaco).




professor in the Studio Rotale, the graduate program connected to the Rota, a
senior member of the Curia, the Vatican's government, and President of the
Monitor Ecclesiasticus Foundation (MEF), an autonomous organization that
published a journal of canon law.6 j9
Martin Frankel was a financier.620 For nearly ten years, Frankel "engaged
in a massive insurance fraud scheme, using various alter egos and front
organizations to acquire and loot several insurance companies. ''62' In 1998,
Frankel decided to include the Roman Catholic Church in his scheme.622
Frankel wanted to form a charitable foundation with an initial $55 million in
capital-$50 million to acquire insurance companies and $5 million for
charitable purposes.623 Thus, pretending to be a philanthropist who only
wanted a charitable foundation, Frankel found a way to contact and befriend
Colagiovanni, who later introduced Frankel to Vatican officials.624
Ultimately, Frankel formed the Saint Francis of Assisi Foundation to
Serve and Help the Poor and Alleviate Suffering (SFAF). 62 5 "He told
associates that the foundation would use the profits from the acquired
insurance companies for charitable purposes. 626 Colagiovanni agreed to
MEF's serving as "SFAF's settlor of record. 627 More important, Frankel
transferred funds to the MEF, which the MEF then transferred to SFAF.628
Even more important, "Colagiovanni admitted he had falsely told insurance
companies and government regulators that [SFAF' s] funds... came from his
own foundation," the MEF. 629
619. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 426-27; see also Ellen Joan Pollock, Italian Prelate Pleads Guilty
in Case Tied to Frankel Scheme, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2002, at C10.
A priest with ties to the Vatican pleaded guilty to one felony count in connection with efforts by
financier Martin Frankel to purchase insurance companies as part of his plan to defraud them.
... Colagiovanni admitted he had falsely told insurance companies and government regulators
that the funds used by Saint Francis came from his own foundation, the Monitor Ecclesiasticus
Foundation, which published a journal of canon law.
Pollock, supra, at C10.
620. See Ellen Joan Pollock, Priest's Arrest Is New Avenue In Financier Frankel's Case, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 31, 2001, at Cl.
621. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 426.
622. Id. at 427.
623. Id.
624. See Pollock, supra note 621, at Cl.
Mr. Frankel' s associates contacted Msgr. Colagiovanni, a former judge of the Roman Rota-a
Vatican appeals court-who allegedly agreed to help and introduced a representative of Mr.
Frankel to Vatican officials. According to the sworn statement by Charles Cooney, a special
agent with the IRS Criminal Investigation Division, Msgr. Colagiovanni received at least





627. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 427.
628. Id.
629. See Pollock, supra note 620, at C10.
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Eventually, federal authorities arrested and prosecuted both Frankel and
8 1-year-old Colagiovanni. 630 The authorities prosecuted Frankel for securities
fraud and racketeering, and they prosecuted Colagiovanni for wire fraud and
conspiring to launder money.63'
Significantly, during the criminal prosecution, a special agent in the
Internal Revenue Service's Criminal Investigation Division presented even
more damaging information about Colagiovanni's criminal activity:
[T]hat Msgr. Colagiovanni helped Mr. Frankel... to secretly acquire Capitol
Life Insurance Co. and Western United Life Assurance Co. Neither deal was
consummated. As Mr. Frankel was attempting to acquire Western United
Life, Msgr. Colagiovanni allegedly signed an affidavit... stating that [MEF]
"has contributed approximately $1,000,000,000 (one billion dollars) to
[SFAF]."
Msgr. Colagiovanni later told federal agents that he signed the affidavit
and admitted that it was false.632
After learning about Colagiovanni's involvement, the insurance
commissioners in five states, as receivers of the targeted insurance companies,
sued the Vatican and Colagiovanni in the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi. 633 The suit alleged that Colagiovanni violated the civil
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).6 4 The
complaint also alleged that the Vatican was vicariously liable because
Colagiovanni was the Vatican's agent.635
630. See id.
631. See id.
632. See Pollock, supra note 621, at Cl; see also Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 427.
By March of 1999, Frankel was being investigated by the Mississippi Department of Insurance
regarding his acquisitions, and received a letter from the Department asking specific questions
about Frankel's investment practices. Frankel responded by causing SFAF to purchase the trust
that had been involved in the acquisitions, which in turn caused the Department to set an
emergency hearing. Colagiovanni appeared at the hearing and represented that Vatican-related
entities had contributed over $1 billion to SFAF.
Colagiovanni, 429 F.3d at 427.
633. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 427. The commissioners-receivers were George Dale, Commissioner
of Insurance for the State of Mississippi; W. Dale Finke, Director of the Department of Insurance for the
State of Missouri; Kim Holland, Insurance Commissioner for the State of Oklahoma; Julie Benafield
Bowman, Insurance Commissioner for the State of Arkansas; and Paula A. Flowers, Commissioner of
Commerce and Insurance for the State of Tennessee. Id.
634. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
§ 1962(c).
635. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 426.
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The Vatican filed its first motion to dismiss under FED. R. .Civ. P.
12(b)(1), arguing that the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction.636 To support its position, the Vatican asserted that it was a
foreign state and that it was immune from the RICO lawsuit under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 637 The Vatican also advanced other
theories to defend itself, but the district court rejected those theories.638
On the other hand, the insurance commissioners argued that the district
court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because Colagiovanni's
conduct involved a certain type of "commercial activity" for which the FSIA
did not grant immunity, and the Vatican ratified Colagiovanni' s conduct or he
secured the actual or apparent authority to engage in such illegality from the
Vatican.639
The district court expressly declined to decide whether Colagiovanni
received actual authority from the Vatican or whether the Vatican ratified
Colagiovanni's errant conduct.64° Instead, the district court denied the
Vatican's motion in part, finding that the Vatican was not immune from the
lawsuit." The lower tribunal found that Colagiovanni had the Vatican's
apparent authority to engage in various activities on behalf of the Vatican. 2
Therefore, the Vatican was not immune under the FSIA." 3 Dissatisfied with
that conclusion, the Vatican appealed.6 "
The FSIA provides the sole source of subject matter jurisdiction in suits
against a foreign state.645 Thus, at the outset, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reviewed the FSIA's "general immunity" clause, which states:
636. Id.; FED R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) states in pertinent part:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim,
cross-claim, or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is
required, except that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ....
FED R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
637. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 427; 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000).
638. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 427.
The Vatican urges several additional theories arguing that it is not subject to jurisdiction under
the FSIA: (1) the creation of a charitable foundation is not a commercial activity;
(2) Colagiovanni's criminal activity was not a commercial activity; (3) the alleged claims were
tort-based, and therefore not within the commercial activity exception; and (4) the Vatican could
not form the requisite intent necessary for [the insurance commissioners'] fraud-based claims.
The district court considered and rejected each of these arguments, and we affirm the district
court's judgment on these issues on the basis of its well-reasoned opinion.
Id.
639. Id. at 428 n.1. The commissioners argued that the Vatican was liable "because its agent,
Colagiovanni, engaged in commercial activity while possessing apparent authority." Id. They also argued
that Colagiovanni possessed actual authority and that the Vatican ratified his commercial acts. Id.





645. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434-39 (1989).
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Subject to existing international agreements to which the United States is a
party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune
from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States
except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.'
A district court, however, may exercise subject matter jurisdiction over
a foreign state if one of several exceptions under the statute applies.67 For
example, FSIA's "commercial activity" exception states:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
[I]n which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that
act causes a direct effect in the United States .... 6
Once more, citing the commercial activity exception, the insurance
commissioners argued that they could sue the Vatican because Colagiovanni,
the Vatican's agent, engaged in commercial activity with apparent authority. 649
Contrarily, the Vatican argued that merely establishing that an agent
performed with apparent authority was insufficient to trigger the commercial
activity exception.65
Certainly, whether actual authority, apparent authority, or ratification
would trigger the commercial activity exception was an issue of first
impression for the Fifth Circuit.65 Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits,
however, have addressed the question squarely and concluded that proof of an
agent's apparent authority is insufficient.652 On the other hand, under the
646. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000); see also Byrd v. Corporacion
Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999). "The general rule under the FSIA
is that foreign states are immune from the jurisdiction of the United States Courts." Byrd, 182 F.3d at 388.
647. Id.
648. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
649. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 428.
650. Id.
651. Id.
652. See Velasco v. Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 399-400 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Byrd v.
Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the agent acted with the actual authority of the state to trigger the commercial
activity exception); El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a
government bank was immune from suit under the FSIA for the acts of agents); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l
Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990) (interpreting section 1603(b) to include individuals sued in
their official capacities)); Phaneuf v. Republic of Indon., 106 F.3d 302, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding




FSIA, a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction and a foreign state has no
immunity from a legal action if an aggrieved party establishes that the foreign
state's agent engaged in commercial activity with actual authority.653
Also, the commercial activity must be the activity "of the foreign
state. '654 The Ninth Circuit explained the rule this way:
When an agent acts beyond the scope of his authority, however, that agent "is
not doing business which the sovereign has empowered him to do." If the
foreign state has not empowered its agent to act, the agent's unauthorized act
cannot be attributed to the foreign state; there is no "activity of the foreign
state. 65
5
Still, the insurance commissioners in Colagiovanni insisted that proof of
apparent authority was sufficient to trigger the commercial activity
656 toriexception. And to reinforce that assertion, they cited relatively recent Fifth
Circuit decisions in Arriba Ltd. v. Petroleos Mexicanos and Hester
International Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.657 The current Fifth
Circuit panel ruled, however, that neither opinion was relevant because the
questions in Arriba and Hester were different from the present question.658
Embracing the Fourth and Ninth Circuits' rules and explanations, the
Fifth Circuit vacated the district court's ruling and concluded that the Vatican
was immune under the FSIA. 659 To trigger the commercial activity exception
under the FSIA and subject a foreign state to a federal court's jurisdiction, a
complaining party must prove that an agent had actual authority to act on
behalf of a foreign state.'
653. Velasco, 370 F.3d at 399-400; Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 307.
654. Phaneuf, 106 F.3d at 307-08. "'[C]ommercial activity of the foreign state' clearly entails
commercial activity in which the foreign state engaged. Because a foreign state acts through its agents, an
agent's deed which is based on the actual authority of the foreign state constitutes activity 'of the foreign
state."' Id. (quoting Chuidan v. Phil. Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1101-03 (9th Cir. 1990)).
655. Id.
656. Dale v. Colgiovanni, 443 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006).
657. Id. at 429 (citing Arriba Ltd. v. Peroleos Mexicanos, 962 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1992); Hester
Int'l Corp. v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 879 F.2d 170, 172 (5th Cir. 1989)).
Both opinions address the presumption of separate juridical status of government
instrumentalities under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983). Neither case directly





660. Id. at 428-29.
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IV. THIRD PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS STATE COMMON LAW
CLAIMS AND DECISIONS
A. Third Party Liability Claims Injury to Persons
1. Whether Under Louisiana Law an Educator's Liability Insurer
Has a Duty to Defend Its Insured School Board in an
Underlying Race-Discrimination Lawsuit
In 2000, the author conducted an empirical investigation to determine
how state and federal courts resolve duty-to-defend controversies-those in
which third party victims accuse insureds of practicing racial, gender-based,
and employment discrimination."6 The author published multiple statistically
significant findings, and in that article, the following observation appears:
Mixed-claims or multiple-allegation controversies generate an exorbitant
amount of litigation and cause much division among state and federal courts.
Nonetheless, the excessive litigation and interjurisdictional divisions that
mixed-claims cases generate could be avoided, especially [when] the
controversy concerns insurers' duty to defend alleged civil rights violators.
This can be achieved if courts would simply stop trying to apply a Title VII
analysis in duty-to-defend ... discrimination cases, because the subsequent
declaratory judgments are poorly reasoned and provide little direction for
future litigants. 662
During the 2005-2006 session, the Fifth Circuit decided Coleman v.
School Board of Richland Parish.663 Coleman is a duty-to-defend and mixed-
claims case.664 In the underlying lawsuit, the third party victim alleged that the
insured violated federal anti-discrimination and various state laws.665 But
more significantly, the Fifth Circuit resolved the conflict in Coleman by
avoiding the errors that this author highlighted and criticized in 2000.' Put
simply, Coleman is a superbly reasoned opinion--one in which the court of
appeals correctly used Louisiana's traditional doctrines of contract interpre-
tation rather than federal substantive law to determine whether the insurer had
a duty to defend and indemnify.667 Without doubt, the opinion is a model of
how federal courts should decide similar insurance law conflicts.
661. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Decisions Over Whether Insurers Must
Defend Insureds that Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights: An Historical and Empirical Review of
Federal and State Court Declaratory Judgments 1900-2000, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 995, 1032 (2000).
662. Id.







Rayville Elementary School (Rayville) is located in Rayville,
Louisiana." The Richland Parish School Board (School Board) regulates the
elementary school's curriculum and other activities.669 In 2000, the School
Board created an associate principal position for the elementary school.670
Katie Coleman, an African-American, applied for the position.67 The School
Board awarded the position to Coleman.672 The contract of employment
spanned two years, but after serving as associate principal for about a month,
the School Board's superintendent asked Coleman to submit her involuntary
resignation.673 She refused.674
Shortly thereafter, the School Board conducted a hearing to consider nine
separate insubordination charges that had been levied against Coleman.675
Finding that she was guilty of four, the School Board voted to terminate
Coleman's employment. 676 In response, Coleman filed a mixed-claims lawsuit
against the School Board.677 Citing her race, she alleged that the School Board
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,6 78 42 U.S.C. § § 198 1679 and 1983.680
668. Id.
669. Id. at 513-14.
670. Id.
671. Id. at 514.
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id. Coleman alleged that the School Board's white member created the associate principal
position only after a proposed school bond on the October 2000 ballot received support from the African-
American members, who agreed to campaign within the African-American community on behalf of the
bond. Id. She claimed that she did not know of the "political under-currents." Id. She alleged that the
School Board asked her to resign the next business day after the bond passed. Id. Coleman stated that the
superintendent "explained the political reality of her appointment and told her that she risked ruining her
career if she did not resign." Id. She alleged that the superintendent threatened her with continuous "write-
ups" and termination if she did not comply with his demands and accept his offer to compensate her for one
year of her two-year contract. Id.
675. Id. at 514 n. 1. The School Board raised the following charges or allegations against Coleman:
"Coleman's failure to perform 'bus duty,"' Coleman's addressing "the Rayville Elementary principal in an
unprofessional and insubordinate manner," and Coleman's improperly using "a federally-funded copier for
a non-designated use." Id.
676. Id. at 514.
677. Id. "She claimed that ... she was subjected to disparate enforcement of the [School] Board's
rules and regulations, and was continuously written-up for infractions that she did not commit. These events
ultimately culminated in her termination by the [School] Board without the consent and approval of several
African-American members." Id.
678. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). Title VII reads in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-( 1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
679. § 1981(a).
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State
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She also filed a common law breach-of-contract cause of action and an action
in equity, citing Louisiana's abuse of rights doctrine.6"'
From October 11, 2000 to October 11, 2001, Mid-Continent Casualty
Insurance Company (Mid-Continent) insured the School Board under an
educators' legal liability insurance contract.682 Therefore, because the School
Board terminated Coleman and she filed her mixed-claims lawsuit during the
policy period, the School Board asked Mid-Continent to provide a legal
defense.683 Mid-Continent refused. 68' Later, the School Board presumably
filed a breach-of-contract action against Mid-Continent in the District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana.685
Mid-Continent responded and filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the School Board.686 The
insurance contract contained an exclusion clause that excluded coverage for
an insured's knowingly wrongful or intentional acts.687 Citing the causes of
action in Coleman's mixed-claims complaint, Mid-Continent argued that the
School Board terminated Coleman and intentionally discriminated against her
because of Coleman's race.688 To rebut, the School Board filed a cross-motion
for summary judgment, arguing that the insurer had a contractual duty to
defend and indemnify because the liability insurance contract explicitly
and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
Id.
680. § 1983.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or any other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered a statute of the District of
Columbia."
Id. Section 1983 does not create federal, substantive rights. Id. Instead, the statute creates a private right
of action and provides a possible remedy whenever anyone, acting under color of state law, deprives a
person of federal rights, privileges, or immunities; violation of state law, by itself, does not allow for relief
under section 1983. See Crocker v. Hakes, 616 F.2d 237, 239-40 (5th Cir. 1980).
681. Coleman, 418 F.3d at 514; see also G.I.'s Club of Slidell, Inc. v. Am. Legion Post No. 374, 504
So.2d 967, 969 (La. Ct. App. 1987) ("Abuse of rights is an equitable doctrine that has been used sparingly
in Louisiana.").
682. Coleman, 418 F.3d at 514.
683. Id.
684. Id.






covered injuries emanating from actual or alleged racial discrimination and
racial harassment.689
While the district court considered summary judgment motions, the
School Board defended itself against Coleman's lawsuit.69° The School Board
used its financial resources, and ultimately, the School Board and Coleman
settled the suit.69' Shortly after the settlement, the district court granted Mid-
Continent's motion for summary relief, finding that the "intentional acts"
exclusion clause in the contract precluded coverage for all of Coleman's
federal and state causes of action.692 On the other hand, the lower court denied
the School Board's motion for summary judgment.693 The School Board
appealed the adverse ruling.69'
Before the Fifth Circuit, the School Board argued that the district court
committed reversible error by ruling summarily that Mid-Continent did not
have a duty to defend and indemnify the School Board against Coleman's
intentional racial discrimination claims. 695 In addition, the School Board
stressed that a breach-of-contract action and the action in equity, the abuse of
rights allegation, appeared in Coleman's complaint.696 The School Board
argued that Mid-Continent still had a duty to defend against Coleman's
nonexcluded claims, even though the insurance contract excluded coverage for
intentional discrimination.697
To determine if the School Board's assertions were sound, the court of
appeals examined the contract's "insuring-agreement clause." 698 It stated that
"Mid-Continent [would] defend and indemnify the School Board, its directors,
trustees, officers, and employees against loss resulting from any 'claim' made
during the policy period .... , 6' That same provision "defined 'claim' as any
written notice received by an insured, or any judicial or administrative
proceeding initiated against an insured, seeking to hold the insured responsible
or liable for a 'wrongful act.'7°
The contract defined a wrongful act as follows:
[A]ny actual or alleged act, error, omission, misstatement, misleading







695. Id. at 516.
696. Id.
697. Id.
698. Id. at 518-19.
699. Id. at 514.
700. Id.
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including:
(1) actual or alleged discrimination, whether based upon race,
sex, age, national origin, religion, disability or sexual
orientation;
(2) actual or alleged sexual or racial harassment;
(3) actual or alleged libel, slander or other defamation;
(4) actual or alleged invasion of privacy; or
(5) actual or alleged interference with or breach of any
employment contract, whether oral, written, express or
implied. 0
The controversial exclusion clause excluded "coverage for loss resulting
from any claim 'brought about or contributed to in fact by any dishonest,
fraudulent or criminal Wrongful Act or by any Wrongful Act committed with
actual knowledge of its wrongful nature or with intent to cause damage.'
72
The court of appeals then examined three of Louisiana's doctrines of
contract construction and interpretation to determine which one was more
applicable in light of the facts appearing in the present case.70 3 First, Louisiana
law is clear: "When the language of an insurance policy is clear, [Louisiana]
courts lack the authority to change or alter its terms under the guise of
interpretation.' ' °  The state's doctrine of ambiguity states, however, that
courts must construe ambiguous coverage and exclusion clauses in insurance
contracts against the insurer and in favor of the insured.70 5
Also, Louisiana's reasonable expectations doctrine requires a court to
construe an ambiguous insurance policy "to fulfill the reasonable expectations
of the parties in the light of the customs and usages of the industry. '' 706 Stated
differently, Louisiana courts must interpret ambiguous insurance contract
701. Id. at 514.
702. Id. at 515.
703. Id. at516-17.
704. La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So.2d 759, 764 (La. 1994).
705. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2056 (1987) ("In case of doubt that cannot be otherwise resolved,
a provision in a contract must be interpreted against the party who furnished the text."); Mayo v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 869 So.2d 96, 100 (La. 2004) ("Ambiguous policy provisions are generally construed
against the insurer and in favor of coverage."); Reynolds v. Select Props., Ltd., 634 So.2d 1180, 1183 (La.
1994) ("[A] provision which seeks to narrow the insurer's obligation is strictly construed against the insurer,
and, if the language of the exclusion is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, the interpretation
which favors coverage must be applied."); Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 630 So.2d at 764 ("If after applying
the other general rules of construction an ambiguity remains, the ambiguous contractual provision is to be
construed against the drafter, or, as originating in the insurance context, in favor of the insured."); RPM
Pizza, Inc. v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So.2d 1366, 1369 (La. 1992) ("[1]f [an] exclusion is ... ambiguous,
insurance policies must be liberally construed in favor of coverage, and provisions susceptible of different
meanings must be interpreted with a meaning that renders coverage effective and not with one that renders
it ineffective.") (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2049 (1987); Breland v. Schilling, 550 So.2d 609, 610 (La.
1989); Capital Bank & Trust Co. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 542 So.2d 494, 496 (La.1989)).
706. La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 630 So.2d at764 (citing Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 916 F.2d
267, 269 (5th Cir. 1990)).
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provision "by ascertaining how a reasonable insurance policy purchaser would
construe the clause at the time the insurance contract was [formed]. '"7°7
Generally, Louisiana courts may employ this rule to extend coverage to meet
the reasonable expectations of the insured, even though a close examination
of the policy reveals that such expectations conflict with the expressed intent
of the insurer.70 8
Directing the Fifth Circuit to a large body of Louisiana7° and federal
law,7 1° the School Board strongly asserted that a conflict existed between the
coverage and exclusion clauses.71' The insured argued that the contract
excluded knowing and intentional racial discrimination and harassment, in
particular.712 On the other hand, the contract also covered unintentional acts
707. Breland, 550 So.2d at 610-11.
708. La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 630 So.2d at 764 n.9 (citing Robert E. Keeton & Alan 1. Widiss,
INSURANCE LAW § 6.13 (1988)).
709. See McIntosh v. McElveen, 893 So.2d 986,991-92 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Cugini Ltd. v. Argonaut
Great Cent. Ins. Co., 889 So.2d 1104, 1113 (La. Ct App. 2004) (declaring that a conflict between coverage
provisions and exclusions gives rise to ambiguity which must be resolved in favor of coverage); Gottsegen
v. Hart Prop. Mgmt. Inc., 820 So.2d 1138, 1142 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that when "a conflict exists
between the declared coverage that was negotiated and paid for and the exclusion that states that same
hazard is not covered," an ambiguity exists that must be interpreted in favor of coverage); Domingue v.
Rodrigue, 686 So.2d 132, 137 (La. Ct. App. 1996) ("[A]n insurance policy cannot in one clause declare that
there is coverage ... and in another clause declare that there is no coverage ...."); Korossy v. Sunrise
Homes, Inc., 653 So.2d 1215, 1229 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a conflict between an exclusion
provision and a narrowed coverage provision which eliminated coverage created an ambiguity that must be
construed against the drafter in favor of coverage).
710. See N. Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Cos., 125 F.3d 983,986 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding ambiguity when
an insurance policy provided coverage for acts of discrimination, yet excluded coverage for acts which did
not occur unexpectedly or unintentionally); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 127 F.3d 563, 571 (7th Cir.
1997) (refusing to interpret a policy so that covered acts of discrimination were completely excluded by a
later provision when the meaning of provision was genuinely ambiguous); Hurst-Rosche Eng'rs, Inc. v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 51 F.3d 1336 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding ambiguity in a policy concerning
intentional torts such as libel, slander, defamation, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and humiliation while
simultaneously limiting coverage to unintentional acts); Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
857 F.2d 945, 950-51 (4th Cir. 1988) (vacating summary judgment in favor of insurer on grounds that
potential ambiguity was raised by an apparent conflict between the policy's coverage of libel, slander,
defamation, and unfair competition and limitation of coverage to unintentional or unexpected injuries); Tews
Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding ambiguity in a
policy that covered advertising injury yet excluded coverage for intentional acts); Titan Indem. Co. v.
Newton, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1344 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (finding a policy ambiguous when it provided
coverage for false arrest, unlawful prosecution, and civil rights violations and then excluded coverage for
intentional acts); Transamerica Ins. Group v. Rubens, No. 97 Civ. 8911, 1999 WL 673338 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug.27, 1999) (approving of the reasoning in N. Bank, 125 F.3d 983); Lineberry v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 885 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (finding ambiguity regarding invasion of privacy); Lincoln
Nat'l Health & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brown, 782 F. Supp. 110, 113 (M.D. Ga. 1992) (finding ambiguity with
respect to false arrest, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery); Purrelli v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
698 So.2d 618, 619-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding ambiguity with respect to invasion of privacy).
711. Coleman v. Sch. Bd. Of Richland Parish, 418 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. July 2005) ("[T]he School
Board argues that a conflict cannot be averted between the policy's exclusion for intentional acts and its
provision of coverage for racial harassment.").
712. Id. at 518.
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generally. 7 3  From the School Board's perspective, the liability contract
offered coverage that was "illusory and meaningless. 714 Therefore, the School
Board maintained that the contract was ambiguous, requiring the court to
resolve the confusion in its favor.715 The School Board also asserted that the
conflict undermined its reasonable expectation that the coverage provision
would cover all of Coleman's claims.716
The Fifth Circuit, however, found "no intractable or irreconcilable
conflict.. between the policy's coverage of racial discrimination and
harassment and its exclusion[] of intentional conduct., 717 To reach that
conclusion, the court of appeals observed that allegations of racial
discrimination may involve an alleged tortfeasor' s intentional or unintentional
acts. 7 8  For example, a complainant who accuses an alleged tortfeasor of
violating Title VH may prove that either racially motivated disparate treatment




716. Id. at 522 ("The School Board also argues that regardless of whether the policy is ambiguous,
it must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the reasonable expectations of a typical purchaser of
insurance.").
717. Id. at 520-21 n.44 ("We are persuaded that the exclusion for intentional acts in the School
Board's policy does not conflict with the policy's coverage for racial discrimination and racial
harassment."). The court further expanded on its holding, stating:
Our interpretation of the policy is buttressed by the apparent existence in Louisiana law of a
public policy prohibiting a person from insuring against his own intentional acts."), citing First
Mercury Syndicate, Inc. v. New Orleans Private Patrol Serv., Inc., 600 So.2d 898, 902 (La. Ct.
App. 1992) (finding that allowing "indemnification for such wrongdoing on the part of the
insured" would violate public policy when insured corporate officers paid themselves excessive
compensation for no work, placed family members on the corporate payroll when such members
were not working, raided corporate funds for personal use, and enacted a resolution
indemnifying themselves against their own wrongful acts); Williams v. Diggs, 593 So.2d 385,
387 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that "when considering an intentional injury exclusion in
an automobile liability policy, another well-established public policy must also be given
consideration. This is the policy against allowing a person to insure himself against his own
intentional acts causing injury to others"); Leon Lowe & Sons, Inc. v. Great Am. Surplus Lines
Ins. Co., 572 So.2d 206, 210 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that "[p]ublic policy forbids a
person from insuring against his own intentional acts, but does not forbid him from insuring
against the intentional acts of another for which he may be vicariously liable."); Vallier v.
Oilfield Constr. Co., 483 So.2d 212, 218 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that "a longstanding
principle of public policy that no person can insure against his own intentional acts" exists);
Swindle v. Haughton Wood Co., 458 So.2d 992,995 (La. Ct. App. 1984) ("No person can insure
against his own intentional acts. Public policy forbids it. But public policy does not forbid one
to insure against the intentional acts of another for which he may be vicariously liable.")
(quoting McBride v. Lyles, 303 So.2d 795, 799 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (citations omitted)); and,
Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So.2d 1168, 1172 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that "[t]he
provisions of the insurance policy should be given effect except to the extent they conflict with
law or public policy," and holding that public policy does not preclude coverage of exemplary
damage awards).
Id.
718. Id. at 520.
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impermissible discrimination."' The former requires proof of intentional
conduct and the latter does not.720 Thus, the Fifth Circuit found that the
insurance contract covered disparate impact claims and excluded coverage for
disparate treatment claims.72'
"Under Louisiana law, the scope of the duty to defend under an insurance
agreement is broader than the scope of the duty to provide coverage.
722
Furthermore, "an insurer's duty to defend is determined solely from a reading
of a third party victim's pleadings and the language in the insurance contract,
without considering extraneous evidence. 723 And if the complaint contains
facts which support coverage for a claim that is not excluded, the insurer must
defend the insured.724  "'[O]nce a complaint states one claim within the
policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to [defend against] the entire lawsuit,
even though other claims in the complaint fall outside of the policy's
coverage.'''725 Furthermore, courts will liberally interpret a complaint's
allegations to determine if the allegations establish the insurer's duty to
defend.726 Applying these rules, the appellate court declared that Mid-
Continent had no duty to defend or indemnify the School Board against
Coleman's Title VII claim.727  The appellate court found no evidence that
would have supported a claim for disparate impact discrimination. 728
But the appellate court also applied the plain meaning rule and declared:
The present insurance contract's clear and explicit language covers acts of
racial discrimination or harassment if an insured commits those acts
unintentionally and without actually knowing the acts are wrongful.729 Thus,
719. Id. at 520 n.37 (citing Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 299 (5th Cir. 2000). "Disparate treatment
refers to deliberate discrimination in the terms or conditions of employment," whereas disparate impact
claims "do not require proof of intent to discriminate." Id.
720. See E.E.O.C. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 927 F.2d 1322, 1328 n.24 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971)). "[U]nder an impact theory, the employee need not prove
intentional discrimination, but need only show that a certain employment policy has a disparate impact on
a protected group." Id.
721. Coleman, 418 F.3d at 520-21.
722. Id. at 523; see Lamar Adver. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 396 F.3d 654, 660 (5th Cir. 2005);
Selective Ins. Co. of S.E. v. J.B. Mouton & Sons, Inc., 954 F.2d 1075, 1077 (5th Cir. 1992); Suire v.
Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov't, 907 So.2d 37, 51-52 (La. 2005).
723. Selective Ins. Co. of S.E., 954 F.2d at 1078.
724. Lamar, 396 F.3d at 660 (quoting Complaint of Stone Petroleum Corp., 961 F.2d 90,91 (5th Cir.
1992)); Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 612 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[When] the pleadings, taken as true, allege
both coverage under the policy and liability of the insured, the insurer is obligated to defend, regardless of
the outcome of the suit or the eventual determination of actual coverage."); Suire, 907 So.2d at 52 ("Unless
unambiguous exclusion of all the plaintiff's claims is shown, the duty to defend arises.").
725. Coleman, 418 F.3d at 523 n.49; see Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Bldg. Eng'g Servs. Co., 730
F.2d 377, 382 (5th Cir. 1984).
726. Coleman, 418 F.3d at 523 n.50; see Lamar, 396 F.3d at 660 ("In making [the duty to defend]
determination, this Court must liberally interpret the complaint.").
727. Coleman, 418 F.3d at 523.
728. Id. at 522-23.
729. Id. at 518.
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comparing the factual allegation in the underlying third party complaint with
the clear and plain meaning of the language in the exclusion clause, the Fifth
Circuit also concluded Mid-Continent had no duty to defend or indemnify the
School Board against Coleman's 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 claims.73 The
reason is not complicated: Under sections 1981 and 1983, a complainant must
prove intentional racial discrimination."'
After examining Coleman's Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983
claims, concluding that Mid-Continent had no duty to defend or indemnify,
and affirming the district court's rulings regarding these issues, the Fifth
Circuit addressed the School Board's final argument.73 2 In her underlying
third party complaint, Coleman asserted that (1) the School Board did not have
a serious and legitimate interest requiring judicial protection to justify
Coleman's termination; (2) the School Board's unwarranted conduct was a
deviation from sound moral rules, good faith, and elementary fairness; and
(3) the School Board exercised one of its legal rights-the power to terminate
-for a nonauthorized purpose.733 Therefore, Coleman sought an equitable
remedy under Louisiana's abuse of rights doctrine."'
Originally, courts recognized the abuse of rights doctrine to "prevent...
holder[s] of [legal] rights or powers from exercising those rights exclusively
for the purpose of harming another... ,,735 To prove that a tortfeasor abused
a legal right, however, a complaining party must prove that the holder of the
right used it for either of the following reasons: (1) exclusively or
predominantly to harm another or to cause harm; (2) when "no serious and
legitimate interest... worthy of judicial protection" exists; (3) to deviate from
"moral rules, good faith or elementary fairness"; or (4) "for a purpose other
than that for which the right was granted.,
736
Again, Coleman alleged that the School Board abused its otherwise
legitimate rights when it voted to terminate Coleman's employment.737 The
730. Id. at 522.
731. See id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (2000).
732. Coleman, 418 F.3d at 522.
In essence, the [School] Board asks that we re-write the terms of the insurance policy to conform
with the reasonable expectations of a typical purchaser of insurance. This step is foreclosed by
Louisiana law, which precludes use of the reasonable expectations doctrine to recast policy
language when such language is clear and unambiguous. Because the language of the policy at
issue here is unambiguous, we cannot impose an alternative meaning on the policy by way of
interpretation.
Id.
733. Id. at 523-24.
734. Id. at 523.
735. 11. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co. v. Int'l Harvester Co., 368 So. 2d 1009, 1014 (La. 1979).
736. Id.
737. Coleman, 418 F.3d at 525.
Coleman explicitly alleged that, following her meeting with the [School] Board Superintendent
at which he asked her to resign, she was subjected to disparate enforcement of the [School]
Board's rules and written-up for infractions that she did not commit. Implicit in this allegation
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liability insurance contract covered losses resulting from claims based on
wrongful acts.738 And the policy defined a wrongful act as "'any actual or
alleged act, error, omission, misstatement, misleading statement, neglect or
breach of duty . . . including but not limited to' a variety of specifically
enumerated acts. 7 39 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit declared that the wrongful act
clause was sufficiently expansive enough to cover Coleman's abuse of right
allegation.'7
The Fifth Circuit also found that "Coleman's factual allegations could...
support a garden-variety breach-of-contract claim. 74 1 Coleman alleged that
the School Board terminated her after disciplining her for violations that she
did not comnit. 74 2 From the court of appeal's perspective, a jury could still
find that the School Board breached Coleman's employment contract and
terminated her without cause.743  And a jury could reach that conclusion,
"[e]ven if a jury were to disbelieve Coleman's claims of intentional racial
discrimination." 7" The Fifth Circuit also found that "the policy explicitly
provide[d] coverage for 'actual or alleged interference with or breach of any
employment contract whether oral, written, express or implied.' 745
Ultimately, the court of appeals declared that Mid-Continent had a duty
to defend the School Board against Coleman's breach of contract and abuse
of rights actions. 7" The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court,
instructing the lower court to determine whether the insurer had to indemnify
or reimburse the School Board for the funds it spent to defend itself and settle
some of Coleman's third party claims.747
is the assertion that Coleman did not commit an infraction for which she could be rightfully
terminated under her contract of employment. Based on this assertion, a jury could hold the
School Board liable for abusing Coleman's rights under her employment contract by firing her
without cause, while simultaneously holding that the [School] Board's actions were not actuated
by intentional racial discrimination.
Id.
738. Id. at 514.
739. Id. at 524.
740. Id. at 524-25 ("Interpreting Coleman's complaint liberally, we find that she alleged facts which,
if true, would support a finding of liability under an abuse of rights theory without requiring proof of intent
to cause harm.").






747. Id. at 526 n.58.
It is premature for us to decide whether Louisiana law permits an insured to recover the entire
balance of a settlement amount when coverage is potentially available for only a fraction of the
claims alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. We note, however that when applying Texas law we
have held that coverage 'cannot be created ex nihilo by estoppel.'
Id. (citing Enserch Corp. v. Shand Morahan & Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 1485, 1493 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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2. Whether Under Louisiana Law an Employer's Liability Insurer Has a
Duty to Reimburse the Employer for Expenses Associated with a
Terminated Employee's Asbestos-Related Injuries
Asbestos is a mineral that has been linked to lung diseases.748 For years,
manufacturers used asbestos to make flame-resistant insulation, and, the
automotive, construction and defense industries, in particular, used the
insulation extensively.749 For decades, asbestos-related claims and lawsuits
have plagued asbestos manufacturers as well as companies that used the toxic
substance. 750 As of this writing, "[a]n estimated 400,000 asbestos claims are
pending and still more are likely over the next decades. 75'
Asbestos-related litigation can span ten years or more and the lawsuits are
extremely costly.7 2  For example, ABB Ltd. (ABB) is a Swiss electrical-
engineering company, and ABB's U.S.-based subsidiary, Combustion
Engineering, Inc., produced asbestos-insulated boilers until the 1970s.753 Over
several decades, complainants' presenting asbestos-related injuries filed
100,000 lawsuits against ABB .7 Recently, ABB agreed to pay $1.43 billion
to settle those suits. 755 To add to ABB's misery, "the crippling legal fights...
cost Europe's largest engineering firm around $1 billion in legal fees-even
before the settlement-and put [ABB] on the brink of bankruptcy ....
"Many companies have sought refuge from asbestos claims by filing for
bankruptcy, leaving insurance companies to settle with plaintiffs while
protecting the defendants' assets. 757 But fairly often, insurance companies
refuse to settle claims.7 58 Liability insurers also refuse to defend insured
748. John Godfrey, Asbestos Fund Narrowly Approved By Senate Panel, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2005,
atB3.
749. Id.
750. Id. ("The bill would provide a substantial break from potential legal liabilities to former U.S.
asbestos manufacturers. Many of those companies and their successor businesses have been driven to seek
bankruptcy protection due to asbestos-related claims, some dating back decades.").
751. Id.
752. See id.
753. Goran Mijuk, ABB Nears Pact On Settlement OfAsbestos Suits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at
A8.
754. Id. ("ABB Ltd. is likely to settle its U.S. asbestos litigation in early spring, concluding 10 years
of restructuring and stanching a $1 billion stream of losses .... ABB's wrangle with asbestos litigation
distracted the company for a decade as it closed down production and cleaned up asbestos sites.").
755. Id.
756. Id.
757. Nathan Koppel, Asbestos Ruling, $13 Million Fine Buffet Law Firm, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24,2006,
at B 1.
758. Godfrey, supra note 751, at B3.
Legislation creating a $140 billion trust fund to handle asbestos-related injury claims narrowly
passed the Senate Judiciary Committee and faces further challenges on the Senate floor.
The trust would be funded by defendant employers and their insurers. The trust would also
seize the assets of other asbestos trusts previously set up by state and bankruptcy courts. Those
[Vol. 39:843
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corporations against third parties' asbestos-related lawsuits. 759 This term, the
Fifth Circuit decided Riverwood International Corp. v. Employers Insurance
of Wausau, a duty-to-indemnify case in which an insured corporation sued an
insurer for refusing to pay for asbestos-related settlement CoStS. 76° Like most
similarly situated insurers, the insurer in Riverwood refused to pay, citing a
complex and nearly indecipherable affirmative defense. 6
Graphic Packaging International, Inc., formerly known as Riverwood
International Corp. (Riverwood), owns and operates a paperboard
manufacturing facility in West Monroe, Louisiana.762 In early 2000, numerous
present and former employees began to sue Riverwood, claiming that they
were exposed to asbestos while working at the West Monroe facility.7 63 The
employees sought damages for an assortment of injuries, including asbestosis
and other asbestos-related diseases.7" Riverwood paid $1.513 million to settle
the multiple lawsuits with 260 employees.765
Before 2000, Riverwood purchased several excess workers'
compensation and employers' liability insurance contracts (Policies) from
funding the trust would be relieved of legal responsibility for further asbestos-injury claims.
Insurers said the bill is 'wholly unacceptable.
Id.
759. See Amy Stevens and Arthur S. Hayes, Legal Bear-Insurers Must Pay Asbestos Litigation
Costs of Policy Holders, Court Says, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1991, at B6.
The Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the terms of comprehensive general liability policies
require insurance companies to reimburse asbestos manufacturers and insulation contractors for
the costs of defending asbestos property damage cases. Whether insurers have a duty to
reimburse policyholders for asbestos litigation is an issue in courts in nearly every state.... In
the Illinois suit, the USF&G Corp. of Baltimore contended that it only has a duty to pay legal
costs in cases [in which] its policy holders were being sued for property damage which involves
tangible injury to buildings.... The Illinois high court ruled that 'an insurer has a duty to
defend its insured if any theory of recovery alleges potential coverage.
Id.
760. Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 379-80 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005).
761. Id.; see Stevens & Hayes, supra note 762, at B6.
In the Illinois suit, the USF&G Corp. of Baltimore contended that it only has a duty to pay legal
costs in cases [in which] its policy holders were being sued for property damage which involves
tangible injury to buildings. Asbestos contamination results only in economic loss due to the
diminished value of buildings, it argued. Five other former insurers of policy holder Wilkin
Insulation Co., of Mt. Prospect, Illinois, joined the suit. They are Commercial Union Insurance
Co., Argonaut Insurance Co., Argonaut Midwest Insurance Co., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
and Zurich Insurance Co. Wilkin Insulation is defending itself in numerous asbestos removal
actions[.]... The company claimed that contamination is the same as damage. The Illinois high
court ruled that 'an insurer has a duty to defend its insured if any theory of recovery alleges
potential coverage.
Id.
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Employers Insurance of Wausau (Wausau).7" Collectively, those contracts
insured Riverwood from May 1974 to January 1984.767 Thus, when the
employees filed the asbestos-related lawsuits, Riverwood sent letters of
notification to Wausau.768 More relevant, neither the reported facts nor letters
identified the underlying third party victims' theories of recovery. 769 The
letters simply stated that the employees' claims concerned "bodily injury by
disease. 77°
Citing the respective thirty-six month exclusion clauses in the Policies,
Wausau refused to contribute to the $1.513 million settlement.771 Wausau also
refused to pay for another reason: the insurer claimed that Riverwood breached
several conditions precedent in the Policies.772 In response, Riverwood filed
an action against Wausau in the District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana.773 The company asserted that the insurer breached a contractual
duty to reimburse Riverwood for the cost of settling the underlying asbestos-
related actions.774
Initially, Wausau filed a partial motion for summary judgment, asserting
that the Policies' thirty-six month exclusion provision excluded the asbestos
claims. 77' The district court found, however, that a question of fact existed
regarding "whether the claimant's asbestos-related disease qualified as a
'bodily injury by disease' or a 'bodily injury by accident,"' because both
phrases appeared in the Policies.776 Put briefly, the district court denied
Wausau' s partial summary judgment motion, finding that the two phrases were
ambiguous.777
Still, the insurer was undeterred, and more than a year and a half later,
Wausau again filed another motion for summary judgment, arguing that:









774. Id. at 380 n.4.
Riverwood also filed suit seeking indemnity under various standard workers' compensation and
employers' liability policies and blanket liability policies it had purchased. The claims regarding
the blanket liability policies were voluntarily dismissed. Furthermore, the court granted
summary judgment against Riverwood on the standard policies because they did not cover any
of the employees' claims at issue. Riverwood does not appeal as to that determination. Initially,
Riverwood had also sought coverage for claims asserted by non-employees, but those claims
were also voluntarily dismissed.
Id.





disease, (2) the thirty-six month exclusion provision barred those claims, and
(3) Riverwood breached a condition precedent that would trigger coverage
under the Policies-regardless of whether the claims were bodily injury by
disease or bodily injury by accident.778 After the second try, the district court
granted Wausau's motion for summary judgment and Riverwood appealed.779
The Policies contained multiple allegedly inharmonious provisions, and
the parties proffered different interpretations of various key phrases.7 0 So, the
Fifth Circuit examined those to determine whether they were ambiguous and
stated Riverwood and Wausau's intent.78' First, the Policies' coverage section
was multi-pronged, containing several subsections. 782 Subsection I-B stated:
"This policy applies to loss sustained by the insured on account of... [] sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury by accident or disease .... 73
Subsection II, "Application of Policy," outlined the types of injuries that
would trigger coverage and stated: "This policy applies only to injury (1) by
accident occurring during the policy period, or (2) by disease caused or
aggravated by exposure of which the last day of the last exposure, in the
employment of the insured, to conditions causing the disease occur[red] during
the policy period.. . ,,74 The definitions clause, Subsection V-C, defined
bodily injury by accident and bodily injury by disease.7 ' The entire section
read:
The contraction of disease is not an accident within the meaning of the word
"accident" in the term "bodily injury by accident" and only such disease as
results directly from a bodily injury by accident is included within the term
"bodily injury by accident." The term "bodily injury by disease" includes
only such disease as is not included within the term "bodily injury by
accident." '786
The Policies also contained a conditions-precedent clause.78 7 Outlining
a series of self-insured retention (SIR) conditions, the clause read in pertinent
part:
RETENTION AND INDEMNITY. The insured shall retain as its own net retention




781. Id. at 381-82.
782. Id.
783. Id. at 382.
784. Id.
785. Id.
786. Id. at 382-83.
787. Id. at 380 n.3.
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company.., agrees to indemnify the insured against loss in excess of such
retention... [up] to the limit of indemnity stated in the declarations;
provided, that the retention and limit of indemnity apply ... [to]:
(a) bodily injury by accident, including death resulting
therefrom, sustained by one or more employees in each
accident, or
(b) bodily injury by disease, including death resulting
therefrom, sustained by each employee.7"'
Finally, the exclusions clause stated somewhat inelegantly: "This policy
does not apply.., to bodily injury by disease unless prior to thirty-six months
after the end of the policy period[,] [a] written claim is made or suit is brought
against the insured for damages because of... injury or death resulting
therefrom ... ,789
On appeal, Riverwood argued generally that the words and phrases in the
various clauses were ambiguous. 7' First, the company asserted correctly that
the Policies did not define the word accident.79' Therefore, Riverwood insisted
that the common understanding of an undefined term must control. 792 And
because popular dictionaries define an accident as "an unforeseen and
unplanned event or circumstance," the company argued that the causes of the
asbestos-related injuries in the present case could be described reasonably as
unforeseen and unplanned events or circumstances.793
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, concluding that an insurance contract's
failure to define a term does not make the term ambiguous, without knowing
more.794 More significant, the court of appeals observed that the Louisiana
Legislature defined an accident in a workers' compensation statute: An
accident is "an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event
happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly
producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than
simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration. '795
Because the duty-to-indemnify issue involved the workers' compensation
policies, the court of appeals decided that the term accident must be given its
plain meaning. 7 6 After applying the rule, the Fifth Circuit found that "an
asbestos-related disease has a long latency period and normally manifests itself
after continued exposure. 79 7 The appellate court also concluded that "an
788. Id. at 380 n.3.
789. Id. at 380 n.2.





795. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1021(1) (1998).
796. Riverwood, 420 F.3d at 383.
797. Id. (citing Hamilton v. Anco Insulation, Inc., 844 So.2d 893, 897 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (observing
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asbestos-related disease cannot be considered an 'accident,' because one's
exposure to asbestos is 'normally not violent' and does not, at the time of
exposure, 'produce objective findings of an injury."""
Regarding the thirty-six month exclusion provision, the district court
concluded that the underlying claims in the present lawsuit involved bodily
injury by disease.799 Therefore, the thirty-six month exclusion applied and
should be enforced as written.8" Regarding the SIR issue, the district court
decided that a separate SIR had to be met for each claim because each claim
was a bodily injury by disease claim.80' But evidence established that no
individual claim exceeded the smallest per-employee $100,000 SIR limit or
the $500,000 SIR limit under later policies.0 2
Still, the Fifth Circuit stated:
We... hold that the district court properly concluded that... an asbestos-
related disease is not a "bodily injury by accident" but is rather a "bodily
injury by disease." Accordingly, the thirty-six month exclusion provision
applies. [Because] Riverwood is not entitled to coverage under the thirty-six
month exclusion provision, we need not address its arguments [regarding] the
SIR issue.803
The Fifth Circuit's analysis is a bit problematic for two reasons.804 First,
the court of appeals adopted without questioning the district court's decision
to view the workers' compensation contract and the employers' liability
insurance contract as if they were identical. 805 Little evidence existed in the
record to support that conclusion. 8°6 Second and more important, "[t]he
Policies [did] not state affirmatively that workers' compensation law [would]
govern the terms" under both the workers' compensation contract and the
employers' liability contract.80 7 Yet, the Fifth Circuit used workers'
that the "vast majority of courts considering the issue have also treated asbestos-related claims as injury by
disease under excess [w]orker's [c]ompensation/[e]mployer [Iliability policies with the same or nearly the
same policy definitions")).
798. Id.
799. Id. at 385.
800. Id. at 385.
801. Id. at 381.
802. Id. at 381 n.5.
The SIR amount for the years covered [under] the Policies were: (1) $100,000 per year for 1974-
1977; (2) $250,000 per year for 1977-1980; and (3) $500,000 per year for 1980-1984. The court
noted that for the settled claims, only Walter Graves's $400,000 claim could possibly satisfy the
SIR, but Graves's last exposure was in 1986, a date not within the policy period.
Id.
803. Id. at 385.
804. Id.
805. Id. at 379.
806. Id. at 379, 383.
807. See id. at 379, 383 n.6.
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compensation rules to define a controversial concept-an accident-to decide
the case.8"8 The appellate court used workers' compensation rules to decide
that Wausau had no duty to indemnify Riverwood, simply because "workers'
compensation law is referenced throughout the Policies. ' '809
From this commentator's perspective, that is arguably an unfair and a
less-than stellar decision for two reasons. First, a fair reading of the reported
facts reveals that Riverwood filed a breach-of-contract suit against Wausau.8"'
The company claimed that the insurer breached a contractual duty to
indemnify or to reimburse funds after the company settled a third party suit.8" '
Without doubt, employers' liability insurance contracts typically outline an
insurer's duty to defend an employer against a third party employee's personal
injury suit. Liability insurance contracts also specify when an insurer will
reimburse an employer after the latter settles a third party lawsuit.
812
Second, barring intentional acts, courts use workers' compensation rules
typically to decide whether employees should be compensated for work-
related injuries and illnesses.813 Stated differently, workers' compensation
rules and policies generally do not disclose whether a liability insurer has a
contractual duty to indemnify an employer after the employer has settled a
third party lawsuit.8
14
More significantly, the facts in Riverwood show conclusively that
Riverwood purchased a series of excess workers' compensation and
employers' liability contracts from Wausau over a ten-year period-from May
1974 to January 1984.815 Arguably, Wausau could have been liable under the
employers' liability contract even if it was not liable under the workers'
compensation contract. Even though Wausau was the only "obligor," a liberal
reading of Louisiana's "solidary obligors" doctrine' t6 suggests that Wausau's
808. Id. at 383.
809. Id.
810. See id. at 381-83.
811. Id.
812. See generally discussion supra Part HLI.A.
813. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032(A)(1)(a) (1998) (outlining employees' rights and remedies
and employers' liabilities to workers under other laws).
Except for intentional acts[,] ... the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his
dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled
to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies, and claims
for damages, including but not limited to punitive or exemplary damages, unless such rights,
remedies, and damages are created by a statute, whether now existing or created in the future,
expressly establishing same as available to such employee, his personal representatives,
dependents, or relations, as against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director,
stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or compensable
sickness or disease."
Id.
814. See generally id.
815. Riverwood, 420 F.3d at 380.
816. See LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1787 (1987). The statute defines "solidary obligors" as follows:
When several persons obligate themselves to the oblige by the terms in solido, or use any other
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obligations under the obviously dissimilar insurance contracts were not
identical as the district and appellate courts assumed. 7
The Fifth Circuit's opinion, therefore, would have been significantly
more enlightening if the appellate court had separately discussed coverage,
exclusions, and the definition of an accident under those distinct insurance
polices. Instead, the Fifth Circuit concluded: "Applying the rules of contract
interpretation, we conclude that the district court properly determined that the
Policies are subject to only one reasonable interpretation-that an asbestos-
related injury is not a 'bodily injury by accident' under the policies in
question. '
3. Whether Under Louisiana's Medical Malpractice Act State Regulators
May Initiate a Direct Action Against a Medical Malpractice Insurer Who
Allegedly Adjusted and Settled Medical Malpractice Claims Fraudulently
Yearly, the overwhelming majority of insurers and their insureds ask the
Fifth Circuit to interpret various rights and obligations under a variety of
insurance contracts. And, as discussed elsewhere, the three state supreme
courts within the Fifth Circuit have adopted identical doctrines to interpret
insurance contracts' words and phrases. 819 On the other hand, insurance
litigants rarely ask the Fifth Circuit to interpret a state's insurance statute, as
insurance contracts typically outline the insureds and insurers' substantive
rights and duties.
expressions, which clearly show that they intend that each one shall be separately bound to
perform the whole of the obligation, it is called an obligation in solido on the part of the obligors.
Id.
817. Cf. Viadav. A &A Machine Works, Inc., 914 So.2d 1113, 1116-17 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
Appellants . . . assign as error the workers' compensation judge's finding that the workers'
compensation carrier and the uninsured motorist carrier are not solidary obligors. [Aippellants
aver that the relationship between the workers' compensation obligor and... insurers is solidary
to the extent of the overlapping obligations.
[A]n insurer bound to repair the damage caused by a tortfeasor is solidarily liable with the
tortfeasor because both are obligated to the same thing, repair of the tort damage.
On the other hand, medical insurers are not obligated to repair tort damages. A medical
insurer contracts to pay stipulated medical expenses, regardless of whether there is a tortfeasor
and tort liability. The medical insurer thus pays its own debt, not that of the tortfeasor, and the
two are not obligated to "the same thing."
Id.
818. Riverwood, 420 F.3d at 382-83.
819. See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2003-2004 Insurance Decisions:
A Survey and an Empirical Analysis, 37 Tax. TECH L. REv. 871, 874, 1029-30 nn.1474-78 (2005).
"Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas have embraced five recognized doctrines to interpret insurance
contracts-the traditional rules of contract construction and interpretation, the doctrine of plain meaning,
the adhesion doctrine, the doctrine of ambiguity, and the doctrine of reasonable expectations." Id.
2007]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
During the 2005-2006 term, however, the court of appeals agreed to
decide the procedural conflict in Louisiana Patients' Compensation Fund
Oversight Bd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. 20 A state appointed
board asked the court of appeals to rule that a state statute allowed the board
to sue an insurer under one of several enumerated conditions.82" ' Of course, the
Fifth Circuit interpreted the statute and issued its ruling.822 But unfortunately,
the ruling was strained, highly unintelligible, and arguably incorrect because
the court of appeals did not cite nor apply any of the rules that Louisiana has
developed to interpret state statutes.
First, a careful review of the reported facts and laws is warranted before
critiquing the Fifth Circuit's analysis and determining whether this
commentator's criticisms are reasonable. First, "the purpose of the Louisiana
Medical Malpractice Act [(LMMA)] is to prevent the uncontrollable escalation
of medical malpractice insurance rates. 823 To help achieve that end, the
Louisiana Legislature created the Patients' Compensation Fund (Fund).82 4
Among other activities, the Fund collects and holds monies in trust for the
"use, benefit, and protection of medical malpractice claimants and.., private
health care provider members .... In addition, the Fund pays "excess
judgments against [qualified] health care providers under the [LMMA] ...."826
Even more significant, the legislature created the Fund and placed it
under the financial control of the Louisiana State Treasury.827 That department
manages and monitors the Fund's assets as well as other special and general
funds in Louisiana.828 On the other hand, the Louisiana Legislature created the
Patients' Compensation Fund Oversight Board (Board) and placed it in the
Office of the Governor. 829 Furthermore, the Board's duties and responsibilities
are exceedingly broad: The Board has "full authority under law, for the
management, administration, operation and defense" of the Fund. 830 The
Board and Fund are not identical entities under the LMMA.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) is a Minnesota
corporation which sells medical malpractice insurance to healthcare providers
820. La. Patients' Comp. Fund. Oversight Bd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.411 F.3d 585, 586
(5th Cir. June 2005).
821. Id. at 586.
822. Id. at 591.
823. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.41 (2006); see William P. Wynne, In Re Medical Review Panel
for the Claim of Maria Moses: The Supreme Court Parts a Red Sea of Questions-The Doctrine of
Continued Tort Applied to Medical Malpractice Claims, 47 Loy. L. REv. 1605, 1612-13 (2001).
824. § 40:1299.44A(1).
825. Id.
826. United Med. Corp. of La. v. Johns, 798 So.2d 1161, 1165 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
827. § 40:1299.44A(1).
828. Id.
829. Id. § 40:1299.44D(1)(a).
830. Id. § 40:1299.44D(2)(a).
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in Louisiana.8 3' Before August 2000, the Board discovered that St. Paul was
engaging in some highly questionable insurance-related practices. 32 Although
the reported facts are sparse, allegedly disgruntled and injured patients filed
medical malpractice suits against healthcare providers-those that St. Paul had
agreed to defend and indemnify under St. Paul's medical malpractice liability
contracts.833
With St. Paul's prodding or assistance, some patients decided to settle
their suits rather than proceed to a trial by jury.834 Thereafter, St. Paul
convinced the medical malpractice plaintiffs to enter into an allegedly secret
agreement with St. Paul. 35 Under the agreement, St. Paul promised to help the
third party victims to secure monies from the Fund, if the patients accepted a
reduced settlement from St. Paul.836 The scheme worked and the Board
responded by suing St. Paul in the District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana. 37
From the Board's point of view, reducing the medical malpractice
patients' settlement amounts, securing the secret agreements, and concealing
those agreements were St. Paul's fraudulent activities, and the Fund was the
victim.838  Therefore, the Board filed a declaratory judgment action. 39 The
Board asked the lower court to declare that St. Paul's allegedly fraudulent
conduct breached St. Paul's statutory duty to exercise good faith and
reasonable care under Section 40:1299.44(C)(7) of the LMMA for the benefit
of both the insured healthcare providers and the patients' compensation
fund.84 The Board also asked the district court to declare that St. Paul had a
duty to indemnify the malpractice claimants as well as the Fund for all monies
that the insurer had secured fraudulently."
831. See St. Paul Travelers Insurance, About Us, http://www.stpaultravelers.corm/about/at-a-glance
.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2007).
832. La. Patients' Comp. Fund. Oversight Bd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.411 F.3d 585, 586
(5th Cir. June 2005).
833. Id. at 587.
834. Id.
835. Id.
836. Id. The complaint was based on "known underlying malpractice cases, as well as underlying




840. Id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44(C)(7) (2006). Section 40:1299.44(C)(7) states:
For the benefit of both the insured and the patient's compensation fund, the insurer of the health
provider shall exercise good faith and reasonable care both in evaluating the plaintiff's claim and
in considering and acting upon settlement thereof. A self-insured health care provider shall, for
the benefit of the patient's compensation fund, also exercise good faith and reasonable care both
in evaluating the plaintiff's claim and in considering and acting upon settlement thereof.
§ 40:1299.44C(7).
841. Oversight Board, 411 F.3d at 587 ("[Tlhe Board requested monetary damages, including loss
of credits for providers involved in the malpractice and loss of funds resulting from adverse judgments and
settlements due to [St. Paul's] fraud and ill practices .... ").
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St. Paul filed a motion for summary judgment, advancing two arguments:
(1) although it had a contractual duty to protect its insureds' interests, it had
no statutory or regulatory authority to protect or preserve the Fund's interests;
and (2) the Board had no legal right to challenge collaterally valid settlement
agreements that injured patients, insured healthcare providers, St. Paul, and the
Fund had approved.
842
The district court denied St. Paul's summary judgment motion. 3 First,
the lower court concluded that St. Paul breached its regulatory duty under
Louisiana's administrative code by failing to give the Fund ten days' written
notice of proposed settlements or compromises.8' The district court also
found that St. Paul breached its statutory duty under the LMMA. 5 More
specifically, St. Paul did not exercise good faith and reasonable care to protect
the Fund's interest when the insurer evaluated underlying malpractice victims'
claims and settled the claims for a reduced amount.8'
St. Paul appealed, and the procedural issue before the Fifth Circuit was
whether the district court's adverse summary judgment was erroneous. 47
More specifically, St. Paul argued that LMMA Section 40:1299.44(C)(7) did
not permit the Board to commence a cause of action against an insurer on
behalf of the Fund, asserting that the insurer breached a duty of good faith and
reasonable care. 8
The Fifth Circuit, however, began its puzzling analysis by stating: "The
Medical Malpractice Act... contemplates that the issue of liability is generally
to be determined between the malpractice victim and the healthcare provider,
either by settlement or by trial, and that the Fund is primarily concerned with
the issue of the amount of damages." 8 9 To further the confusion, the Fifth
Circuit stated: "Payment by one health care provider of the maximum amount
of his liability statutorily establishes that the plaintiff is a victim of that health
care provider's malpractice. Once payment by one health care provider has
triggered the statutory admission of liability, the Fund cannot contest that
admission. ' '85 In both instances, however, the court of appeals did not cite a







848. Id. at 588. St. Paul also raised two additional arguments: (1) Even if the LMMA created a cause
of action for damages, St. Paul did not breach a duty to protect the Fund's interest because St. Paul had a
superior fiduciary duty to protect its insureds' interests; and (2) the district court failed to dismiss two
underlying lawsuits from its deliberation. Id. Given the Fifth Circuit's limited appellate jurisdiction under
§ 1292(b), however, the appellate court only addressed St. Paul's first argument. Id.
849. Id.




Furthering the confusion even more, the Fifth Circuit also stated: "We
agree with St. Paul.... [Tihe Fund attempts to collaterally challenge the
complete and effected settlements in underlying malpractice actions by
claiming against one of the health care provider insurers, as opposed to the
health care provider., 85 2 Then the court of appeals declared:
The Louisiana legislature did not provide the Fund with the cause of action
it seeks to create here. Nowhere in the LMMA is the Fund, or the Board on
the Fund's behalf, given the authority to challenge prior malpractice
settlements by instituting fraud claims against the insurer of a health care
provider. 53
In Louisiana, "[legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will;
therefore, interpretation of a law is primarily the search for the Legislature's
intent. '854 To achieve that end, the Louisiana Supreme Court encourages
lower courts to use the following methodology to interpret litigants' rights and
obligations under Louisiana's civil statutes. 8" First, "[t]he starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. '856 When a statute "is
clear and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd
consequences," courts must apply the statute as written; therefore, courts may
not deliberate further "in search of [a] legislative intent." '857
On the other hand, when a statute is "susceptible to different meanings,"
courts must interpret the statute in a manner that conforms best to its stated
purpose.858 Courts must interpret ambiguous words by "examining the context
in which they occur and the text of the law as a whole., 859 In addition, if two
or more statutes concern the same subject matter, courts must review each
852. Id. at 590. (citing Stuka v. Fleming, 561 So. 2d 1371, 1373 (La. 1990)). The court observed
that under the LMMA, a qualified healthcare provider is not liable for an amount in excess of one hundred
thousand dollars plus interest for all malpractice claims because of injuries to or death of any one patient.
Stuka, 561 So. 2d at 1373. All "damages in excess of the total liability of all liable health care providers,
up to $500,000, are to be paid by the Fund." Id. (citing LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42B(2)); see also
Turner v. Sw. La. Hosp. Ass'n, 856 So.2d 1237, 1240-41 (La. Ct. App. 2003) (approving Stuka).
853. Oversight Board, 411 F.3d at 590-91.
Rather, the LMMA provides a regulatory structure through which the Board manages the
Fund and administers the system created in Louisiana within which both insurers and
health care providers work.... The cause of action alleged by the Board is not expressly
granted by the governing statute, and, to the extent the Board seeks additional enforcement
powers on behalf of the Fund under the LMMA, its pleas must be addressed to the
Louisiana legislature.
Id.
854. See O'Regan v. Preferred Enters., Inc., 758 So. 2d 124, 128 (La. 2000); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2.
855. See Oversight Board, 411 F.3d at 590-91.
856. Deshotel v. Guichard Operating Co., 916 So. 2d 72, 78 (La. 2004).
857. O'Regan, 758 So.2d 128; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 9 (1987).
858. Deshotel, 916 So. 2d at 76; see also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 10.
859. Deshotel, 916 So. 2d at 76.
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statute and give an interpretation after harmonizing the conflict or differences
among the statutes. 860
Section 40:1299.44(C)(2) of the LMMA states in relevant part:
If the insurer of a health care provider.., has agreed to settle its liability on
a claim against its insured and claimant is demanding an amount in excess
thereof from the patient's compensation fund for a complete and final release,
then the following procedure must be followed:
A copy of the [third party claimant's] petition shall be served on the
board, the health care provider and his insurer, at least ten days before filing
and shall contain sufficient information to inform the other parties about the
nature of the claim and the additional amount demanded.861
Once more, the Board asserted that St. Paul entered into secret
agreements with third party victims on behalf of insured healthcare
providers.862 The insurer reduced the settlement amount by a certain
percentage and encouraged victims to sue the Fund to secure the remainder.8 63
The Board argued that St. Paul concealed that allegedly fraudulent conduct,
which is arguably a violation under LMMA Section 40:1299.44(C)(2).8" The
Board also maintained that the allegedly fraudulent concealment violated St.
Paul's statutory duty to exercise good faith and reasonable care under LMMA
Section 40:1299.44(C)(7).8 65
Furthermore, LMMA Section 40:1299.44(D)(2)(a) states that "[t]he board
shall be responsible, and have full authority under law, for the management,
administration, operation and defense of the fund in accordance with the
provisions of this Part. '8 66  And finally, LMMA Section
40:1299.44(D)(2)(b)(xi) states:
In addition to such other powers and authority elsewhere expressly or
impliedly conferred on the board by this Part, the board shall have the
authority, to the extent not inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, to
[d]efend the fund from all claims arising under R.S.
40:1299.44(D)(2)(b)(x), and obtain indemnity and reimbursement to the fund
of all amounts for which [anyone other than a qualified healthcare provider]
860. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 13.
861. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44(C)(2) (2006).
862. La. Patients' Comp. Fund Oversight Bd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 585, 587







may be held liable.16 7
So, we raise the question again: Do these sections of the LMMA allow
the Board to commence a fraud action against St. Paul on behalf of the Fund?
The district court said yes. 68 Moreover, a fair application of Louisiana's rules
for interpreting statutes, which the Fifth Circuit did not cite or embrace, also
suggests that the Board could bring a fraud action. But the Fifth Circuit
concluded: "In the absence of the Louisiana legislature's express language so
providing, and in light of the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation of the
LMMA in Stuka and Mumphrey, we decline to do So." ' 8 6 9 Unfortunately, the
questions and holdings in Stuka and Mumphrey had absolutely nothing to do
with the procedural question before the Fifth Circuit in Oversight Board.7 °
4. Whether the Federal District Court Properly Stayed a Lawsuit
in Which an Insured Corporation's Sole Bankrupt Shareholder Sued
the Liability Insurer for Refusing to Defend or Indemnify the
Insured After a Patron Filed a Wrongful Death Action Against
the Corporation in a Mississippi State Court
Stewart v. Western Heritage Insurance Co. is an ideal case for a first-year
law course---civil procedure, contracts, or torts.8 7 ' Although it presents
multiple issues that first-year law students confront, the Fifth Circuit agreed
to review the controversy in Stewart because the parties presented a persistent
procedural issue that appears among insurance-related conflicts.8 72 The central
procedural conflict concerns judicial abstention; however, the court of appeals
discussed other familiar procedural issues, which makes Stewart an excellent
teaching tool.
873
There are multiple parties in this case, but the facts are few. 74 So, the
facts reported here are derived from a careful reading of the case in its entirety
and secondary sources. 875 Boardwalk Lounge, Inc. (Boardwalk) owns an
867. § 40:1299.44(D)(2)(b)(xi).
868. Oversight Board, 411 F.3d at 587.
869. Id. at 591.
870. See generally Stuka v. Fleming, 561 So.2d 1371, 1372-73; Mumphrey v. Gessner, 581 So.2d
357, 359-60 (La. Ct. App. 1991). In Mumphrey, the underlying plaintiff sued multiple healthcare providers
and ultimately settled with one who paid the statutory limit of $100,000. Mumphrey, 581 So.2d at 360. The
providers were released. Id. The settlement was approved, but the Fund challenged it by filing a third party
action against the dismissed healthcare providers. Id. Relying in part on Stuka, the court held that the Fund
could not seek contribution from the settling defendants through the collateral challenge. Id.




875. Id.; Thyrie Bland, No Motive in Slaying Outside Lounge, THE CLARION-LEADER (Jackson, MS),
Nov.13, 2001, at lB.
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entertainment establishment with a similar name-Boardwalk Lounge
(Lounge). 76 The business is located in Jackson, Mississippi. 77 Susie Pierce
Stewart is Boardwalk's sole officer, shareholder, and registered agent. 78
On November 9, 2001, Ryan Yates and his girlfriend, Rebecca Roberts,
went to the Lounge, where they met Yates's sibling and friends for a Friday
night's outing.879 Suddenly, Yates "walked away from the group and left the
Lounge without saying where he was going." ' Given her concern and
befuddlement, Roberts left the Lounge and returned to their car, looking for
Yates. 8 ' As she approached the car, she saw Yates lying on the ground.8 2
Although he had been shot and "was having problems breathing," Yates was
still alive.883 The next day, however, Yates died at the University of
Mississippi Medical Center in Hinds County, Mississippi.8ss Later, Yates's
survivors commenced a wrongful-death suit against Boardwalk."s5
When Yates's survivors commenced their lawsuit, Western Heritage
Insurance Company (Western) insured Boardwalk under a liability insurance
contract. 8 6 And although Western contractually agreed to defend and
indemnify Boardwalk against third party actions, the insurer refused to defend
Boardwalk in the underlying lawsuit.88 7 As a consequence, Yates's survivors
secured a $1.4 million default judgment, because neither Boardwalk nor
Western appeared and defended against the underlying wrongful-death
action.88 Shortly thereafter, both Boardwalk and its sole shareholder and
agent, Stewart, filed for bankruptcy.8
89
Also, given that Western had refused to indemnify or provide a legal
defense in the underlying action, Stewart sued the insurer on October 23,
2003.890 Before the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
Stewart alleged that Western acted in bad faith and breached its contractual
obligations under the insurance contract.89' Western filed a motion for
summary judgment, and the District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi set February 14, 2005 as the date for trial.8
92
876. Stewart, 438 F.3d at 490.
877. See Bland, supra note 879, at lB.
878. Stewart, 438 F.3d at 490.
















Nearly nine months after Stewart filed her lawsuit against Western, the
bankruptcy trustee for Boardwalk filed a suit in the Circuit Court of Hinds
County, Mississippi. 93 The trustee's complaint listed Western, Stewart, and
Phillip Dunn, an insurance agent, among others, as defendants 9.8 ' The
trustees' lawsuit mirrored the Stewart's lawsuit against Western, barring two
exceptions. 895 First, the trustee alleged that Stewart and Western had a
fiduciary duty to protect Boardwalk's interests and they failed in this duty.8 96
Second, the trustee alleged that Dunn had some unspecified duty and he
breached that duty.8 97 Western removed the state case to the District Court for
the Southern District of Mississippi, claiming an improper joinder.898 In
response, the bankruptcy trustee moved to remand to the Circuit Court of
Hinds County, Mississippi.899
The trustee's suit commenced and Stewart filed two motions to
voluntarily dismiss that action.9°0 Western opposed both motions.90' Stewart
also filed a motion to join Dunn as a party.9° In addition, Western moved to
join Boardwalk's trustee as a necessary party to Stewart's lawsuit against the
insurer. 3 A magistrate judge granted Western's motion and ordered Stewart
to serve the trustee with process. 9°4 The trustee, however, is not a party to this
action because the trustee never became a party.95
The district court set a hearing to consider all pending motions, at which
the federal district court stayed Stewart's lawsuit pending another court's
ruling on the remand motion in the trustee's suit.906 On March 22, 2005,
another judge remanded the trustee's lawsuit to state court finding that Dunn
had been properly joined.907 On March 31, 2005, the federal district court
judge issued an order that terminated all pending motions in Stewart's
lawsuit. 8 In addition, the district court stayed Stewart's suit until the
Mississippi state court resolved the controversy in the bankruptcy trustee's
893. Id.
894. Id. Later, the state court dismissed the others from the suit. Id.
895. Id. at 490-91.
896. Id.





902. Id. at 491 n. 1. Dunn joining the suit would have defeated diversity jurisdiction because Dunn
and the Appellee were from Mississippi. See Cornhill Ins. PLC, v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 84 (5th Cir.
1997).
903. Stewart, 438 F.3d at 491.
904. Id.
905. Id. at 491 n.2. The Appellee stated that it never had an opportunity to join the trustee because
the district court stayed the case. Id.




TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
lawsuit.' °9 Western appealed that order, asserting that the District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi abused its discretion.9 '
The procedural question before the Fifth Circuit was whether the district
court properly stayed the case pending the outcome of a parallel, Mississippi
state court proceeding. 9 ' At the outset, the court of appeals reviewed and
considered the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States.912 Colorado River presented an
abstention doctrine, which helps guide courts in deciding whether to enter a
permanent stay when suits are parallel-those which have the identical parties
and identical issues.9 13
Under Colorado River, a district court may abstain from deciding a case
only under "exceptional circumstances." 914  The Court has identified six
relevant factors to help lower courts determine whether an exceptional
condition exists: (1) whether either court has assumed jurisdiction over a res,
(2) the relative inconvenience of the forums, (3) whether the exercise of
jurisdiction avoids piecemeal litigation, (4) the order in which the concurrent
courts obtained jurisdiction, (5) whether and the degree to which federal rules
will help to resolve the controversy on the merits, and (6) the degree to which
state proceedings protect the rights of the party who wants federal
jurisdiction. 915
The Fifth Circuit found that the federal district court did not apply the
Colorado River test when it stayed the proceedings.9 6 Therefore, assuming
rather than deciding that Stewart and the bankruptcy trustee's cases were
parallel, the court of appeals reviewed the facts in light of the six factors
outlined in the Colorado River test.917  First, the Fifth Circuit found that
"[n]either the state nor federal court has assumed jurisdiction over any res in
this case" and rejected the argument that the absence of this factor has little
significance. 9"8 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the first factor
909. Id.
910. Id.
911. Id. at 490.
912. Id. at 491 (citing Colo. R. Water Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)).
913. Diamond Offshore Co. v. A&B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531,540 (5th Cir. 2002); RepublicBank
Dallas, Nat'l Ass'n v. McIntosh, 828 F.2d 1120, 1121 (5th Cir. 1987) (concluding that if suits are not
parallel, a federal court must exercise jurisdiction).
914. Colorado R. Water Dist., 424 U.S. at 813 (describing abstention as "an extraordinary and
narrow exception to the duty of a [d]istrict [c]ourt to adjudicate a controversy properly before it").
915. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1995).
916. Stewart, 438 F.3d at 492.
917. Id.
918. Id. at 492 n,4 (citing Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1191 (5th Cir. 1988))
(finding that "the absence of this factor is 'a neutral item, of no weight in the scales."'). But, the Fifth
Circuit noted: "This holding in Evanston Insurance conflicts with the holding in Bank One. Because
Evanston Insurance predated Bank One, the former controls our analysis.... The first factor, therefore, is




supports the district court's exercising federal jurisdiction.9" 9
Second, the bankruptcy trustee filed his suit in a Mississippi state court,
and Stewart sued Western in a federal district court.92 ° Both courthouses are
located in Jackson, Mississippi. 92' Therefore, the court of appeals declared that
this close proximity supported federal jurisdiction and concluded that "[w]hen
courts are in the same geographic location, the inconvenience factor weighs
against abstention. 922
Third, federal law does not bar duplicative litigation.9 23 A federal court
may hear a dispute that is also the source of controversy in a pending state
court case.924 But Colorado River prevents piecemeal litigation as well as "the
concomitant danger of inconsistent rulings" involving a res.925 In the present
case, the Fifth Circuit observed that the potential for piecemeal litigating was
present because the Mississippi court was "the only forum hearing the breach
of fiduciary duty claims and claims against Dunn."926 Thus, the appellate court
found that condition favoring abstention, noting that inquiry should focus on
"'how much progress has been made in the two actions. '927
Finally, the Fifth Circuit also found that other factors argued against
abstention: (1) the federal lawsuit had progressed further than the state court
suit; (2) Stewart's lawsuit involved the state law issue in the trustee's case only
minimally and insignificantly; and (3) whether the Mississippi state court
could adequately adjudicate the case was not an issue.92' Therefore, barring
one exception, the piecemeal litigation issue, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
every factor outlined in Colorado River weighed against abstention and in
favor of federal jurisdiction.929 The facts in the case simply could not
overcome the "extraordinary and narrow exception" to the "virtually
unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise [their proper]
jurisdiction. 93 °
919. Id. at 492.
920. Id. at 490-91.
921. Id. at 492.
922. Id. (citing Murphy v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1999)).
923. Id.
924. Bank One, N.A. v. Boyd, 288 F.3d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 2002).
925. Black Sea Inv. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650-51 (5th Cir. 2005).
926. Stewart, 438 F.3d at 492.
927. Id. at 492 & n.5 (citing Murphy v. Uncle Ben's, 168 F.3d 734,738 (5th Cir. 1999)). "While the
current captions suggest that different parties exist, the record is clear that the magistrate intended to have
the trustee joined and the Appellee [was] attempting to join Dunn. These efforts and the ability of the trustee
to file a cross-claim could [have mooted] these piecemeal characteristics." Id.
928. Id. at 493.
929. Id. at 493 ("Given that we must balance these in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction, abstention
in this case is inappropriate.").
930. Colo. R. Water Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.800, 814, 817 (1976).
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5. Whether Under Texas's Doctrine of Equitable Subrogation a
Commercial General Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Indemnify a
Commercial Automobile Liability Insurer Who Defended Against
and Settled an Underlying Wrongful Death Action on Behalf
of an Insured Corporation
Like the third party complainants in Stewart, the aggrieved third party
victims in EMCASCO Insurance Co. v. American International Specialty Lines
Insurance Co. commenced a wrongful death action against the insured.93" ' In
both cases, however, the central controversy involved parties other than the
insureds.932 But unlike the procedural conflict in Stewart, a substantive
question is the focus of attention in EMCASCO.9 33 Furthermore, the action in
EMCASCO sounds in equity rather than in contract or tort, which is a major
departure from the majority of insurance cases that the Fifth Circuit decided
and published this term.934
Also, like an inordinate number of the cases reported this term, the facts
in EMCASCO are unduly sparse. 935 Moreover, they are strewn in small bits
agonizingly and extensively throughout the long opinion.936 Based on a
careful reading of the case and secondary sources, the following facts,
however, are incontrovertible. 937 First, Wilson-Riley, Inc. (Wilson) is a Texas
corporation with its principal place of business located in Tyler, Texas.938
Wilson operates a sand pit, and the company owns and operates trucks to
transport the sand.939 SLS Management Corporation (SLS) owns the land on
which the sand pit is located.'
In February 2001, Jaime Langston was driving down a public, paved
country road with her young son.94' Suddenly, she skidded on a patch of slick
mud, clay, or sand.942 The car swerved off the road and struck a tree.943 Jaime
Langston received serious injuries, and Jamie's son died at the scene.9" About
a year later, the Langstons commenced a wrongful death action against Wilson
and SLS in a Texas state court. 945 The original complaint alleged that Wilson's
931. EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Am. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519,520-21(5th Cir. Jan. 2006).
932. Id.; Stewart, 438 F.3d at 490-91.
933. EMCASCO, 438 F.3d at 520-21.
934. See id.
935. See id.
936. See id. at 520-23.
937. See id.; see Construction Work, http://www.constructionwork.com/contractor2685808_wilson
rileyinc.html (last vivsited Mar. 18. 2007).
938. EMCASCO, 438 F.3d at 521.
939. id. at 521.
940. Id. at 521 n.l.




945. Id. at 521 n.1.
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trucks tracked mud onto the public road when they left the sand pit.9'
Therefore, given the presence of heavy rains in the vicinity of the sand pit, the
Langstons alleged that mud on the road was the primary cause of the
accident.9
47
When the accident occurred, EMCASCO Insurance Company insured
Wilson and SLS under a single commercial auto liability policy. 8 In
addition, American International Specialty Lines Insurance Company
(AISLIC) insured Wilson and SLS under two similar commercial general
liability policies (CGL).9 Wilson notified both insurers and demanded a legal
defense.95° After apparently reserving their rights under the respective
insurance contracts, both EMCASCO and AISLIC hired defense counsel and
began to defend Wilson in the underlying wrongful death lawsuit.95'
Eventually, AISLIC decided to settle the third party claims against SLS
and gave the Langstons $200,000.92 After learning about that settlement,
EMCASCO's counsel and Wilson's personal attorney contacted AISLIC and
asserted that AISLIC's insurance contract also covered the Langstons'
remaining claims against Wilson.953 Thus, EMCASCO demanded that AISLIC
share equally the cost of settling the third party claims against Wilson.954
AISLIC refused to settle on behalf of Wilson, citing (1) facts in the underlying
third party complaint, (2) probative evidence that might be introduced at trial,
and (3) statements from the Langston attorney.955
In effect, AISLIC insisted that it had no contractual duty to settle under
its CGL policy.956 AISLIC also asserted that to the extent that Wilson was






951. Id. at 521-22.
About seven weeks after the accident EMCASCO ... hired defense counsel Mike Winchester
to defend Wilson-Riley. In doing so, EMCASCO asserted its reservation of rights in defending
the suit. In April 2002, AISLIC hired its own defense counsel, Chad Parker, to represent
Wilson-Riley's interests in the Langston suit. AISLIC also issued Wilson-Riley a reservation
of rights letter in which AISLIC advised that, in its view, the existence of the auto exclusion
provision in the CGL policy precluded coverage in the Langstons' suit.
Id.; see Farmers Texas County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (observing that prior to a determination of an insured's liability in an underlying
lawsuit, the insured and insurer agree not to invoke the doctrines of waiver and estoppel and that a
"reservation of fight" means that the insurer "reserves to itself all of its policy defenses" in the event a trier
of fact ultimately finds the insured liable and the insurer decides to defend the insured nevertheless, even
when coverage is in doubt).
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settle the claim under its automobile liability insurance contract.957 Yet,
AISLIC agreed to contribute $20,000 in the event that Wilson and the
Langstons decided to settle.958  EMCASCO, however, refused that offer,
obtained a full release of Wilson's liability from the Langstons, and settled the
lawsuit for $350,000.959
Shortly thereafter, EMCASCO filed an equitable subrogation action
against AISLIC in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas.96° The
former insurer wanted the district court to declare that AISLIC had an
equitable duty to pay all or a part of the $350,000 settlement.96' EMCASCO
and AISLIC filed motions for summary judgment. 962 The district court granted
AISLIC' s motion, finding that EMCASCO's automobile insurance liability
policy covered the Langstons' claims and that AISLIC's CGL policy explicitly
excluded the third party claims.963
More specifically, the district court found that mud erosion from the
unpaved roadway next to Wilson's sand pit was not a separate or independent
cause of the accident; therefore, coverage for the accident was not triggered
under AISLIC's CGL policy.9 4 On the other hand, the lower court found that
Wilson's trucks tracked mud and clay onto the public road and that
commercial activity triggered coverage under EMCASCO's automobile
insurance policy.965 EMCASCO appealed.966
On appeal, EMCASCO argued that (1) the district court's interpretation
of the "automobile exclusion" clause in AISLIC' s CGL policy was erroneous;
(2) the damages that the Langstons sought did not arise out of the use of a
vehicle; and (3) the district court's decision was erroneous because the lower




960. Id. at 520, 524 ("[fin a subrogation case such as this, Texas law recognizes the right of one
insurer to seek payment from a second insurer under the doctrine of equitable subrogation."); see also Gen.
Star Indem. Co. v. Vesta Fire Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1999) (defining equitable subrogation
as "the legal fiction through which a person or entity, the subrogee," becomes a substitute for the insured
or one entitled to secure "the rights and remedies of another by virtue of having fulfilled an obligation for
which the other was responsible"); 16 LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALIO, COUCH ON INSURANCE
§ 223:134, at 147-48 (3d. ed. 2000) (stating that generally, "under the doctrine of equitable subrogation...
[when] an insured is entitled to receive recovery for the same loss from ... the insurer and the tortfeasor,
it is only after the insured has been fully compensated for all of the loss that the insurer acquires a right to
subrogation"); 6A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4121, at
395 (1972) ("An insurer [will not] be subrogated to the rights of the insured unless it had paid the loss in
full.").
961. EMCASCO, 438 F.3d at 520, 524.








To address EMCASCO's concerns, the Fifth Circuit examined the
coverage provision, "Insuring Agreement § 1 (a)," in AISLIC's CGL policy.968
It states:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this Coverage
applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any suit seeking those
damages. However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any
suit seeking damages for bodily injury or property damage to which this
Coverage does not apply. We may, at our discretion, investigate any
occurrence and settle any claim or suit that may result.9 69
The court of appeals also reviewed the automobile exclusion clause,
"Exclusions § 2(g): Aircraft, Auto or Watercraft," in AISLIC's insurance
contract.970  The exclusion clause read as follows: "This insurance does not
apply to... [b]odily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any aircraft, auto or watercraft
owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured. Use includes
operation and loading or unloading."' 97'
Under Texas law, the "eight corners rule" or "complaint allegation rule"
determines whether an insurer has a duty to defend.972 First, a court must
examine the allegations in a third party victim's most recent amended
pleading, along with the coverage clause in a liability insurance contract. 973
967. Id.
[Conversely, AISLIC argued that] the policies .. contain[ed] no ambiguity .... Second, it
[argued] that EMCASCO's proposed reading of the policies [did] not favor the insured, Wilson-
Riley, because EMCASCO's interpretation merely shift[ed] the coverage for the underlying
settlement from EMCASCO to AISLIC, yielding no benefit to Wilson-Riley. Finally, AISLIC
maintainfed] that EMCASCO's interpretation of the policies [was] unreasonable because it [was]
inconsistent with Texas law and reie[d] on caselaw that is inapposite to the facts.
Id.
968. Id.
969. Id. at 521.
970. Id.
971. Id.
972. Id. at 524.
973. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 695, 701 (5th Cir. 1996)
(applying Texas law and declaring that "[t]he duty to defend arises only when the facts alleged in the
complaint, if taken as true, would potentially state a cause of action falling within the terms of the policy");
Rhodes v. Chi. Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that "[t]he duty to defend is determined
by examining the latest amended pleading upon which the insurer based its refusal to defend the action").
Furthermore, the insured has the initial burden to show that the alleged facts in the third party petition state
a potential claim against him. Rhodes, 719 F.2d at 119. To defeat the duty-to-defend claim, the insurer
bears the burden of showing that the plain language of a policy exclusion or limitation allows the insurer
to avoid coverage of all claims, also within the confines of the eight comers rule. Id.; see TEX. INS. CODE
ANN. art. 21.58(b) (Vernon Supp. 1997); Calderon v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex., 1998 WL 898471, at
*2 (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 29, 1998, pet. denied) (citing E&L Chipping Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 962
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"'If a petition does not allege facts within the scope of coverage, an insurer is
not legally required to defend a suit against its insured.'
97 4
Furthermore, Texas courts must focus their inquiry on the third party's
alleged facts and not on the asserted legal theories.975 If doubt exists as to
whether the third party's allegations state a cause of action under the coverage
clause, courts must resolve all doubt in favor of the insured and order the
insurer to defend the insured.976 On the other hand, if the third party complaint
only alleges facts which are excluded under the policy, the liability insurer has
no duty to defend.977
In the Langstons' amended petition, they "alleged that the ... wrongful
death.. . was caused by an accident resulting from [Wilson's]... use [of] the
trucks." '978 Reading that allegation in light of the coverage provision in
EMCASCO's commercial auto liability, the Fifth Circuit declared the contract
covered the accident and that EMCASCO had a duty to defend Wilson.979 On
appeal, however, EMCASCO argued that AISLIC had a duty to indemnify
EMCASCO, a subrogee, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation.980 Under
Texas law, a duty to defend and a duty to indemnify are separate doctrines. 98'
In addition, the duty to indemnify is not based on the allegations appearing in
a third party complaint.982 More important, no duty to indemnify arises in
Texas unless the underlying litigation establishes liability for damages, which
the liability insurance contract covers.983
S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1998, no pet.)); Butler & Binion v. Hartford Lloyd's Ins. Co., 957
S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
974. King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Trinity Universal Ins.
Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821-22 (Tex. 1997)).
975. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Tex., 249 F.3d 389, 392 (5th Cir.
2001) (applying Texas law).
976. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139,141 (Tex.
1997) (noting that courts give the petition's allegations a liberal interpretation).
977. See Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. 1982);
see also Cowan, 945 S.W.2d at 828-29 (declaring that facts ascertained before a suit, developed in the
process of litigation, or determined by the ultimate outcome of the suit do not affect the duty to defend).
978. EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. Am. Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. Jan. 2006).
979. Id.
980. Id.
981. See Farmers Tex. Co. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1997) (declaring that
an insurer may have a duty to defend but no duty to indemnify).
982. See, e.g., Tesoro Pet. Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118, 125 ('ex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (declaring that facts rather than allegations determine an indemnitor's
duty to indemnify).
983. See Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84 (holding that the duty-to-indemnify question is only justiciable
under Texas law after liability has been established in the underlying suit unless "the same reasons that
negate the duty to defend likewise negate any possibility the insurer will ever have a duty to indemnify");
Comsys Info. Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 130 S.W.3d 181, 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [ 14th
Dist.] 2003, no pet.); Collier v. Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 64 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2001, no pet.) (declaring that "the duty to indemnify only arises after an insured has been adjudicated,
whether by judgment or settlement, to be legally responsible for damages in a lawsuit").
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So, did AISLIC have a duty to indemnify EMCASCO? Once more, the
Langstons alleged that Wilson's use of trucks to haul sand was the cause of the
wrongful death. 984 But the exclusion clause in AISLIC's insurance contract
clearly stated that "[tihis insurance does not apply to. .. [b]odily injury...
arising out of the.., use.., of any... auto ... owned or operated by ... any
insured. Use includes operation and loading or unloading. 985 A fair reading
of the language in the complaint and in the exclusion clause leads one to
conclude that AISLIC's contract excluded coverage for the wrongful death,
therefore obliterating AISLIC's alleged duty to indemnify EMCASCO.9 86
Curiously, the Fifth Circuit cited, misstated, and incorrectly applied
Texas's "complete operation theory," thereby reaching a different and
arguably extremely questionable conclusion.9 7 In Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Employers Casualty Co., the Texas Supreme Court described the theory this
way: Under a liability insurance contract, coverage is not limited to the
insureds' acts when the insured simply loads or unloads a vehicle.988 Instead,
"loading and unloading" means the complete operation-the entire process of
transporting goods between a vehicle and the places from which and to where
they are delivered.989
The complete operation theory is designed to expand the definition of the
term use under a liability insurance contract.99 Without more, Travelers
certainly could not help enhance either EMCASCO or AISLIC's defense,
because use was not an issue before the district court.99' Therefore, to present
a more convincing analysis and conclusion, the current Fifth Circuit panel
cited its own modified version of Texas's complete operation theory in Red
Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. ofWisconsin. 992
In Red Ball, a different Fifth Circuit panel incorrectly cited the Texas
Supreme Court's ruling in Travelers9 93 and held that federal courts must
984. EMCASCO, 438 F.3d at 524.
985. Id. at 521.
986. Id. at 521-22.
987. Id.
988. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Employers Cas. Co., 380 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. 1964).
989. Id. at 612.
990. See id.
991. EMCASCO, 438 F.3d at 521-23.
992. Id. (citing Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis., 189 F.2d 374,
377 (5th Cir. 1951)).
993. Id. at 524. The Fifth Circuit panel in Red Ball created a modified rule for Texas out of thin air.
That panel stated:
[T]he theory adopted in Texas [is] generally known as the 'complete operation theory,' [which]
holds that the provision for use coverage extends to foreseeable consequences of what was done
in connection with the use of the car, whether before, after, or during loading or unloading, so
long as the act or thing done by the insured's employee which causes the accident arises out of
the use of the insured's car.
Red Ball, 189 F.2d at 377. But, the Fifth Circuit did not cite any Texas cases that clearly outlined this
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address two issues when applying Texas's complete operation theory:
(1) "whether [an] insured's act was an act incident to . . .the use of [a]
truck" 994 and (2) "whether that act proximately caused plaintiffs injury. 995
Applying the modified rule and considering the first element, the Fifth Circuit
"reject[ed] EMCASCO's contention that... 'the phrase "arising out of'...
the use... require[s a] contemporaneous use of the insured's vehicle. "996 Put
simply, the opinion's analysis and conclusion are highly unintelligible and
arguably irrelevant. 7
The facts revealed that Wilson's trucks tracked mud onto the public
road. 998 Therefore, turning to the second element, the Fifth Circuit stated the
importance of determining whether the tracking of mud onto the highway was
the proximate cause of the wrongful death.999 The appeals court observed: "If
the factfinder determines that the insured's act in connection with the use of
the vehicle did not proximately cause the injuries, the insured is not liable, and
the insurer has no duty to indemnify."" °
The Fifth Circuit found that AISLIC's policy covered the mud tracking
which was "unrelated to the use of the trucks ... ."00' Concluding that at least
one genuine issue of material fact existed, the Fifth Circuit held that the district
court's summary judgment in favor of AISLIC was improper."° 2 The court of
appeals, therefore, remanded the case."'c The Fifth Circuit also instructed the
district court to determine whether sufficient evidence existed to decide as a
matter of law that heavy rains before the accident produced sufficient mud,
which could have been the independent cause of the wrongful death, and
whether that issue should be sent to a factfinder. 1 °
expansion of Texas's complete operation theory. Id. The separate causation prong, foreseeable
consequences, magically appeared in the doctrine.
994. EMCASCO, 438 F.3d at 525 n.3 (citing Red Ball, 189 F.2d at 377) (noting that coverage extends
"so long as the act or thing done by the insured's employee which causes the accident arises out of the use
of the insured's car).
995. Id. at 525 n.4 (citing Red Ball, 189 F.2d at 377) (stating that "the provision for use coverage
extends to foreseeable consequences of what was done in connection with the use of the car").
996. Id. at 526 n.9.
997. Id. at 522-23.
998. Id. at 523.
999. Id. at 526.
1000. Id. at 526 n.10.
1001. Id. at 528.
The non-excluded event, the washing of mud from the unpaved roadway, however, is covered
by the general liability policy, because it could have independently caused the injuries. When
two separate events-one that is excluded and one that is covered by the general liability policy
-may independently have caused the accident, Texas law mandates that the general liability
policy also provide coverage despite the exclusion.






Without doubt, EMCASCO is a poorly reasoned and an excruciatingly
difficult to understand opinion, but it need not be. The complaining insurer
simply asked the federal district and appellate courts, sitting in equity, to make
a simple declaration."° Instead, the district issued a summary judgment, and
the Fifth Circuit wasted precious judicial resources attempting to explain why
the summary judgment was erroneous." °  Elsewhere, this commentator has
highlighted the problems and costs that summary judgment motions and
practice present when litigants ask courts to make rulings in equitable actions,
like those involving declaratory judgment and equitable subrogation.'0°7
Again, under Texas law, the doctrine of equitable subrogation allows a
party or a subrogee who involuntarily pays another's debt to seek
reimbursement from the person, who in equity and good conscience, should
have paid the debt."'°8 Stated differently, equitable subrogation is intended to
prevent the unjust enrichment of a debtor.'0° 9 To receive relief under an
equitable subrogation action, a claimant must prove both that the other party
or debtor was primarily liable for the debt and that the claimant paid the debt
involuntarily. 10 If the district and appellate courts had applied these rules,
reviewed the undisputed facts carefully, and applied one of Texas's five
doctrines of contract interpretation, the analysis in EMCASCO would have
been more intelligible and the conclusion less troublesome.
6. Whether Under Texas Law a Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Defend and
Indemnify an Insured Operator of a Refinery After the Refinery's
Employees and Other Third Party Victims Commenced Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death Actions Against the Refinery
The substantive question in Motiva Enterprises, LLC v. St. Paul Fire and
Marine Ins. Co., also centered on whether an insurer had a duty to defend and
indemnify an insured, after third parties commenced a wrongful death and
other tort actions against the insured.'0 ' Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C. (Motiva)
1005. Id. at 519-28.
1006. ld. at 528.
1007. See Rice, supra note 77, at 638-39 nn.487-88.
[Texas's trial judges participate in another unsettling practice. Instead of conducting full-blown
declaratory-judgment trials, trial judges regularly grant or deny summary-judgment motions
without giving intelligible, meticulous, or studious explanations of their rulings. As a
consequence, Texas's appellate courts must spend an enormous amount of time and limited
judicial resources exploring various plausible theories to determine whether an unexplained
summary-judgment ruling was sound or erroneous.
Id.
1008. See Brown v. Zimmerman, 160 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
1009. See First Nat. Bank of Kerrville v. O'Dell, 856 S.W.2d 410, 415 (Tex. 1993).
1010. See McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc., 515 S.W.2d 32,36 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 869 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied).
1011. Motiva Enters., LLC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 381, 381 (5th Cir. Mar. 2007).
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is "a joint venture between Shell and Saudi Refining Inc. [that] refines,
distributes, and markets oil products in the eastern and southern United
States.' '012 In addition, Motiva refines and supplies gasoline to "approxi-
mately 7,600 Shell-branded gasoline stations.' ' ° 3 The company's principal
place of business is Houston, Texas.
01 4
Motiva owns a refinery in Delaware, where John Beaver was an
employee." 5 In July 2001, a sulfuric acid storage tank at the Delaware
refinery exploded. 10 1 6 The explosion killed one employee and injured several
others, including John Beaver.' 17 Along with numerous other victims, John
and Pamela Beaver sued Motiva (the Beaver suit).0 18 Specifically, Motiva's
coverage existed under two main "towers," which were known as the
Continental Tower and St. Paul Tower.'0 9 Both towers totaled seven
insurance policies in all.'0 2 Additionally, National Union Fire Insurance Co.
of Pittsburgh (National) provided $25 million umbrella coverage, with the duty
to indemnify and defend once the underlying insurance was exhausted.'°2'
Motiva contacted National in July 2002 and informed the insurer about
the underlying lawsuits, including the Beaver suit.' °22 At that time, Motiva
asked National to provide a legal defense.0 2 3 Initially, National balked.'024 In
May 2003, however, National sent a reservation-of-rights letter to Motiva that
withdrew its denial of coverage but reserved the right to withhold or limit
coverage under the terms and conditions of National's insurance contract.
0 25
Two months later, Motiva informed National that St. Paul's insurance policy
was exhausted and that the burden of defending the lawsuit shifted to
National.
0 26














In February 2003, National Union conditionally disclaimed coverage on the ground that the
underlying insurance policies had not yet been exhausted. National Union reserved the right to
supplement or amend its disclaimer in the future. When National Union did not withdraw its







On August 6, National agreed to defend Motiva in the case and in the
other pending lawsuits, but again, that defense was offered subject to a
reservation of National's right to deny coverage. 102 7 Under the insurance
contract, Motiva had a duty to cooperate fully with National during the legal
defense; therefore, National asked Motiva to participate in the Beaver
mediation. 10 2' But Motiva refused to give the Beaver documents to
National. 10 29 Still, a National representative attended the mediation, during
which the Beaver complainants demanded $40 million to settle the lawsuit. 030
Motiva, however, forced National's agent to leave and the mediation continued
without National's presence.'0 3' Motiva voluntarily settled the lawsuit
voluntarily for $16,500,000.1032
Following the mediation, Motiva asked National to reimburse the
settlement expenditures. 33 National refused, asserting that Motiva had not
secured its consent as required under the consent-to-settle clause in the
insurance contract.' °34 Shortly thereafter, Motiva filed a breach-of-contract
action against National in the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas.0 35 In its complaint, Motiva argued that National had a duty to pay the
cost of settling the Beaver claim.' 36 Both National and Motiva filed motions
for summary judgment. 10 37 Ultimately, the district court granted National's
motion, holding that Motiva had breached conditions under the contract's
consent-to-settle and cooperation clauses. 1 31 Motiva appealed.' 39
Before the Fifth Circuit, Motiva argued that the federal district court
committed reversible error.' 4 First, reviewing the coverage clause, the court
of appeals found that National indeed agreed to defend and indemnify Motiva
once the underlying insurance policies were exhausted. 1"' But, as stated
1027. Id.
1028. Id. at 383-84.
1029. Id.
Motiva asked National Union to send a representative with full settlement authority to [mediate]
the Beaver case that was scheduled for August 8, 2003. National Union immediately requested
all documents related to Beaver, but on August 1, Motiva rejected the request, claiming that
National Union had "never acknowledged coverage" for the Beaver claim. Despite that refusal,
Motiva still demanded that National Union attend the mediation.
Id.











1041. Id. at 383.
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before, two conditions precedent were required.' 2 One condition appeared
in the insurance contract's consent-to-settle provision: "No Insureds will,
except at their own cost, voluntarily make a payment, assume any obligation,
or incur any expense, other than for first aid, without our consent."' 3 The
second condition appeared in the cooperation clause." 4 It stated in pertinent
part: "You and any other involved Insured must: ... cooperate with us in the
investigation, settlement or defense of the claim or suit. ' °
Notwithstanding the conditions precedent appearing in those two clauses,
Motiva insisted that it had a right to settle the Beaver lawsuit without
consulting National and securing the insurer's consent." a  To justify its
decision to settle the case independently, the company stressed that National's
willingness to defend the underlying lawsuits was subject to a reservation of
right to deny coverage at a later date." 7 To prove that its decision to settle the
suit without National's consent was legal, Motiva cited the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Rhodes v. Chicago Insurance Co.°48 In Rhodes, the court of
appeals declared:
If the insurer properly reserved its rights and the insured elected to pursue his
... defense, the insurer is bound to pay damages which resulted from covered
conduct and which were reasonable and prudent, up to the policy limits....
[Tihe insured is not constrained by conditions in the policy which limit the
insured's ability to settle the claim, and the insurer cannot complain about the
insured's conduct of the defense.' 9
But the present Fifth Circuit panel observed that the holding in Rhodes
was an Erie guess of what the then Texas Supreme Court would have
decided.0°0 Fifteen years after Rhodes, however, the Supreme Court of Texas
decided State Farm Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Maldonado. °5' In Maldonado,
the supreme court held that an insured may sue an insurer and recover
proceeds under a liability insurance contract, if the insurer agrees to defend the
insured under a reservation of rights and the insured breaches a condition
precedent in the insurance contract.' 52
Therefore, embracing Maldonado, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
district court's ruling was proper: Even though National reserved its right to
1042. Id. at 384.
1043. Id. at 383 n.1.
1044. Id.
1045. Id. at 383 n.2.
1046. Id. at 383.
1047. Id. at 384.
1048. Id. (citing Rhodes v. Chi. Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1983)).
1049. Rhodes, 719 F.2d at 121.
1050. Motiva, 445 F.3d at 385.
1051. State Farm Ins. Co. v. Maldonado, 963 S.W.2d 38, 38 (Tex. 1998).
1052. Id. at 40.
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contest coverage and refused to offer an unqualified legal defense, Motiva had
no right to breach the consent-to-settle clause and settle the underlying lawsuit
without National's consent. 0 53 Still, Motiva argued that National must pay the
policy benefits, unless National could prove that Motiva's breach prejudiced
the insurer's rights under the contract.'0 54
To prove that National had to show prejudice, Motiva cited the Texas
Supreme Court's decision in Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds. 055 In
Hernandez, the supreme court held that an insurer may escape liability-
assuming the insured settled without the insurer's consent--only when the
insured's breach of a condition actually prejudiced the insurer's interests or
rights under the insurance contract. 56 On the other hand, a court must force
an insurer to fulfill its obligation and provide coverage when the insured's
breach of a condition is not material and has not prejudiced the insurer's
benefit of the bargain under the contract.' 7
Citing a recent Fifth Circuit panel's application of Hernandez in Ridglea
Estate Condominium Ass'n v. Lexington Insurance Co., the current Fifth
Circuit panel concluded that after an insured breaches a prompt-notice or a
consent-to-settle provision, whether an insurer must demonstrate prejudice
before breaching its obligations is not conclusively clear under Texas law.
058
Therefore, without deciding whether the insurer must show prejudice to avoid
its contractual obligations when the insureds breach the consent-to-settle
provision, the Fifth Circuit concluded that National was prejudiced as a matter
of law.0 59 And of course, that ruling removed the court of appeals' burden of
1053. Motiva, 445 F.3d at 385 (citing Maldonado, 963 S.W.2d 38 at 38). An insurer that "tenders a
defense with a reservation of rights is entitled to enforce a consent-to-settle clause." Id.
1054. Id.
1055. Id. (citing Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 1692 (Tex. 1994)).
1056. Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 692.
1057. Id. at 693.
1058. Motiva, 445 F.3d at 386 (citing Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 415 F.3d
at 476, 480 n.4 (5th Cir. July 2005)).
[A] panel of this court recently applied Hernandez . .. . The insurer argued that it had no
obligation under the policy because the insured failed to give "prompt notice of the loss or
damage" to covered property.... The panel... concluded that although notice of damage was
not prompt, the district court erred in holding that the insurer was not required to show prejudice
in order to rely on the prompt notice provision as a defense. The panel carefully noted, however,
that it "[did] not read Hernandez as necessarily creating a prejudice requirement for all insurance
policies issued in Texas."
Motiva, 445 F.3d at 386. A breach of a notice provision is a "condition precedent" to the insurer's liability,
not a "covenant"; thus, the insurer is not required to show prejudice from the breach. Id. at 386 n.5 (citing
PAJ Inc. v. Hanover, 170 S.W.3d 258, 260-61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005)).
1059. Id. at 386-87.
An insurer's right to participate in the settlement process is an essential prerequisite to its
obligation to pay a settlement. When ... the insurer is not consulted about the settlement...
and the insurer has no opportunity to participate in or consent to the ultimate settlement decision,
we conclude that the insurer is prejudiced as a matter of law. Under these circumstances the
breach of the consent-to-settle provision in the policy precludes this action.
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deciding whether Motiva's breach of the cooperation clause precluded
recovery under the insurance contract.l160
7. Whether Under Texas Law an Excess Liability Insurer Has
Duty to Defend and Indemnify Its Insured After the Receiver for
the Injured Judgment Creditor Sues the Excess Insurer in a Third
Party Personal Injury Suit
Minter v. Great American Insurance Co. of New York is another case in
which a complainant asked the federal court to determine whether an insurer
has a duty to defend and indemnify under a liability insurance contract. z"' But
unlike other cases discussed in this presentation, the facts in Minter are
extremely complex. 1062 For that reason, the Fifth Circuit's analysis is quite
extensive and complicated." 63 Yet, if the court had spent less time sifting
through arguably irrelevant facts and more time applying one of Texas's
doctrines of contract interpretation, the analysis in Minter would have been
more instructive.
Hammer Trucking, Inc. (Hammer) does business in Texas and
elsewhere. °64 Jerry Lee Largent was Hammer's employee." 5 On June 27,
1996, JTM Materials, Inc. (JTM) leased an tractor-trailer truck from
Hammer. °66 Under the lease, Hammer assumed several contractual duties:
(1) to maintain control of the truck, (2) to use the truck exclusively for the
benefit of JTM, (3) to ensure the truck was safe and performed properly, (4) to
pay all maintenance and operating expenses and (5) to select a driver and pay
the driver's salary." 7 To comply with the latter, Hammer selected Largent to
drive the truck "exclusively for JTM's benefit."' 6
Largent lived in Bridgeport, Texas, and in early November 1996, Don
Hammer, the owner and president of Hammer Trucking, instructed Largent to
deliver the truck to a maintenance facility near Decatur, Texas' °69 Hammer
had scheduled an inspection and services for the truck to comply with one of
Hammer's duties under the lease.'0 70 As Largent was driving the tractor-trailer
truck to Decatur, he collided with another vehicle. 07' Grant Morris was the
1060. Id. at 387.













owner and driver in the other vehicle.' 72 Moreover, Largent was intoxicated
when the accident occurred.1 73 Later, Largent pleaded guilty to the charge of
driving while intoxicated. 1074
In May 1997, Morris filed a multiple-claims lawsuit against Largent,
Hammer Trucking, and JTM in a Texas court.1 75 At that time, St. Paul Fire
and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul), the primary insurer, insured JTM
under a commercial automobile liability insurance contract.0 76 The policy
limit was $1 million for each accident that a covered automobile caused.1 77
In addition, Great American Insurance Company (Great American) insured
JTM under an excess liability insurance policy.' 78 Great American agreed to
provide excess coverage after the primary insurance coverage was
exhausted. 10
79
Therefore, in the underlying litigation, St. Paul defended JTM against
Morris's actions, and the Texas court granted JTM's motion for summary
judgment 80 A jury tried the suit against Hammer and Largent.'l 8 ' But St.
Paul did not defend Hammer or Largent 08 2 Instead, the latter defendants
defended themselves pro se. 1'83 Morris received a directed verdict against
Hammer and Largent, finding that Largent was acting within the scope of his
employment with Hammer when the accident occurred and that Largent was
a permissive user of the truck.'0 4 The jury awarded approximately $2.6
million in damages, along with very substantial pre- and post-judgment
interest.08 The jury also found that Hammer and Largent's conduct was
malicious.10 86 Consequently, they assessed $1.65 million and $300,000 in




1075. Id. at 463. The complaint listed the following causes of action and allegations: (1) Largent's
alleged common law negligence and negligence per se; (2) Hammer and JTM's alleged negligent hiring,
retention and supervision of Largent, negligent entrustment, and vicarious liability; (3) JTM's liability based
on joint enterprise, joint venture, and civil conspiracy theories; (4) JTM's liability for Largent's conduct
based on statutory violation and on the doctrine of borrowed-servant; and (5) JTM's alleged liability under
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. Id.
1076. Id.
1077. Id. at 462.
1078. Id.
1079. Id.
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Hammer and Largent did not appeal the verdict andjudgment. 88 Morris,
however, appealed JTM's favorable summary judgment award to the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals, where that Texas appellate court remanded the case
to the trial court after partially affirming and vacating some of the lower
court's rulings. 0 89 But even before Morris's appeal, the Texas trial court had
acted to ensure that Largent satisfied Morris's judgment. °9 The lower court
ordered Largent to transfer his assets to Darrell Minter, an appointed receiver
for Morris. 1°9'
Largent transferred all of his alleged claims and causes of action against
St. Paul and Great American.' °92 The transferred claims against the primary
an excess insurers included the following: (1) breach of contract for failing to
defend Largent in the underlying lawsuit, (2) failure to indemnify Largent
under JTM's insurance contracts, (3) common law, bad faith refusal to defend
Largent in the underlying action, (4) statutory violation of the Unfair
Competition and Unfair Practices Act, and (5) statutory violation of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.l°1
3
To satisfy Morris's multimillion-dollar judgment, Minter sued St. Paul in
a Texas state court." 4 Ultimately, St. Paul paid $1.9 million, which
effectively settled all of Morris's claims and actions against both JTM and
Hammer.'°95 Although that settlement completely exhausted JTM's primary
coverage under St. Paul's $1 million insurance contract, it did not cover the
remaining part of the judgment against Largent.1 096 To secure the additional
damages, Minter, Morris's receiver, filed a diversity lawsuit against Great
American in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas.' 7 Both
Great American and Minter moved for summary judgment."°8
1088. Id.
1089. Id. at 463-64.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals (1) vacated that judgment for part of the vicarious liability
claims and for the claims for negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and entrustment, and
remanded for trial on those issues, and (2) affirmed for respondeat superior, civil conspiracy,
joint venture and joint enterprise. In vacating the summary judgment awarded JTM for part of
Morris' vicarious liability claims, the court held: if JTM was a federally regulated motor carrier,
it was liable, as a matter of law, under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
Importantly, in affirming JTM's summary judgment against Morris' respondeat superior claim,
the court held: Largent was acting outside the scope of his employment at the time of the
collision. (The record is silent concerning the disposition of this matter on remand.).
Id. at 464-65 (citing Morris v. JTM Materials, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 28,43, 51-53 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002,
no pet.)) (other citations omitted).








1098. id. at 464.
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The district court granted Great American's motion for summary
judgment, in light of the Fort Worth Court of Appeals' favorable summary
judgment ruling in favor of JTM.' 9 The district court found the following:
(1) Minter was collaterally estopped from asserting that Largent was acting
within the scope of his employment when the collision occurred; (2) Great
American's assertion that Largent was not a permissive user of the trailer truck
was a valid defense, notwithstanding the Texas trial court's judgment because
this issue was vigorously litigated in the state court; (3) Largent's decision to
use the truck while he was intoxicated was beyond the scope of Hammer or
JTM's permission; (4) a TE 9916 endorsement and the "exclusive use" clause
under the St. Paul policy did not cover the accident because Largent had no
ownership interest in the truck; (5) the MCS-90 endorsement to the St. Paul
insurance contract did not cover Largent because it served only as an
independent basis for coverage when other coverage was absent; (6) Great
American's excess policy did not cover the underlying third party claims
because St. Paul's policy-the underlying primary insurance contract-did not
cover the accident; and (7) because the Great American excess policy did not
cover any of the third party claims, Minter's extra-contractual tort claims were
barred as a matter of law."' Minter appealed."0"
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by examining the coverage clause in
Great American's excess contract."02 Under sections II(B)(1) and II(B)(5) the
definition of an "insured" included the following persons:
"Your [JTM's] employees, other than your executive officers, but only for
acts within the scope of their employment .... [and any] other person or
organization who is insured under any policy of [the] 'Underlying Insurance.'
The coverage afforded such 'Insureds' under this policy will be no broader
than the 'Underlying Insurance' except for this policy's Limit of
insurance."" 03
Also, St. Paul's primary insurance contract was catalogued in the Great
American policy's schedule of underlying insurance contacts."'
On appeal, Minter asserted that Largent was JTM's "statutory employee"
under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR) and was acting
within the scope of his employment."' ° Consequently, according to Minter,
JTM, and Great American were vicariously liable for Largent' s negligence.l '0
1099. Id.
1100. Id. at 464.
1101. Id. at 461.






TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
Great American disagreed."' 7 To resolve this issue, the Fifth Circuit had to
determine whether Largent was an insured under either the excess or primary
insurance contracts. 10 8
First, the court of appeals observed that the "permissive user" or
"omnibus clause" in St. Paul's primary policy defined an "insured" as anyone
who used a covered vehicle that JTM leased or borrowed with JTM's
permission."' Because all parties agreed that the truck was a covered auto
under St. Paul's policy, the issue became whether Largent was using the
vehicle with JTM's permission when the collision occurred."'l Under Texas
law, an owner's "consent to use the vehicle at the time and place in question
and in a manner authorized by the owner, either express or implied" is the
definition of permissive use.." Also, the Texas Supreme Court's ruling in
Royal Indemnity Co. v. H.E. Abbott & Sons, Inc. is worth stating here:
"[A]lthough express permission requires an affirmative statement," one may
infer implied permission "'from a course of conduct or relationship between
the parties in which there is mutual acquiescence or lack of objection
signifying consent...'112
Examining the undisputed facts more closely, the Fifth Circuit found that
Hammer Trucking had the exclusive responsibility for maintaining the
truck." 3 On the night of the collision, Largent had secured Don Hammer's
express permission to drive the truck to the maintenance facility in Decatur,
Texas." "4 But the federal district court found that the accident occurred in
Bridgeport as Largent returned home after visiting his sister's house."' 5 Great
American argued Largent' s visit to his sister's house was a personal errand."1' 6
The district court agreed, finding that Largent's familial visit was deviation
1107. Id.
1108. Id.
1109. Id. at 466; see BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1121 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "omnibus clause" as
"[a] provision in an automobile-insurance policy that extends coverage to all drivers operating the insured
vehicle with the owner's permission").
1110. Minter, 423 F.3d at 466.
1111. Hartford Accident & Indem. Corp. v. Lowery, 490 S.W.2d 935, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
1112. Royal Indemnity Co. v. H.E. Abbott & Sons, Inc., 399 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1966).
1113. Minter, 423 F.3d at 466.
1114. Id.
1115. Id. at462.
On the day of the collision, Largent, who lived in Bridgeport, Texas, was in the process of
delivering the truck to a facility near Decatur, Texas, for scheduled maintenance .... That day,
Largent had been instructed... to deliver the truck by 9:00 a.m. the next day (Sunday.. .). At
approximately 11:00 p.m. Saturday . . . , Largent drove the truck to his sister's house, also
located in Bridgeport, in order for her to give him a ride back from the maintenance facility in
Decatur. Because his sister could not give him a ride, Largent ... decided to return to his house
and take the truck to the maintenance facility the next morning. The collision occurred while




from the express, permissible bounds that Hammer had set before Largent
began the trip to Decatur.'
117
The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that the district court's summary
judgment ruling in favor of Great American was erroneous in part because
whether Largent had express permission to drive the truck to his sister's house
created a genuine material question of fact."' 8 Largent insisted that he had
received Hammer's express permission to secure a ride from his sister after he
delivered the truck."' 9 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit found competent
summary judgment evidence suggesting a genuine question of fact about
another issue: whether Largent had implied permission to drive to his sister's
house."20
The court of appeals noted that Largent's sister lived "approximately one
mile from [Largent' s] apartment" and "Hammer allowed Largent to keep the
truck at his apartment-because [Largent] had no other regular transportation
to and from work." 112' The Fifth Circuit concluded that these two bits of
information could suggest that Hammer impliedly consented to Largent's
deviating from a planned course of conduct. 1122 And that would preclude Great
American's receiving a favorable summary judgment. 123
Still, even if Largent received Hammer's express or implied permission
to drive to his sister's house, the court of appeals had to address another
equally important issue before vacating the district court's summary judgment
in favor of the excess insurer." 24 The Fifth Circuit had to decide whether
Largent's use of the truck while intoxicated was beyond Hammer's express or
implied permission to operate the vehicle.125 And if so, the court of appeals
had to decide whether that deviation was minor or material." 126
In Coronado v. Employers' National Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme
Court embraced the minor deviation rule to determine whether an operator's
use of a vehicle deviated from the scope of the vehicle's intended use."1 2 7
1117. Id.
Driving to [Largent's] sister's house was outside the scope of the permission expressly granted
to [him], as he was only given express permission to take the truck to the maintenance yard[, but]
[a]t the state court trial... Don Hammer testified that he gave Largent permission to go to his
sister's house to secure a ride back from the maintenance yard.
Id.
1118. Id. at 466-67.
1119. Id.
1120. Id. at 467.
1121. Id.
1122. Id.
1123. Id. at 467. "Implied permission may be inferred from a course of conduct or relationship
between the parties in which there is mutual acquiescence or lack of objection signifying consent." Id.




1127. Coronado v. Employers' Nat'l Ins. Co., 596 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex.1979).
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Under the rule, courts must determine whether the deviation was minor or
material, taking into account a number of factors, including the extent of the
spatial and temporal deviation, as well as the lender or owner's reasons for
giving the operator permission to use the vehicle.'l 2 8 Minor deviations do not
create genuine issues of fact, although "more significant deviations may create
triable questions of fact."129 Other deviations, however, will revoke a grantor's
permission-as a matter of law-if a court concludes that those deviations are
material. "30
In the present case, the federal district court found that Largent operated
the truck while he was intoxicated and therefore deviated from the intended
use of the truck. 13 1 More important, the lower court found that Largent's
driving while intoxicated was a material deviation as a matter of law and
therefore, JTM and Hammer's permission was revoked. "132 To decide whether
that conclusion was warranted, the Fifth Circuit carefully reviewed the facts
and holdings in three somewhat similar cases: Coronado, Old American
County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Renfrow, and Royal Indemnity.I33
In Coronado, the employee and driver of the company's pickup truck left
work at 4:15 p.m. with his work crew.1"34 Instead of taking the crew members
to their respective homes, however, the employee took them to a local bar."
135
After leaving the bar eight hours later, the employee-driver collided with
another vehicle, causing the death of a passenger. 1 36 In the underlying
wrongful death action, the third party asserted that the employer's liability
policy contained an omnibus clause rendering the driver a permissive user." 137
The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the eight-hour deviation was a gross,
material deviation as a matter of law. 138 The supreme court found that the
employee's use of the vehicle exceeded the scope of the permission that the
company had granted.' 139 Consequently, whether the employer had impliedly
or expressly consented to the deviation was not a question of fact.1"'
1128. Id. at 504-05.
1129. Id. at506.
1130. Id.
1131. Minter, 423 F.3d at 467.
1132. Id. (citing Minter v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 3:02-CV-2040-K, 2004 WL 515615, at *7 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 27, 2004)).
1133. Coronado, 596 S.W.2d at 506; Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Renfrow, 130 S.W.3d 70,
74 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Royal Indem. Co. v. H.E. Abbott & Sons, Inc. 399 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex.
1966).
1134. Coronado, 596 S.W.2d at 503-04.
1135. Id. at 503.
1136. Id.
1137. Id. at 504.





In Renfrow, a similar omnibus clause in an automobile liability insurance
contract generated a heated debate."14' The employer gave an employee
permission to drive the company's truck to the employee's home after work
and instructed the employee to return the vehicle to the job site the next
morning."142 Instead, the employee drove approximately forty miles from the
work site to visit his girlfriend. 143 The employee killed his girlfriend in a
single-vehicle accident." 44 The Renfrow court found that the employee
removed the truck from the boundaries set by the employer and concluded,
therefore, that the forty-mile trip to the girlfriend's house was a material
deviation as a matter of law."145
Finally, in Royal Indemnity, a ranch owner hired a laborer to work on his
ranch that was located approximately fourteen miles northwest of Ballinger,
Texas."' The employee had permission to drive two trucks as needed in his
duties.' 147 One Saturday, the rancher and laborer made a round-trip to Bronte,
Texas.1148 After returning to the ranch, each drank two bottles of beer.' 149 That
same evening, and without receiving the rancher's permission, the employee
drove one of the trucks to San Angelo, which is approximately fifty miles
away from the ranch." 150 The employee went to San Angelo for personal
reasons. "151
During the trip, the worker bought and drank more beer."152 Eventually,
the laborer lost control of the vehicle and ran into a building.' 153 A jury found
that the worker's decision to drive the truck to San Angelo was within the
scope of the rancher's implied permission; therefore, the omnibus clause in the
rancher's automobile insurance contract covered the accident. 1154 The Texas
Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the employee had never driven a work
truck off the ranch, except when the rancher specifically instructed the
employee to do so.1"55 In addition, the Texas Supreme Court found that the
employee had never used the trucks for personal reasons." 56 Therefore, the
court reversed the jury's verdict and the lower court's judgment, concluding
that the evidence did not show "a relationship nor a prior course of conduct
1141. Old Am. County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Renfrow, 130 S.W.3d 70, 71-72 (Tex. 2004).
1142. Id.
1143. Id. at 71-72.
1144. Id.
1145. Id. at 73.
1146. Royal Indem. Co. v. H.E. Abbott & Sons, Inc., 399 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex 1966).
1147. Id.
1148. Id.





1154. Id. at 344.
1155. Id. at 347.
1156. Id.
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from which [an] implied permission might fairly be inferred."' 1 57
After reviewing these cases, the Fifth Circuit observed that the Royal
Indemnity court did not consider the employee's intoxication to reach a
decision, even though undisputed facts indicated that the employee's
intoxication caused the accident.11 8 Instead, the Royal Indemnity court
focused primarily on the distance and length of the employees' deviation from
the scope of the employers' permission. 59 But the Fifth Circuit also observed
that the Coronado court considered the employee's intoxication before finding
a material deviation as a matter of law."6
Embracing the view that intoxication is an "other factor" that courts must
consider when determining whether a deviation is material or the extent of the
deviation, the Fifth Circuit concluded that whether Largent's intoxication
placed his use of the truck outside the scope of permission was a genuine
question of fact."61 Reversing the district court's summary judgment award
in favor of Great American, the appellate court stated that a jury could find
that Largent's use of the truck complied with Hammer's permission and that
Largent's intoxication revoked that permission."1 62 But the court of appeals
was adamant about one issue: No Texas state law precedent supports a finding
that Largent's failure to follow his employer's instruction is a material
deviation as a matter of law without knowing more.
1 163
8. Whether Under Louisiana Law and a Service Agreement a
Subcontractor Has a Duty to Indemnify the Contractor's Developer's
Liability Insurer After the Insurer Settles a Personal Injury Claim of an
Employee Who Worked for Both the Contractor and Subcontractor
The legal issue in St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co. v. Halliburton
Energy Services, Inc. also concerns whether one has a duty to indemnify. 1"64
Here, the question is whether an alleged tortfeasor must indemnify a
developer's liability insurer after the insurer settled an injured employee's
third party suit. 1165 The case is somewhat complicated because both the
insured employer and the alleged tortfeasor had a duty to protect the injured
employee from harm. 1166
1157. Id.





1163. Id. at 470.






LLOG Exploration Company (LLOG) develops and operates oil and gas
properties. 167 In March 2001, LLOG leased a drill barge from R&B Falcon
Drilling USA, Inc. (Falcon). 1 68 LLOG used the barge to help drill wells off
the coast of Venice, Louisiana.1 69 The contract between LLOG and Falcon
(Drilling Contract) stated that LLOG would hold Falcon harmless if LLOG's
employees or invitees filed any third party injury claims against Falcon."170
The Drilling Contract also required LLOG to provide various services which
a service company usually provides for persons working at oil and gas sites." I
7
'
Founded in 1919, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. (Halliburton) is one
of the world's largest providers of products and services to the petroleum
industry."17' To ensure that employees and others received the appropriate
services at the well site, LLOG selected Halliburton to deliver those
services.' 1'7 To consummate the agreement, LLOG and Halliburton executed
a Master Service Contract (Service Contract).1 74
Without doubt, under Louisiana law, Halliburton assumed at least a
limited contractual duty to take care of two sets of employees at the site."
75
Halliburton had a duty to protect its employees delivering the services and
products, as well as other oil and gas employees at the work site. 1 76 More
important, the Service Contract obligated Halliburton to indemnify LLOG as
well as LLOG' s invitees-including Falcon-if Halliburton' s employees filed
third party claims against LLOG and its invitees.' '
7
In March 2001, one of Falcon's barges capsized. 1 78 Gilbert Goldman, a
Halliburton engineer and a LLOG invitee, was on the barge when the accident
occurred. 79 Goldman was injured, and he sued LLOG and Falcon to recover
damages.18 0 Citing the Drilling Contract, Falcon, LLOG's invitee, demanded
that LLOG provide a legal defense and indemnify Falcon for expenses
associated with the third party suit." 8' Initially, both LLOG and Halliburton






1172. See Halliburton Inc., Overview, http://www.halliburton.com/default.aspx?navid=337&pageid
=706 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
1173. Halliburton, 445 F.3d at 821.
1174. Id.
1175. Seeid.
1176. Id. at 821-22.
1177. Id. at 821 n. 1 ("The Service Contract was accompanied by a Rider executed by the parties which
modified portions of its indemnity provisions.").
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and sought reimbursement from LLOG and St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance
Company."83 St. Paul insured LLOG's oil and gas operations under a liability
insurance contract."
8 4
St. Paul and LLOG withdrew the denial of liability and reimbursed
Falcon for $550,000.'185 After studying the Drilling Contract's indemnity
provisions, St. Paul decided to sue Halliburton to collect the $550,000 that the
insurer paid to Falcon."11 6 From St. Paul's perspective, Halliburton was
contractually obligated to indemnify LLOG and LLOG's invitee, Falcon, for
monies paid for Halliburton's employees' injuries."87 The insurer filed the
action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 188 After
considering cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted
Halliburton's motion.1 89 St. Paul appealed the case."'
At the outset, the Fifth Circuit examined two documents that governed the
contractual relationship between LLOG and Halliburton." 9' First, the Service
Contract began by defining the parties:
[This contract is] made and entered into on the above date by and between
[LLOG Exploration Company] (hereinafter referred to as "LLOG") and
[Halliburton Company], its divisions [Halliburton Service] and [Halliburton




LLOG initially rejected Falcon's demand for indemnity on the grounds that the Drilling Contract
failed the 'express negligence test,' which provided that a party cannot be indemnified for its
own negligence when the indemnity contract does not so provide expressly. Although LLOG
and St. Paul initially refused to reimburse Falcon, they relented after this court concluded that
the express negligence test would not operate to preclude claims asserted against Falcon based
upon Falcon's negligence in East v. Premier, Inc., a case involving an identical contract between
Falcon and LLOG.
Id.
1186. Id. at 822.
1187. Id. at 822 n.3. "St. Paul also argue[d] that Halliburton [was] estopped from withholding
reimbursement due to its representations and action in defending LLOG in the litigation." Id. But because
the court declared that Halliburton was "obligated to indemnify LLOG under the Service Contract," the
court did not address the equitable estoppel argument. Id.
1188. Id. at 822.
1189. Id.
Both Halliburton and St. Paul filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion filed by Halliburton and denied St. Paul's motion. Because Halliburton did not
expressly agree to indemnify LLOG for contractual claims, the district court concluded that
Halliburton was not responsible for the defense or indemnity obligations [that LLOG] assumed





and [Otis Engineering Company] (hereinafter referred to as "Contractor"). 192
Second, Paragraph 4(a), the indemnity clause in the LLOG/Halliburton Service
Contract, stated: "For the purposes of this section any reference to LLOG
shall include... any or all agents, directors, officers, employees or invitees of
LLOG or such co-lessees, or any or all of such parties."" 93
The Fifth Circuit also reviewed a rider to the Service Contract."'
Although the rider did not modify Paragraph 4(a) in the indemnity clause, the
rider certainly modified and revised the remaining sections of the indemnity
clause." 95 The rider's revised language stated in pertinent part:
Section 4. INDEMNITY: Paragraphs (b) and (c) shall be amended and
paragraphs (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) and (i) added to read:
(b) Contractor shall be responsible, and LLOG shall never be
liable, for property damage or personal injury to or death of
Contractor's employees or the employees of Contractor's
subcontractors and Contractor agrees to indemnify and hold
LLOG harmless against any and all such claims, demands or suits
which may be brought against LLOG by any such party, or the
legal representative or successor of any such employee, in
anywise arising out of or incident to the work to be performed
under this contract by Contractor, or Contractor's subcontractors,
irrespective of whether such claims, demands, or suits are based
on the relationship of master and servant, third party, or
otherwise, the unseaworthiness or unairworthiness of vessels or
craft, or the negligence or strict liability, in whole or in part, of
LLOG." 196
Before the court of appeals, St. Paul and LLOG argued that the rider
required Halliburton to reimburse St. Paul and LLOG. 197 They argued that the
third party victim, Goldman, was Halliburton's employee and that Falcon was
LLOG's invitee within the meaning of Paragraph 4(a)." 9 ' Halliburton
embraced the view that Falcon was LLOG's invitee. "99 The service company
asserted, however, that the indemnity provision was defective.1200 Halliburton
stressed that the indemnity provision did not clearly state that Halliburton must
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indemnify LLOG after the latter company settled the third party injury
claim. 1 20
1
The district court granted Halliburton's motion for summary judgment,
relying on the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Foreman v. Exxon Corp. and Corbitt
v. Diamond M. Drilling Corp.1 2 2 In both cases, the Fifth Circuit held that
"'express notice is required [when] a party seeks to shift [their] contractual
liability to indemnify a third party"' and that contractual language that creates
an indemnity obligation-"'for injury to or death or illness of persons"'-only
gives notice about tort-based, rather than contract-based claims. 20 3
But the court of appeals observed that it also addressed the present
controversy in five other cases-Sumrall v. Ensco Offshore Co.,' 204 Campbell
v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc.,1 205 Mills v. Zapata Drilling Co.,' 2°6 Kelly v.
Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc.,' 20 7 and Lirette v. Popich Bros. Water
Transport, Inc. 1208 And in each, the Fifth Circuit cited the controlling language
in the indemnity clauses and ordered the responsible torffeasors to pay for third
party injuries."'121
1201. Id. at 823 n.4.
Halliburton also argues that the Service Contract Rider modified the contract to effectively
remove "invitee" from Paragraph 4(a) of the Service Contract. However, the Service Contract
Rider specifically enumerates which subsections of Paragraph 4 are to be modified, and leaves
4(a) untouched. The district court refused to read the Service Contract Rider as impliedly




1203. Id. (quoting Foreman v. Exxon Drilling Corp., 770 F.2d 490, 496-97 (5th Cit. 1985); Corbitt
v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 654 F.2d 329, 333-34 (5th Cir. 1981)).
1204. Sumrall v. Ensco Offshore Co., 291 F.3d 316 (5th Cit. 2002).
1205. Campbell v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc., 27 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 1994).
1206. Mills v. Zapata Drilling Co., 722 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1983).
1207. Kelly v. Lee's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc., 908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cit. 1990) (per curiam).
1208. Lirette v. Popich Bros. Water Transp., Inc., 699 F.2d 725 (5th Cir. 1983).
1209. See St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs. Inc., 445 F.3d 820, 825 (5th
Cir. April. 2006) (stating, "[wie subsequently applied Lirette's conduit principle in Mills, 722 F.2d at 1175,
Campbell, 27 F.3d at 187-88, and Sumrall, 291 F.3d at 320"); see also Lirette, 699 F.2d at 728.
In Lirette, Popich Bros. Water Transport, Inc.... owned and operated a vessel time-chartered
to Otto Candies, Inc. ("Candies"). The contract between Popich and Candies required that
Popich indemnify Candies, as well as its "affiliated companies and anyone for whom the vessel
may be working" against personal injury claims made by Popich employees.
The [Fifth Circuit] concluded that: Popich was called upon to make good its contractual
obligation to hold Candies (and Exxon) harmless from claims, suits or damage 'arising out of,
or in any way connected [with] the operation of the vessel under this charter." Popich's
obligation to reimburse Candies for amounts due Exxon arose because of Popich's express
undertaking to make good to Exxon all such losses. Candies acting as a conduit did not alter that
obligation.
Because Exxon was a member of the class of "affiliated companies" named in the
indemnity provision, Popich was obligated to indemnify Exxon, and Popich could not escape
its obligation merely because Candies acted as a "conduit" for indemnification.
Halliburton, 445 F.3d at 824-25 (internal citations omitted).
970
INSURANCE DECISIONS
To resolve the present controversy, the court of appeals relied heavily on
those earlier decisions, especially its rulings in Mills and Lirette.1210 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and declared that Halliburton
had a contractual duty to reimburse LLOG and its insurer, St. Paul, for the
expenses associated with settling the injured employee's third party lawsuit.1 2 ,I
B. Third Party Liability Claims-Injury to Property
1. Whether Under Louisiana's Direct-Action Statute a Stevedoring
Company's Marine Liability Insurer Has a Duty to Indemnify the Seller-
Shipper of Cargo After the Cargo Was Severely Damaged
Earlier in this review, a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's analysis and
conclusion in Motiva appears. 21 2 Again, the insured in Motiva used its funds
to settle a third party lawsuit.1 213 Afterward, the insured asked the insurer to
reimburse the settlement expenditures. 1 4 The insurer refused, arguing that the
insured breached conditions in the insurance contract's consent-to-settle and
cooperation clauses. 5  More specifically, the insured did not secure the
insurer's consent or cooperate with the insurer before settling the third party
lawsuit.12
16
The insured insisted, however, that the breach of conditions did not
prejudice the insurer's interests as the insurer claimed.' 7  But, the Fifth
Circuit panel deciding Motiva disagreed, even though the panel admitted that
Texas law is unclear regarding whether an insurer must prove prejudice after
an insured breached a prompt notice or a consent-to-settle provision.1218 Still,
rather than certifying the case to the Texas Supreme Court, the Motiva panel
concluded that the insurer was prejudiced as a matter of law.1219
Similarly, the central question in Thyssen, Inc. v. NOBILITY MV also
concerned whether an insured's breach of a prompt-notice clause prejudiced
the insured and insurer's interests. 20 But, unlike the Motiva panel, a different
1210. Id. at 826.
LLOG's claim for indemnity from Halliburton under the Service Contract is functionally
indistinguishable from CNG's claim for indemnity in Mills .... Because this case is
controlled by our decisions in Lirette, Mills, Campbell, and Sumrall, we reverse the
judgment of the district court and render summary judgment in favor of St. Paul.
Id.
1211. Id.
1212. See supra Part IV.A.6.
1213. Motiva Enters., LLC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 381, 381 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006)
1214. Id.
1215. Id. at 384.
1216. Id.
1217. Id.
1218. Id. at 386-87.
1219. Id.
1220. Thyssen, Inc. v. NOBILITY MV, 421 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005).
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Fifth Circuit panel that decided Thyssen did not reach a questionable
conclusion as a matter of law. 22' Instead, the Thyssen panel considered and
thoughtfully applied Louisiana law."222 As a consequence, the panel delivered
an exceedingly thoughtful, lucid, and carefully researched decision.
Multiple parties were involved in Thyssen, and the relationships among
them were complicated. Fenice Maritime Ltd. (Fenice) owns the MV
NOBILITY (MV Nobility), a large vessel that transports containers and other
cargo. 223  Thyssen, Inc. (Thyssen) is presently doing business as
ThyssenKrupp Materials North America, Inc. 1224  Thyssen is a Michigan
corporation with its principal place of business located in Detroit.'225 Among
other enterprises, Thyssen processes and makes deliveries of high-grade steel
to companies in North America. 1226  Its portfolio of steel-based products
includes hot-rolled, cold-rolled, electro-galvanized, aluminized, and advanced
high-strength steels.1227 CPLA is Thyssen's customer.1228 Thyssen purchased
243 cold-rolled steel coils (cargo) from CSN, the Brazilian subsidiary
company. 229 Thyssen intended to resell the steel coils to CPLA. 2 30
Clipper Bulk Shipping, Ltd. or Bossclip, Ltd. time chartered the MV
Nobility from Fenice. 23' CSN, the manufacturer of the coils, voyage chartered
the vessel from the time charterers. 232 The shipper incorporated the voyage
1221. Id.
1222. See id. at 304-07.
1223. Id.
1224. See Jeffrey McCracken, Ex-Thyssen Executives Guilty; 2 Face Federal Prison in Vendor
Kickback Scheme, DET. FREE PRESS, Aug. 13, 2004, at IC.
A federal jury in Detroit returned guilty verdicts on charges of conspiracy, money laundering and
tax and mail fraud against Kenneth J. Graham, the former CEO of Thyssen Inc. N.A., and Kyle
E. Dresbach, the Detroit-based company's former executive vice president.... Thyssen, which
has because changed its name to ThyssenKrupp Materials North America, cooperated with the
government on the case. It has about 400 employees in Michigan and 1,900 in the United States.
It has annual sales of about $2 billion.
Id.
1225. Id.
1226. See ThyssenKrupp Steel N.A., Inc., http://www.tksna.com (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
1227. See id.
1228. Thyssen, 421 F.3d at 297.
1229. Id.
1230. Id.
1231. Id. at 297 n.l.
A time charter is a contract whereby a vessel is let to a charterer for a stipulated period, in
exchange for a remuneration known as hire-a monthly rate per ton deadweight or a daily rate.
The charterer is free to employ the vessel as it sees fit within the terms as agreed, but the
shipowner continues to manage his own vessel through the master and crew who remain his
servants.
Id.
1232. Id. at 297 n.2.
A voyage charter is a contract under which the shipowner agrees to carry an agreed quantity of
cargo from a specified port or ports to another port or ports for a remuneration called freight,
which is calculated according to the quantity of cargo loaded, or sometimes at a lump sum
freight.
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charter date, February 19, 2001, into the bills of lading and listed the liability
for Thyssen's cargo as "[f]ree in out stowed."'2 33 The MV Nobility left Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil in February 2001 and arrived in New Orleans, Louisiana in
April 2001.1234
Pennant Shipping Services, Inc. (Pennant) is a Louisiana corporation,
with its principal place of business located in Kenner, Louisiana. 1235 Pennant
was Fenice's agent in New Orleans. 1236 Therefore, before the MV Nobility
arrived, Pennant contacted Stafford & Stillwell Stevedoring, Inc. (S & S) and
hired the company to unload the cargo. 12 37 Pennant also contacted Thyssen,
disclosing the vessel's discharge location and reporting that S & S's stevedores
would unload the steel coils. 1238 Thyssen embraced Pennant's decision,
thereby creating a binding contractual relationship between Thyssen and S &
5.1239
The MV Nobility arrived in New Orleans on or about April 6, 200 1.124°
Shortly thereafter, Thyssen inspected the 243 cold-rolled steel coils while they
were still aboard the MV Nobility. 124' After discovering condensation and rust
on the coils, Thyssen lodged a tentative water-damage claim with the MV
Nobility's charterers. 1242  Subsequent examinations, however, strongly
suggested that the stevedores' negligence was the cause of the rust damage. 1
243
After learning about the damaged cargo, CPLA refused to purchase the coils
from Thyssen. 121
Over the succeeding twenty-five months, Thyssen filed several
supplemental and amended complaints against three defendants in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 1245 First, the disgruntled company
commenced a suit in rem against Fenice, MV Nobility's owner. 246 Soon
thereafter, Thyssen added S & S as a defendant, and during those long months,
Thyssen discovered that USI Gulf Coast, Inc. (USI) was S & S's insurance
Id.
1233. Id. at 297 & n.3. "Free Out" cargo is discharged at the risk and expense of the cargo interests.
Id.
1234. Id. at 297.
1235. See Pennant Shipping, Company Information, http://www.masterseek.com/id/1229603/Pennant-
Shipping.htm (last visited Mar. 18 2007).
1236. Thyssen, 421 F.3d at 297.
1237. Id.
1238. Id. at 297.
1239. Id. at 297-98.
1240. Id.
1241. Id. at 298.
1242. Id.
1243. Id. at 301. "Thyssen emphasize[d] that S & S was represented by its own surveyor, the firm
Martin Ottoway, during the damage surveys. Martin Ottoway surmised the damage occurred... as a result
of S & S['s] using improper equipment to handle the coils." Id.
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broker.124 7  USI disclosed to Thyssen that National Union Fire Insurance
Company of Louisiana (National) insured S & S under a comprehensive
marine liability (CML) policy.' 248
Relying on USI's representation, Thyssen submitted its third party
property loss claim to National.' 249 National refused to pay or settle the claim,
arguing that Thyssen did not file the notice of loss in a timely manner. 250 In
response, Thyssen amended its complaint and sued National under the
Louisiana Direct Action Statute (LDAS). 251  LDAS allows a third party
complainant to sue liability insurers directly.1252 National answered Thyssen's
original and amended complaints and filed a motion for summary judgment.253
Both Thyssen and Fenice opposed National's motion and, ultimately, the
district court denied it.1
2 4
S & S, however, did not answer after receiving notice and being
served. 255 More relevant, the stevedoring company did not have any legal
representation at the hearing, neither retained representation or representation
that National secured on behalf of S & S.1256 Thyssen petitioned the federal
district court for a default judgment. 25 7 The court granted and entered a
$160,696.28 default judgment against S & S258 Nearly two years after
Thyssen discovered the damaged cargo, a judge decided his action against
National in a bench trial.' 59 At the trial's closing, the district judge granted
National's motion for involuntary dismissal.126  Put simply, the court found








1251. Id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (2004).
1252. § 22:655(B)(1).
The injured person or his or her survivors or heirs .... at their option, shall have a right of direct
action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy; and, such action may be
brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and insurer jointly and in solido,
in the parish in which the accident or injury occurred or in the parish in which an action could
be brought against either the insured or the insurer under the general rules of venue prescribed
by Code of Civil Procedure Art. 42 only.
Id.
1253. Thyssen, 421 F.3d at 298-99.
1254. Id.









Furthermore, a few months later, that same district court dismissed
Thyssen's claim against Fenice. 262 The court concluded that the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) shielded Fenice from liability for the damaged
steel-rolled coils. 12 63 Alternatively, the district judge concluded that, assuming
the Harter Act applied, Fenice was not liable for Thyssen's damaged cargo
under that federal statute.""6 Thyssen timely appealed, and the appeals were
consolidated. 26
5
Before the Fifth Circuit, Thyssen argued that the district court committed
reversible error by concluding that Thyssen's default judgment against S & S
ipso facto prejudiced National.' 21 More specifically, Thyssen strongly
asserted that National failed to meet its burden in showing adequate prejudice
on the present facts. 1267 To support that assertion, Thyssen observed that S &
S's agent concluded that National could not have defended S & S successfully
at the hearing during which the lower court awarded the default judgment.2 68
Additionally, Thyssen acknowledged that USI, the insurance broker, waited
three weeks to notify and forward the property damage claim to National. 1269
But Thyssen insisted that National was not prejudiced because the limitation
period for appealing the default judgment had not been exhausted prior to the
notice of loss. 270 Thyssen also stressed that National could have raised a Rule
60(b) motion to set aside the default judgment for good cause.' 27' Therefore,
Thyssen argued that if National were prejudiced, the insurer's own inaction
was the culprit. 1272
On the other hand, National supported the Fifth Circuit's finding of
prejudice as to the notice issue.1273 And the insurer insisted that the default
judgment and the absence of legal representation at the hearing established
ipsofacto prejudice. 274 Essentially, National asserted that "late notice of the
claim deprived it of the opportunities to promptly investigate the claim, to




1263. Id. (citing Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300-15 (2000)).
1264. Id. at 299 (citing Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 190 (2000)).
1265. Id. The non-insurance related question before the Fifth Circuit was whether the district court
erred in dismissing Thyssen's in rem claim against the NOBILITY and against Fenice as vessel owner. Id.
A discussion of the panel's disposition of that question does not appear in this review, but the panel
concluded that the district court did not commit reversible error. Id. at 306-08.
1266. Id. at 300-01.




1271. Id. (citing FED. R. CrY. P. 60(b)).
1272. Id.
1273. Id.
1274. Id. at 302.
1275. Id.
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The panel framed the central question this way: whether the district court,
in granting National's motion for involuntary dismissal, committed reversible
error after National proved sufficient prejudice to defeat Thyssen's LDAS
action. 276 And to determine if Thyssen or National's arguments were sound,
the Thyssen panel began its deliberations by reviewing the notice-of-loss or
notice-of-occurrence provision that appeared in S & S's CML insurance
contract. 277 It reads in pertinent part:
Whenever the Assured has information from which the Assured may
reasonably conclude that an occurrence covered [under this policy involves]
... injuries or damages which... is likely to involve this Policy, notice shall
be sent to: USI Gulf Coast, Inc. as soon as practicable, . . . however ....
failure to notify the above firm of any occurrence which at the time... did
not appear to involve this Policy, .. . shall not prejudice such claims.278
A reporting-of-claims provision also appeared in the liability contract,
specifying the proper procedure for filing claims. 1279 It stated in relevant part:
In the event of an occurrence with respect to which insurances are afforded
under this Policy, written notice containing particulars sufficient to identify
the Assured and also reasonably obtainable information with respect to the
time, place and circumstances thereof, and the names and addresses of
available witnesses, shall be given by or for the Assured to this Company as
soon as practicable. 2 s°
Louisiana law is clear: An insurer must establish sufficient prejudice if
an insurer wants to defeat a third party's action under the LDAS. 2 sl Citing
this rule, Thyssen asserted that National had to appeal the default judgment
against S & S or exhaust other procedural remedies before attempting to prove
prejudice. 282 But the Thyssen panel found contrary authority.'283 In Elrod v.
P.J. St. Pierre Marine, Inc., the Louisiana appellate court concluded that the
following acts or conditions would support a finding of prejudice: (1) a
court's entering a default judgment is evidence of prejudice; (2) an insurer's
lost opportunity to defend an insured before a default judgment; (3) an
insured's ability to secure legal representation in an underlying suit; and (4)
a jury's verdict in favor of the third party plaintiff along with an unsettled
1276. Id.
1277. Id.
1278. Id. at 300.
1279. Id.
1280. Id.
1281. See Auster Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Stream, 891 F.2d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 1990) (reaffirming
Louisiana's law that an insurer can escape liability if the insurer shows prejudice at an adequate level).




dispute about damages.' 2 4
National argued that it would have challenged the assertion that S & S's
negligence, while unloading the cargo, was the cause in fact of the damaged
cargo; the insurer insisted that it would have raised that defense before the
lower court entered the default judgment against S & S. 285 To establish
prejudice on appeal, National presented prima facie evidence strongly
suggesting that preloading activities and conditions on the MV Nobility were
the cause in fact of the damaged cargo rather than S & S's alleged
negligence. 1286 The insurer also presented evidence suggesting that the lower
court's methodology for calculating damages prejudiced the insurer's
interests. 287 According to National, Thyssen's "late notice.., deprived [the
insurer of] ...opportunities to promptly investigate the claim, to appoint
counsel to represent S & S's interests, and to [defend against] ... Thyssen's
claim.
,, 1288
Embracing National's arguments, the Thyssen panel concluded that the
district court did not commit reversible error. 128 9  The Fifth Circuit panel
affirmed the district court's finding that National and S & S's interests were
sufficiently prejudiced when Thyssen breached the notice-of-loss clause in the
comprehensive marine liability insurance contract.'
21
1284. Elrod v. P.J. St. Pierre Marine, Inc., 663 So.2d 859, 859-64 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (noting the
difficulty of conceiving "greater prejudice... than a demand for payment of a default judgment of which
a defendant is totally ignorant").
1285. Thyssen, 421 F.3d at 301-02.
1286. Id. at 302.
National Union attempts to shift some of the blame for the damage from S & S, noting that two
preloading surveys indicated several of the outer covers of the coils were already bent and
crimped. National Union also emphasizes Thyssen's persistent claims of rust damage prior to
entry of the default judgment. Moreover, National Union contends Thyssen failed to mitigate
any handling damages by S & S by not stopping the discharge operations when Thyssen was
informed the coils were being damaged, and then by subsequently allowing S & S to load the
coils onto trucks for transfer to the inspection site.
Id.
1287. Id. National Union argued that the method used in the default hearing to determine the amount
of damaged coils was not equitable. Id. The insurer stressed that Thyssen calculated its damages
inappropriately, assuming that all 243 coils were damaged. Id. A representative sample, however, estimated
that only 80% of the cargo (194 coils) had been damaged. Id. The difference between the two calculations
was nearly $22,000. Id. National Union also argued that certain "transportation fees, surveyor's fees, and
storage charges" were improperly listed as damages, as Thyssen would have incurred those expenses even
absent S & S's alleged negligence. Id.
1288. Id.
1289. Id. at 304.
1290. Id.
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2. Whether Under Texas Law an Environmental Impairment Liability
Insurer Has a Duty to Indemnify its Insured-a Metals, Smelting and
Refining Corporation-After the Insured Paid Fines Under the Federal
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
Arguably, the findings in International Insurance Co. v. RSR Corp., are
the most intelligible, and the conclusions are the most carefully weighed
among this year's reported insurance law cases. 2 9' In addition, the reported
facts in RSR are generous, thereby enabling jurists to understand the court's
findings and conclusions. 1292 Also, the RSR panel carefully considered a
variety of legal issues and thoroughly researched each one. 293  But more
important, the legal analysis in RSR is more outstanding than the greater
majority of this term's insurance law decisions because the RSR panel
embraced a simple, commonsense methodology, carefully considering and
applying one of the five doctrines of contract interpretation. 1294 The RSR panel
embraced a jury's definition of a disputed term in a policy, rather than
spending an inordinate amount ofjudicial resources trying to define the elusive
"true" meaning of a term.
295
The underlying controversy in RSR is fairly widespread in the United
States, and the insurance law dispute is extremely common as well.
1296
Therefore, the pertinent facts in RSR are fairly interesting and easy to
comprehend. RSR Corporation (RSR) is a Texas corporation with its
headquarters located in Dallas, Texas. 2 97 RSR is a leading lead smelter with
several subsidiaries. 29' Among other activities, RSR recycles scrapped lead-
acid batteries and other lead-bearing materials.1299 The end product is a refined
material consisting of lead, calcium, and antimonial lead alloys. 300 RSR
operates recycling sites in several states, including its Harbor Island site near
Seattle, Washington. 3°
1291. Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281,284 (5th Cir. Sept. 2005).
1292. Id.
1293. Id.
1294. Id. at 291-92.
1295. Id.
1296. Id. at 285.
1297. Id.
1298. See id. at 284. RSR's subsidiaries are Quemetco, Inc., Quemetco Metals Limited, Inc., f/k/a
Murph Metals, Inc., Bestolife Corporation, and Revere Smelting & Refining Corporation of New Jersey,
and in this presentation, they are referred to collectively as RSR. Id.
1299. Id.
1300. Id.
1301. See Lisa Stiffler, $8.5 Million from Ex-Smelter Owner Will Aid Cleanup, SEATILE POST-
INTELUGENCER, Feb. 1, 2006, at B2.
A former smelter owner has agreed to pay the federal government $8.5 million to help pay for
the massive cleanup of lead and toxic chemicals on Harbor Island.
Dalas-based RSR Corp. and two subsidiaries, Quemetco Inc. and Quemetco Realty Inc.,
[Vol. 39:843
INSURANCE DECISIONS
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).1302 Congress responded to the
public's concern about (1) the production and careless disposal of hazardous
wastes and (2) the severe environmental and public health effects of hazardous
substances. 30 3 CERCLA has two stated purposes: to ensure the "prompt
cleanup of hazardous waste sites" and to "impos[e] ... all cleanup costs on the
responsible party."'' 30
4
To achieve congressional intent, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has the authority to remove hazardous spills and prevent the release of
hazardous substances which "may present an imminent and substantial danger
to the public health or welfare."' 1305 The EPA may respond in two ways."'
The agency has authority to commence a removal action, which allows the
EPA to take immediate action to clean up a hazardous release. 130 7 In addition,
the agency may commence a remedial action to prevent or minimize the
release and migration of hazardous substances-those which present and are
likely to present a substantial danger to public health or to the environment. 130
Furthermore, the EPA may ask the Attorney General to commence an
action against an actual or potential polluter to prevent "imminent and
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment
.... , 3' Finally, after the United States or a state spends money to prevent
pollution or to decontaminate a hazardous site, the EPA may account for the
expenditures associated with a removal or a remedial action. 310 CERCLA
gives the EPA authority to recover money from all responsible persons,
including the owners of contaminated sites."31'
Therefore, in December 1982, the EPA issued a press release, announcing
that the agency would place Harbor Island on its proposed National Priorities
List (NPL). 1312, At that time, North River Insurance Company (North River)
were named in the consent decree settling the costs. Quemetco bought the Harbor Island smelter
in 1969 and became a subsidiary of RSR three years later.
Id.
1302. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2000).
1303. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
1304. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990).







1312. See § 9605(a)(8)(A)(B).
[Tihe President shall... revise and republish the national contingency plan for the removal of
oil and hazardous substances... [The plan] ... shall establish procedures and standards for
responding to releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants, which shall
include at a minimum:
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insured RSR under an environmental impairment liability (EIL) insurance
contract.1 31 3  The EIL policy covered RSR from September 4, 1981 to
November 4, 1982, which included an extended reporting period until
November 4, 1983.' 314 RSR gave written and oral notice of the EPA's
intention to North River. 1315 Nearly a year later, the EPA included the Harbor
Island site on the final NPL.
1316
During the wrangling between the EPA and RSR, International Insurance
Company (International) became North River's successor-in-interest. 131 7
Therefore, believing that the EPA would file a lawsuit against RSR,
International filed a declaratory judgment action in February 2000 against RSR
in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas. 318 The liability insurer
asked the district court to declare that International had no contractual
obligation to indemnify or reimburse RSR for any potential CERCLA
remediation costs at the Harbor Island site. 1319
In response, RSR filed a declaratory judgment suit, asserting that
International had a duty to cover any actual or potential expenditures
associated with the cost of remediation at the polluted Harbor Island site.
1320
(8)(A) criteria for determining priorities among releases or threatened releases
throughout the United States for the purpose of taking remedial action and, to the
extent practicable taking into account the potential urgency of such action, for the
purpose of taking removal action.... ; [and]
(B) based upon the criteria set forth in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the
President shall list.., national priorities among the known releases or threatened
releases throughout the United States and shall revise the list no less often than
annually.... In assembling or revising the national list, the President shall consider
any priorities established by the States. To the extent practicable, the highest priority
facilities shall be designated individually and shall be referred to as the "top priority
among known response targets," and, to the extent practicable, shall include among
the one hundred highest priority facilities one such facility from each State which
shall be the facility designated by the State as presenting the greatest danger to public
health or welfare or the environment among the known facilities in such State.
Id.




In late 1983, RSR sold the Harbor Island lead smeltery to Bergsoe Metals, which was owned by
East Asiatic. On July 31, 1986 the EPA determined that Quemetco Realty, Inc., one of the RSR
entities, was a potentially responsible party with respect to the environmental impairment of
Harbor Island. The EPA requested information from Quemetco as to the ownership of the site
and the activities being performed there along with other salient facts. The letter stated that as
a potentially responsible party, Quemetco may be liable for all monies expended for corrective





1320. Id. While RSR and International were suing each other in district court, the EPA filed a
CERCLA action on May 22, 2000, against RSR in the District Court for the Western District of Washington.
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Later, International filed a motion for summary judgment, but the district court
denied International's motion. 3 2 ' The court found two issues of material fact:
whether the EPA had established a claim against RSR during the policy period
regarding the pollution at Harbor Island and whether RSR waived its right to
receive coverage for the Harbor Island site. 1
322
A jury found that the EPA submitted a covered claim under
International's EIL policy when the agency demanded pollution remediation
reimbursements from RSR during the policy period and that International
failed to establish that RSR waived its right to coverage under the EL
policy. 1323 On the basis of those findings and the evidence introduced at trial,
the district court granted RSR' s request for declaratory relief, concluding that
International had a contractual duty to reimburse RSR for the costs of
decontaminating Harbor Island. 13 24  The district court also denied
International's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. 1325
International timely appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 1
326
International presented two major issues on appeal. 1327 Again, the jury
found that the EL policy covered the EPA's CERCLA claim and that RSR
was liable for damages. 13 28 But the insurer insisted that the jury's finding was
unwarranted because the supporting evidence was insufficient. 1329 To
determine whether the liability insurance contract covered the EPA's claim,
the Fifth Circuit panel reviewed the contract. 331 It contained two types of
coverage provisions.3  First, in one clause, International promised to
indemnify RSR after the latter pays costs or settles third party environmental
impairment claims. 1332 The indemnity provision stated that the insurer agreed
Id. The EPA sought $8 million for the cost of removing the pollution at Harbor Island and money for future
expenditures at the site. Id. The EPA did not serve RSR until the summer of 2000. Id.






1327. Id. Actually, six questions were raised on appeal, but this Article discusses only two. Id. The
remaining four issues concern the district court's alleged abuse of discretion and erroneous jury charges,
but the Fifth Circuit panel found no evidence to support International's assertion. Id. Those issues were:
(1) whether "[t]he definition of 'claim' in the district court's jury charge was legally erroneous because it
did not require that the jury find ... that the EPA demanded money or action from RSR," (2) whether "[a]
supplemental jury instruction misled and confused the jury because it conflicted with the definition of
'claim' in the jury charge," (3) whether "the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony
of John Morrison because it contained privileged attorney-client communications," and (4) whether "the
district court abused its discretion in excluding an excerpt from the deposition of Donald Brayer as evidence
of his expert opinion." Id.
1328. Id.
1329. Id.
1330. Id. at 286-87.
1331. Id. at 286.
1332. Id. at 286-87.
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to indemnify the insured for the indured's obligation to pay damages to the
following: "[p]ersonal injury; [p]roperty damage; [i]mpairment or diminution
or other interference with any other environmental right or amenity protected
by law. . . and caused by [e]nvironmental impairment in connection with the
[b]usiness of the insured ... during the Policy Period."'133 3
Under the other coverage provision, the insurer promised to reimburse the
insured for costs and expenses associated with the insured's voluntary cleanup
operations. 1334 That provision stated in applicable part:
[The insurer promises to] reimburse the insured for costs and expenses of
operations ... [which are] designed to remove, neutralize, or clean up any
substance released or escaped which had caused Environmental impairment
... to the extent that such costs and expenses have been incurred or have
become payable[,] ... provided that such costs and expenses... are incurred
with prior written consent of insurer ....
Upon closer inspection, the RSR panel discovered that the EIL policy did
not explicitly define "claim.' ' 13 36  Instead, a definition of claim provision
simply stated that a claim "comprises any single claim or any series of claims
from one or multiple claimants resulting from the same isolated, repeated, or
continuing environmental impairment.'337 But the Fifth Circuit panel
observed that a majority of federal and state courts have concluded that EIL
insurance contracts cover "damages," a term that includes the insured's actual
or potential liability for CERCLA-related response, remediation, and cleanup
costs after the EPA or other third parties commence legal action. 1338 Also, a
majority of courts have found that damages "may include 'response costs,'
'cleanup costs' and costs of remediation under CERCLA," and air, soil, and
groundwater contamination from man-made pollutants may be properly
characterized as property damage. 1339
1333. Id.
1334. Id. at 286.
1335. Id.
1336. Id.
1337. Id. at 287 n.2.
1338. Id.; see Anderson Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 49 F.3d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that the EPA's mandated response and environmental clean-up costs are damages and "[tihe
fact that the insured cooperates and assumes the obligation to conduct the clean-up, rather than forcing the
EPA to incur the expenses of a clean-up and then bring a coercive suit, does not change the bottom line that
a legal obligation exists"); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1511-12 (9th Cir. 1991);
Indep. Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 944 F.2d 940, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Morton Int'l,
Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 845 (N.J. 1993); U.S. Aviex Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (concluding that the distinction between a government's
recovery for cleanup costs and natural resources damages is merely fortuitous).
1339. See, e.g., Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1023, 1024 (2d Cir. 1991);
New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1162 (3d Cir. 1991); Avondale
Indus. Inc. v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1206-07 (2d Cir. 1989); Port of Portland v. Water
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But more relevant, under Texas law, environmental remediation or
cleanup costs are damages within the meaning of an EIL insurance contract.134o
For example, in SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indemnity Co., a different
Fifth Circuit panel embraced Texas law and held that if the government incurs
environmental cleanup costs under CERCLA or an individual incurs costs after
voluntarily decontaminating a hazardous waste site, then the costs are damages
under the liability insurance contract.134' Also, in Bituminous Casualty Corp.
v. Vacuum Tanks Inc., the Fifth Circuit cited a settled Texas principle: Courts
must resolve disputes about insurance coverage in favor of the insured.'
After applying that principle, the Bituminous court concluded that the disputed
coverage provision in the liability policy covered the government's CERCLA-
related cleanup costs at a hazardous waste dumping site.
343
Citing the decisions in SnyderGeneral and Bituminous, the RSR panel
concluded that the EPA's CERCLA claim triggered coverage under EIL's
indemnification clause. 3" The panel reached that conclusion even though the
district court did not clearly state whether it was granting relief under the
indemnification or the "voluntary cleanup operations" clause.1345 But the Fifth
Circuit panel stressed: "[W]e conclude that the district court's erroneous pre-
trial contractual interpretation error ... was harmless, because the district court
reached results in its declaratory judgment and its post judgment rulings that
Quality Ins. Syndicate, 549 F. Supp. 233, 235-36 (D. Or. 1982), affd in part and rev'd in part, 796 F.2d
1188 (9th Cir. 1986).
In cases discussing environmental coverage, most courts conclude that liability policies cover an
insured's voluntary cleanup of the contamination before government demand and money owed after
demand. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Co., 444 N.W.2d 813, 819 (Mich. App. 1989), appeal
granted in part, denied in part, and rev 'd on other grounds, 476 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991); Metex Corp.
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 675 A.2d 220, 224-30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996; Broadwell Realty v. Fid. & Cas.
Co., 528 A.2d 76, 81-83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.,
874 P.2d 142,146 (Wash. 1994) (en banc); Compass Ins. Co. v. Cravens, Dargan & Co., 748 P.2d 724,727-
28 (Wyo. 1988).
On the other hand, a minority of courts have distinguished between voluntary cleanups, those mandated
by administrative agencies, and cleanups mandated by court order. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd's of London v. Super. Ct. of L.A. County, 16 P.3d 94, 103-05 (Cal. 2001); N. 111. Gas Co. v. Home
Ins. Co., 777 N.E.2d 417, 421-22 (111. App. Ct. 2002).
1340. Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. Sept. 2005).
1341. SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 113 F.3d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1997).
1342. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks Inc., 75 F.3d 1048, 1053 (5th Cit. 1996).
1343. Id.
1344. Int'l Ins. Co., 426 F.3d at 288-89.
1345. Id. at 289-90.
[A]pproving the pretrial order and in ruling on the motions for summary judgment[, the district
court concluded] that RSR was entitled to coverage for indemnification against liability to the
EPA only under [the voluntary cleanup operations clause.] [W]e conclude that the district court
in trying the issue of indemnification that was not submitted to the jury may have continued with
that mistaken view ... or realized that RSR [was] entitled to indemnification against EPA claims
under [the indemnification clause rather than under the voluntary cleanup operations clause].
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are consistent with the correct interpretation of the policy.' 134 6
The second issue on appeal was whether RSR waived its right to coverage
under the EIL policy. 347 The jury found no express or implied waiver.1 348 But
International argued that the jury's finding was contrary to the greater weight
and preponderance of the evidence. 349 Therefore, according to International,
the federal district court abused its judicial discretion when the court did not
cancel the jury's finding, grant the insurer's motion for judgment as a matter
of law, and grant International's alternative motion for a new trial. 35°
To support the assertion that the jury's finding was incorrect,
International presented the following evidence on appeal. 351 On September
8, 1983, the EPA placed the Harbor Island site on the agency's final NPL 3 5
In late 1983, RSR sold its Harbor Island lead smeltery to Bergsoe Metals
(Bergsoe), and the latter company had agreed to indemnify and reimburse RSR
for any EPA response costs if RSR became liable. 353 Therefore, at that time,
RSR believed that neither it nor its insurer would be responsible for removing
the lead from Harbor Island. 
354
Additionally, Howard Myers was RSR's general counsel, and in 1995,
Myers wrote a series of letters to North River Insurance Company,
International's predecessor. 355 In one letter, Myers disclosed that RSR did not
intend to file a notice-of-loss claim, asking North River to pay the cost of
decontaminating the Harbor Island site.1356 During the trial, Myers stated that
he expected Bergsoe to indemnify RSR for the EPA's response costs, thereby
removing RSR's need to ask International for the insurance proceeds.
357
1346. Id. at 290.
1347. Id. at 300.
1348. Id.
1349. Id.
1350. Id. at 296-300. FED. R. Cv. P. 50(a)(1) states:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may
determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law
against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be
maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) states:
If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the
close of all the evidence, the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject
to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may renew
its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry
of judgment-and may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under
Rule 59.
FED. R. CIv. P. 50(b).








But Myers stressed that he did not waive and never intended to waive
RSR's rights under the EIL policy. 358 Still, International insisted that RSR
and Myers's prior behaviors were inconsistent with their assertion of a right
under the insurance contract. 359 Citing Texas law, the Fifth Circuit refused to
embrace International's argument. 3 ' First, the RSR panel observed that
"under Texas law, a waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquishes a
known right or intentionally engages in conduct that is inconsistent with
claiming a known right."1361 Second, Texas law requires an individual's words
or conduct to manifest unequivocally the intent to relinquish a legal right. 362
Affirming the district court's ruling, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
district court did not abuse its discretion because "a reasonable jury could have
found that RSR did not permanently and unequivocally waive its right to
recover from International.' 363
3. Whether Under Texas Law a Commercial General Liability Insurer
Has a Duty to Defend and Indemnify its Insured Homebuilder
After Homeowners Sued the Builder for Negligently Designing
and Constructing Their House
The litigants in Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co. also
asked the Fifth Circuit to determine whether the insurer had a contractual duty
to defend and indemnify the insured in an underlying action. 364 Lamar
Homes, Inc. (Lamar) designs and constructs homes. 1365 In April 1997, Vincent
and Janice DiMare (DiMares) purchased a house from Lamar. 13  Six years
later, the DiMares sued the homebuilder and its subcontractor in a Texas state
court. 1367 In the underlying complaint, the DiMares alleged that Lamar
negligently designed and constructed the foundation of the DiMares' house. 1368
The homeowners also asserted that Lamar breached implied and express





1361. Id. (citing Emscor Mfg., Inc. v. Alliance, Ins. Group, 879 S.W.2d 894, 917 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
1362. See Enter.-Laredo Assocs. v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 835 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, writ denied).
1363. Int'l Ins. Co., 426 F.3d at 301.
1364. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 428 F.3d 193, 195 (5th Cir. Oct. 2005).
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When the DiMares filed their lawsuit, Mid-Continent Casualty Company
(Mid-Continent) insured Lamar under a CGL insurance contract.370
Therefore, Lamar timely forwarded a copy of the DiMares complaint to Mid-
Continent and asked the insurer for a legal defense and indemnification if
Lamar paid out-of-pocket damages to satisfy a judgment or to settle the
lawsuit. 137' Mid-Continent refused to defend Lamar. 372 In response, Lamar
filed a declaratory judgment action against Mid-Continent in a Texas state
court. 1
3 73
Before the Texas trial judge, the homebuilder asked the judge to declare
that Mid-Continent's insurance contract covered the DiMares' third party
claims and that Mid-Continent had a contractual duty to defend Lamar. 1
374
Lamar also argued that Mid-Continent's failure to provide a legal defense
violated Texas's Prompt Payment of Claims Statute. 137 Citing a diversity of
citizenship, Mid-Continent removed the declaratory judgment action from the
Texas court to the District Court for the Western District of Texas. 376
Before the federal district court, both Lamar and Mid-Continent filed
motions for summary judgment and agreed that the central question would be
whether Mid-Continent had a duty to defend Lamar in the DiMare
litigation. 377  The district court found that the DiMares' "builder's
construction errors," or faulty construction claims, were essentially breach-of-
contract or breach-of-warranty claims. 378 Consequently, Mid-Continent did
not have a contractual duty to defend Lamar, because the DiMareses only
sought damages for a pure economic loss and Mid-Continent's CGL insurance
contract did not cover construction errors or faulty construction claims as a
matter of law. 3 79
According to the district court, insurers sell builder's comprehensive







1376. Id. at 195 n. 1; TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 (Vernon Supp. 1997) (current version at TEx. INS.
CODEANN. § 542.051-.061 (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
1377. Lamar Homes, 428 F.3d at 196.
1378. Id.
1379. Id. at 196 n.2. The district court found that the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Jim Walter
Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617,617 (Tex. 1986) mandated this conclusion. Id. In Jim Walter Homes,
the court held that "a homeowner could not recover punitive damages against a builder because the
substance of the homeowner's claim was a breach of contract causing purely economic loss." Jim Walter
Homes, 711 S.W.2d at 618. The decision in Jim Walter Homes persuaded the district court that the Texas
Supreme Court wanted lower courts to examine an underlying petition "to determine if the cause of action
sounds in contract or tort." Lamar Homes, 428 F.3d at 196 n.2. If a cause of action sounds in contract, then
the court must find no occurrence or accident. Id.
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injury claims-those that the builder's product causes.38° Builder's liability
insurance is not sold to replace or repair a builder's product, such as a
home. 138 ' The district court also concluded that allowing a builder's liability
insurance to cover construction deficiencies would allow a contractor to
receive money from the homeowner after an initial sale and subsequent
payment from the contractor's insurance company to repair and correct
deficiencies in the builder's own work. 38 2 From the district court's viewpoint,
such a holding would transform a builder's liability policy into a performance
bond. 138 3 Therefore, the court found that Mid-Continent had no obligation to
defend to Lamar in the underlying litigation. 
131
Lamar appealed the case, and the first broad question before the Fifth
Circuit was whether the district court correctly interpreted the meaning of an
occurrence and "property damage" in the CGL insurance contract. 138 5 The
insurance contract defined an occurrence as "an accident, including a
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions."' 386 The contract defined property damage as "either (a) physical
injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property;
or (b) loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured."'' 37 The
CGL policy covers and pays damages for third party property damage if an
occurrence causes the losses, and the losses are confined within a clearly
defined "coverage territory."'
1388
The Fifth Circuit's research revealed that Texas courts as well as federal
district courts in Texas are divided over whether shoddy workmanship or
construction errors are occurrences under liability insurance contracts.
1389
Some Texas and federal courts conclude that construction errors are
occurrences under a CGL insurance contract; therefore, the insurer must pay
third party damages. 3' Other courts, however, have held that a bad
workmanship claim is essentially a breach-of-contract claim. 3 9'
Consequently, liability policies do not cover a contractor's shoddy
construction because that type of construction is foreseeable rather than
accidental or unexpected. 1392 These latter courts find that the builder's
1380. Id., 428 F.3d at 196 n.3.
1381. Id.
1382. Id. at 196 n.4.






1389. Id. at 197. The court cites an extensive list of cases with holdings on both sides of the argument.
Id. at 197 nn. 6, 7.
1390. Id. at 197.
1391. Id.
1392. Id. at 197 n.5. The court notes, regarding the present liability policy, that:
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negligence rather than intentional conduct causes the shoddy workmanship;
thus, the financial loss is unexpected and accidental. 3 93
The Fifth Circuit also discovered that state courts and federal district
courts in Texas are divided over another question: whether defective
workmanship is property damage under CGL insurance contracts."' Some
courts conclude that CGL policies do not cover defective workmanship claims
for two reasons. 3 95 First, some tribunals conclude that faulty workmanship
claims are essentially pure economic loss claims, which "typically flow from
a breach of contract."' 39  Second, some courts find that faulty workmanship
is an inherent risk associated with the construction industry. 3 97 Therefore,
applying the business risk doctrine, these courts conclude that CGL policies
do not insure against business risks because a CGL policy is not a performance
bond. 39 8 Of course, other courts have adopted a different view and concluded
that defective workmanship is property damage under CGL insurance
contracts. 1399
Finally, as reported earlier, Lamar also argued that Mid-Continent
violated Texas's Prompt Payment of Claims Statute when the insurer refused
to defend Lamar in the underlying lawsuit." °  Put simply, the controversial
article provides specific deadlines for an insurer to accept or reject insureds'
claims.'0 1 If an insurer does not comply with the statutory deadlines, the
insurance company must pay the full amount of the requested damages, plus
The policy does not define the term "accident," but the Texas Supreme Court has held that an
injury is accidental for purposes of coverage under a CGL policy if "[it is] not the natural and
probable consequence of the action or occurrence which produced the injury ... [and] if the
injury could not reasonably be anticipated by [the] insured, or would not ordinarily follow from
the action or occurrence which caused the injury."
Id. (quoting Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. 1999)).
1393. Id. at 197.
1394. Id. at 198. The court also cites here a list of cases with holdings on both sides of the argument.






1400. Id. at 199.
1401. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (current version at TEx. INS. CODE
ANN. § 542.055(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
[A]n insurer shall, not later than the 15th day after receipt of notice of a claim
(1) acknowledge receipt of the claim; (2) commence any investigation of the claim; and
(3) request from the claimant all items, statements, and forms that the insurer reasonably
believes, at the time, will be required from the claimant.
Id.; TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 § 3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1997) (current version at TEx. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 542.056(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
[An insurer shall notify a claimant in writing of the acceptance or rejection of the claim not later
than the 15th business day after the date the insurer receives all items, statements, and forms
required by the insurer, in order to secure final proof of loss.
§ 3(a).
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an additional eighteen percent of the damages and attorneys' fees.1" 2
The federal district court found that Mid-Continent did not breach a
contractual duty to defend Lamar against the underlying third party claims."43
Thus, the district court did not address the question of whether an insured may
commence a statutory action against an insurer and secure damages under
article 21.55 when an insurer violates a duty-to-defend clause under a CGL
policy. 10' On appeal, however, Lamar raised the question and argued that an
insured states a valid statutory claim under article 21.55 when an insurer
refuses to provide a legal defense.'" 5 The court noted that the statute defines
a claim as a "first party claim made by an insured or a policyholder under an
insurance policy or contract... that must be paid by the insurer directly to the
insured or beneficiary."'06
And after combing Texas and federal courts decisions, the Fifth Circuit
found yet another issue that divides these courts.' 47 One tribunal has
concluded that the statute only covers first party claims-those in which the
insured asks the insurer to pay proceeds or reimburse out-of-pocket
expenditures to cover an insured's property losses or personal injuries.' 40 '
According to one court, a duty-to-defend claim is not valid under article 21.55
because it is a third party rather than first party claim.' 409 Other courts,
however, have declared that an insured's request for a legal defense is a first
party claim. 410 Thus, article 21.55 covers that request and requires the insurer
to defend the insured in the underlying third party action.
41
'
1402. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1997) (current version at TEx. INS. CODE
ANN. § 542.600 (Vernon Supp. 2006)).
In all cases [in which] a claim is made pursuant to a policy of insurance and the insurer liable
therefore is not in compliance with the requirements of this article, such insurer shall be liable
to pay the holder of the policy ... in addition to the amount of the claim, 18 percent per annum
of the amount of such claim as damages, together with reasonable attorney's fees.
§ 6.





1408. See TIG Ins. Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., 129 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet.
denied) (embracing the view that "[alrticle 21.55 applies only to claims that trigger the insurer's duty under
the policy to pay the insured").
1409. Id.; see also Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 53 n.2 (Tex. 1997) ("A first party
claim is one in which an insured seeks recovery for the insured's own loss," while a third party claim is one
"in which an insured seeks coverage for injuries to a third party.").
1410. See N. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685, 691 (Tex. 2004) (concluding that
"[the insurer's] conduct in this case did not violate the terms of article 21.55, whether or not that statute
properly applies to a liability insurer who fails to promptly accept or reject its insured's defense"); Rx.Com,
Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (embracing Davalos); Housing




TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
Given that Texas and federal courts frequently litigate the substantive
issues appearing in Lamar and that those issues continue to generate
conflicting holdings among the courts, the Fifth Circuit could have made three
Erie guesses about how the Texas Supreme Court would resolve the conflicts.
Instead, the court of appeals correctly decided to certify three questions to the
Texas Supreme Court. 412 Those questions are:
(1) When a homebuyer sues his general contractor for construction defects
and alleges only damage to or loss of use of the home itself, do such
allegations allege an "accident" or "occurrence" sufficient to trigger the
duty to defend or indemnify under a CGL policy?
(2) When a homebuyer sues his general contractor for construction defects
and alleges only damage to or loss of use of the home itself, do such
allegations allege "property damage" sufficient to trigger the duty to
defend or indemnify under a CGL policy?; and,
(3) If the answers to certified questions 1 and 2 are answered in the
affirmative, does Article [ ] 21.55 [currently Article 542.055] of the
Texas Insurance Code apply to a CGL insurer's breach of the duty to
defend?
1413
C. Third Party Liability Claims-Injury to Businesses and Professions
Collectively, the conflicts in the remaining two cases concern whether
liability insurers have a duty to defend or indemnify business associations,
officers, and directors or a right to sue insurance defense lawyers. Certainly,
the issues in the underlying lawsuits are easy to comprehend as they concern
primarily breach-of-contract and legal malpractice claims. Determining the
Fifth Circuit's methodology for reaching its conclusion in at least one of these
cases is, however, a bit problematic. Put simply, the court of appeals correctly
identified the settled principles in Louisiana and Texas to resolve these
remaining disputes. But the manner in which the Fifth Circuit applied Texas's
duty-to-defend and duty-to-indemnify laws was less than ideal.




1. Whether Under Texas Law a Commercial General Liability Insurer Has
a Duty to Defend and Indemnify Its Insured Corporation After a Third
Party Company Sues the Insured for Its Allegedly Negligent
Misrepresentations and After the Insured's Excess Professional Liability
Insurer Pays All Defense and Indemnity Costs
In the immediately preceding section, an analysis of the three-judge
panel's decision in Lamar appears.4 4 The observation is relevant because
Lamar is a third party case, involving whether a comprehensive general
liability insurer has a duty to defend and indemnify an insured homebuilder for
construction defects. 415 But the Lamar panel did not address the central
appellate questions because an ancillary issue was present: whether a
construction defect is an occurrence and, therefore, an accident which triggers
an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify under a CGL policy. 46 To secure
a definitive answer, the Lamar panel certified the question to the Texas
Supreme Court. 1
417
In Federal Insurance Co. v. Ace Property & Casualty Co. litigants also
asked a different Fifth Circuit panel to declare whether a different
comprehensive general liability insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify an
insured. 418 Once more, the secondary issue was whether an insured's conduct
was an occurrence and, therefore, an accident that triggers the insurer's duty
to defend and indemnify. 41 9 But unlike the Lamar panel, the Federal panel
issued a declaration, concluding that no need existed to certify the occurrence
question to the Texas Supreme Court. 421 The following discussion should
illustrate why the Federal panel's decision not to certify a similar occurrence-
accident question to the Texas Supreme Court was less than prudent.
Here are the pertinent facts in the underlying dispute between the insured
and the third party complaints. Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS)
is a global technology services company that regularly sells computer and
electronic services to all sorts of consumers, including the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). 42' EDS's contact person at NATO was an
individual who identified himself as Colonel West. 42 2 West allowed EDS to
believe that he was in charge of a covert NATO procurement project. 1423
Reporting that NATO would purchase eighty to one hundred billion dollars
1414. See supra Part IV.B.3.
1415. See supra Part IV.B.3.
1416. See supra Part V.B.3.
1417. Lamar Homes, 428 F.3d at 195.
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worth of sophisticated electronic equipment, West encouraged EDS to join the
clandestine operation and become the general contractor. 1
424
EDS accepted the offer and invited Akai Musical Instrument Corporation
(Akai) and Pioneer New Media Technologies, Inc. (Pioneer) to submit bids. 425
EDS informed Akai and Pioneer that their participation was subject to a
condition precedent: the bidding process required Akai and Pioneer to ship
samples of their electronic products to several NATO representatives.4 2 6 EDS
also informed the suppliers that the representatives would have the right to
destroy the samples in the course of NATO's testing procedures. 1427
Therefore, relying on EDS's representations, Akai and Pioneer signed
respective Test to Destruction Authorization Agreements and shipped millions
of dollars worth of electronic equipment to the supposed NATO
representatives. I428
The shipments continued for three years, but eventually, the parties, EDS,
Akai, and Pioneer, learned that West had deceived them. 1429 The so-called
"NATO operation" was a fraud. 1430 In addition, they discovered that West was
not a military officer and was not affiliated with NATO. 43' More egregious,
NATO representatives did not receive or use Akai and Pioneer's electronic
equipment. 1432 Instead, West appropriated the equipment and disposed of it
commercially for his private gain. 14 33 Subsequently, Akai and Pioneer
commenced a negligent-misrepresentation cause of action against EDS. 1434
When the underlying lawsuit commenced, and during the period when
Akai and Pioneer were shipping the products to West, Ace Property and
Casualty Company (Ace) insured EDS under two primary, CGL policies. 1435
Additionally, Federal Insurance Company (Federal) insured EDS under an
excess professional liability insurance contract. 14 36 Because Ace was the
primary insurer, EDS asked Ace to provide a legal defense. 14 37 Ace refused,
asserting that EDS's alleged negligent misrepresentations were not
















1438. Id. at 121-22.
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EDS eventually settled the suit, and Federal, the excess insurer, paid the
legal defense and indemnity costs-those exceeding EDS's deductible under
the excess professional liability policy. 439 Therefore, asserting its subrogation
rights under the excess insurance contract, Federal filed a declaratory judgment
action against Ace in the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas."
The excess insurer asked the district court to declare that Ace had a contractual
duty to defend EDS in the underlying suit and to order Ace to reimburse
Federal for monies spent to settle and defend against Akai and Pioneer's five
million dollar lawsuit.44'
Both insurers filed motions for summary judgment.' 442 Ultimately, the
federal district court granted Ace's motion, concluding that EDS's alleged
negligent misrepresentation was not an accident and, therefore, not an
occurrence under the CGL policies.'" 3 Therefore, the district court concluded
that Ace had no duty to defend EDS and had no duty to pay Akai and Pioneer
for their property loss."'" Federal appealed.'"1
5
Before the Fifth Circuit, Federal insisted that the lower court's decision
was erroneous and that an insured's allegedly negligent misrepresentation is
an occurrence under a CGL insurance contract.'" 6 To determine whether
Federal's assertions were sound, the Fifth Circuit panel examined Ace's CGL
policies and found that Ace promised to "pay those sums that [EDS] becomes
legally obligated to pay as damages because of... property damage ....
Ace promised to pay damages, however, only if an occurrence causes property
damage during the duration of the contracts.448
The CGL policies defined property damage as a "[p]hysical injury to
tangible property, including ... use of that property" or "[1]oss of use of
tangible property that is not physically injured."'"9 Under the contracts, an
occurrence was "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions. ''1450 A definition of an
accident did not appear in the CGL insurance contracts. 45' In Lamar Mid-
Continent insured Lamar under a similar CGL policy. 452 Under both Mid-
Continent's and Ace's polices, the definitions of property damage are













1452. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 428 F.3d 193, 196 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005).
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identical. 453 In addition, the definition of an occurrence in Ace's liability
insurance contract is similar to the definition appearing in Mid-Continent's
CGL contract. 
1454
Returning to Federal's argument, the Fifth Circuit panel observed that the
Texas Supreme Court and lower courts in Texas have not decided whether an
insured's negligent misrepresentation is an occurrence under a liability
insurance contract. 1455 But Federal invited the appellate court to consider and
adopt the district court's ruling in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Metropolitan Baptist Church.1456 In Metropolitan, a company negligently
misrepresented the extent of coverage under the company's health insurance
policy, and the district court concluded that the applicant's reliance on the
negligent misrepresentation was an occurrence under a liability insurance
contract. 1411 Surprisingly, the Federal panel concluded:
We need not resolve today whether Metropolitan was correctly decided or
whether, under Texas law, negligent misrepresentations can ever constitute
an "occurrence" because ... under the facts of the case before us, none of
EDS's conduct nor any of its alleged omissions was an "accident" within the
meaning of the policy.458
To reach that rather unexpected conclusion, the panel cited the facts and
the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Argonaut Southwest Insurance Co. v.
Maupin, "[p]erhaps the most analogous Texas case" according to the panel.459
In Argonaut, the insured signed a contract under which he agreed to remove
borrowed material from a tract of land that had been used during the
construction of a highway. 14  After removing and damaging a considerable
amount of the material, the insured learned that the other party to the contract
was a tenant rather than the owner of the land.' 46' Subseqently, the true
owners of the property sued the insured, and the insured asked his insurance
carrier to provide a legal defense or pay for the judgment rendered against the
insured.' 2 The insurer refused.' 3
Ultimately, the Texas Supreme Court ruled in favor of the insurer, finding
that the insured intentionally committed an act, removing the material from the
1453. Id.
1454. Id.; Fed. Ins. Co., 429 F.3d at 122.
1455. Fed. Ins. Co., 429 F.3d at 123.
1456. Id.; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Metro. Baptist Church, 967 F. Supp. 217, 224 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
1457. Metropolitan, 967 F. Supp. at 223-24.
1458. Fed. Ins. Co., 429 F.3d at 123.
1459. Id. at 123 n.7; Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 633 (Tex. 1973).






property, even though the insured had no intent to injure the true owners4'64
Stated slightly differently, the supreme court found that the insured's action
was "voluntary and intentional," even though the result or injury "may have
been unexpected, unforeseen and unintended."'
'14 5
In addition, the Argonaut court ruled that the insured's action was not an
accident, even though (1) the insured mistakenly signed a contractual
agreement with someone other than the true owners of the property, (2) the
insured did not deal originally with the true owners of the property, and (3) the
insured was completely ignorant about who actually owned the property.'6
So, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the insurer had no obligation to
defend or indemnify because the insurance contract did not cover a property
loss stemming from a mistake or an erroneous belief about the true ownership
of the loss property.'4
7
The Federal panel also cited King v. Dallas Fire Insurance Co. and Mid-
Century Insurance Co. of Texas v. Lindsey for support in stating: "[w]hether
there has been an accident, and thus an occurrence, is judged from the
viewpoint of the insured .... 468 Embracing the rulings in those decisions,
the Federal panel concluded that EDS intended West to secure Akai and
Pioneer's goods without returning the property to those companies.'469  Or
stated slightly differently, EDS expected that West would exercise control over
Akai and Pioneer's property without ever returning the property to the two
shippers. 147" Furthermore, the panel concluded that even though EDS
mistakenly characterized the property's intended use and was unaware of
West's scam when EDS made representations to Akai and Pioneer, EDS's
actions were not accidental.
1 471
But, the Fifth Circuit panel's reliance on the rulings in Argonaut, King,
and Mid-Century to decide the conflict between Federal and Ace in the present
case is unwarranted. In those cases, litigants asked the Texas Supreme Court
to interpret the meaning of "intent" or "intended," as those terms appeared in





1468. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ace Prop. & Cas. Co., 429 F.3d 120, 123 (5th Cir. Oct. 2005) (citing Mid-
Century Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Lindsey, 997 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. 1999) (reaffirming that "an injury is accidental
if from the viewpoint of the insured, [it is] not the natural and probable consequence of the action or
occurrence which produced the injury"); King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2002) (holding
that under a policy with virtually identical provisions that an accident must be determined from the
viewpoint of the insured)).
1469. Id. at 124-25 ("EDS did intend for Akai and Pioneer to [relinquish their property permanently,
knowing] that the property might even be destroyed. The loss of Akai's and Pioneer's property 'ordinarily
follow[ed]' from EDS's misrepresentations and the Test to Destruction Authorization Agreements."').
1470. Id. at 123-24.
1471. Id. at 124.
1472. See King, 85 S.W.3d at 188; Mid-Century, 997 S.W.2d at 163.
2007]
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
the coverage clause and its endorsement stated in relevant part:
[The insurer agrees to] pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury
to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by [an]
accident.
The word "occurrence". . .shall mean either (a) an accident, or (b)...
a condition for which the insured is responsible... [and that] causes physical
injury to or [the] destruction of property which was not intended. 473
In the present case, however, a careful review of the CGL contract's
coverage clause reveals that words like intent, intended, intend, and intentional
do not appear. 14 Why did the Federal panel spend precious judicial resources
deciding a question involving intent that was foreign to the central question of
whether Ace had a contractual obligation to defend the underlying third party
actions and indemnify Federal for settling the claims against EDS.""7 The
Federal panel concluded that Ace had no duty to defend or to indemnify
because EDS intended to produce Akai and Pioneer's losses and those losses
were not caused by an accident. 1476
Without doubt, the Federal panel should have embraced the Lamar
panel's prudent approach and certified the following occurrence question to
the Texas Supreme Court: whether a property loss is an occurrence and,
therefore, an accident which triggers an insurer's duty to defend and indemnify
under a CGL policy. 147 7 The Supreme Court of Texas likely would have
provided a clear answer, applied the eight comers doctrine and other doctrines
of equity appropriately and completely, and avoided the Federal panel's poor
analysis and extremely questionable conclusion. 4
78
1473. Argonaut Sw. Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 634 n.1.
1474. Fed. Ins. Co., 429 F.3d at 125.
1475. Id. at 122.
1476. Id. at 125.
1477. Id.; see Lamar Homes, Inc., v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 428 F.3d 193, 199 (5th Cir. Oct. 2005).
1478. King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002) (reiterating that under the eight
comers rule, Texas courts must examine information appearing within the four corners of the pleadings
along with the terms and conditions found within the four corners of the insurance contract to determine
whether an insurer has a duty to defend an insured in Texas); see, e.g., Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Griffin, 955 S.w.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1997) (concluding that the duty to indemnify is properly justiciable by
initiating a declaratory judgment action "before the rendition of a judgment in the underlying suit").
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2. Whether Under Louisiana Law a Professional Liability Insurer May
Commence a Legal Malpractice Action Against an Insurance Defense Law
Firm After the Insurer Settles an Underlying Lawsuit But Before an Appeal
of an Adverse Jury Verdict in the Underlying Suit
As discussed throughout this review, primary insurers hire attorneys and
law firms to defend insureds against third party claims and lawsuits. And
insurance defense lawyers often do not successfully defend insureds in
underlying lawsuits. In Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, the law is clear:
An attorney-client relationship exists between an insured and the insured's
insurance defense attorney. 1479 Therefore, if an insured does not prevail in an
underlying third party lawsuit, the unsuccessful insured may commence a legal
malpractice action against an insurance defense lawyer or law firm.
On the other hand, whether a person's insurance company may
commence a legal malpractice action against a person's insurance defense
attorney is more problematic because an attorney-client relationship does not
exist between the insurance carrier and the lawyer. The Supreme Court of
Texas, however, has allowed insurers to file legal malpractice actions against
insurance defense firms and lawyers under the doctrine of equitable
subrogation. 1480 The Supreme Court of Mississippi has strongly suggested a
willingness to do the same. 148' The Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled
either way, which explains in part the Fifth Circuit's willingness to decide a
novel procedural question in American Reliable Insurance Co. v. Navratil
involving whether an insurer had a legal right to commence a legal malpractice
action against an insurance defense firm. 482
The facts in Navratil are extremely meager. 483 American Reliable
Insurance Company (ARIC) insured Eli Prudhomme under a liability
1479. See generally Robin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 844 So.2d 41, 44-46 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Foster, 528 So.2d 255, 269-70 nn.8-9 (Miss. 1988); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Keck, Mahin & Cate, 154 S.W.3d 714, 723-24 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004,
pet. denied).
1480. See Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Canal Ins. Co., 843 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Tex. 1992) (recognizing
an excess insurer's right to assert a legal malpractice claim against the insured's defense attorney under a
theory of equitable subrogation and concluding that permitting an excess carrier to stand in the shoes of its
insured and assert the insured's claims would not burden the existing attorney-client relationship with
additional duties or create potential conflicts of interest for the attorney); Keck, Mahin & Cate v. Nat'l
Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 20 S.W.3d 692, 703 (Tex. 2000) (reaffirming an insurance carrier's
right to commence a legal malpractice action against an insurance defense firm under the doctrine of
equitable subrogation).
1481. See Baker Donelson Bearman & Caldwell, P.C. v. Muirhead, 920 So.2d 440, 448 (Miss. 2006)
(suggesting that an assignment from an insured would permit the insurer to sue an insurance defense
attorney for legal malpractice).
1482. See Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Navratil, 445 F.3d 402, 403 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006).
1483. Id. at 403.
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insurance contract. 14 84 The policy limit was $25,000. 1485 In addition, the
contract had a duty-to-defend clause in which ARIC promised to defend
Prudhomme under certain conditions. 148 6 A third party complainant filed a
lawsuit against Prudhomme in a Louisiana state court and ARIC retained the
law firm of Navratil, Hardy & Bourgeois to defend Prudhomme. 14 87 Boris
Navratil (Navratil) was the attorney of record for the insured. 1488 A jury tried
the underlying lawsuit and returned a verdict in favor of the third party
complainant.4 9 Prudhomme and ARIC in solido had to pay $25,000 in
damages-the insurance contract's policy limit.14 Prudhomme had to pay an
additional $420,198.30 in damages to satisfy the judgment."49
Believing that several legal theories could possibly reduce the size of the
damages or change the allocation of damages, Navratil wanted to appeal the
verdict and damages awards."492 Therefore, Navratil contacted ARIC and
urged the insurer to appeal the case. 4 93 At that time, Navratil also informed
ARIC that Louisiana law required Navratil to appeal the adverse judgment
against Prudhomme, even if ARIC would not directly benefit from an
appeal.' 494 Still, ARIC ignored Navratil's recommendation and terminated
Navratil's representation before the state court entered a final judgment on the
verdict. 49
5
After firing Navratil, ARIC settled the underlying lawsuit with the third
party complainant for $550,000, which greatly exceeded the jury's award. 1496
But the settlement amount was apparently less than the total anticipated
judgment against Prudhomme. 1497 Furthermore, in exchange for ARIC's
completely settling the third party lawsuit, Prudhomme assigned all of his
contractual rights to ARIC and released the insurer from all liability.149 8
Shortly thereafter, ARIC filed a legal malpractice action against Navratil
in the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. 14 99 The insurer
alleged that Prudhomme would have secured a better outcome in the
underlying third party proceedings if Navratil had not deviated from the
1484. Id.
1485. Id.
1486. Id. at 403 n.3.
1487. Id. at 403.
1488. Id.
1489. Id. at 404.




1494. Id. ("Navratil acknowledged in his letter that, given ARIC's $25,000 policy limit and the




1498. Id. at 403 n.3.
1499. Id. at 403-04.
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standard of care expected of attorneys practicing law in Louisiana. 50 Both
ARIC and Navratil filed motions for summary judgment. 50 ' The federal
district court granted Navratil's motion and dismissed ARIC's legal
malpractice action with prejudice.150 2 The federal judge held that ARIC's
failure to appeal the jury verdict-before voluntarily settling the underlying
third party lawsuit-barred ARIC's legal malpractice action against Navratil
as a matter of state law. 50 3 The insurer appealed the federal district court's
adverse summary judgment."'
The district court granted Navratil's summary judgment motion after
relying almost exclusively on a Louisiana appellate court decision in Gross v.
Pieno and making an Erie guess. 505 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit made its own
Erie guess about how the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide this
controversy and reversed the district court's finding for two reasons. "'
First, the court of appeals found the district court's reliance on Pieno was
overly broad. 50 7 In Pieno, the clients' decision to settle the case before a pre-
trial hearing, regarding the attorney's alleged abandonment, shortened the
proceedings. 5 8 Consequently, no court could determine whether the attorney
had in fact harmed his clients. "09 In stark contrast, the attorney in the present
case represented his client continually and thoroughly until a jury decided
against Prudhomme and awarded large damages to the third party
complainants. 5  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that, given the
extensive record of the state court proceedings, a trier of fact could determine
with certainty whether Navratil committed legal malpractice while
1500. Id.; see also Francois v. Reed, 714 So.2d 228, 229-30 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (reaffirming that a
complainant must prove three elements to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice: (1) the presence
of an attorney-client relationship, (2) the attorney's negligent representation, and (3) evidence that the
attorney's negligence was the cause in fact and proximate cause of the client's loss in the underlying
lawsuit).
1501. Navratil, 445 F.3d at 403-04.
1502. Id. at 404.
1503. Id.
1504. Id.
1505. Id. at 404 & n.7 (citing Gross v. Pieno, 892 So.2d 662 (La. Ct. App. 2004)).
The district court, sitting in diversity, made an "Erie guess" in its effort to determine the
applicable state law. In the absence of any controlling state statute or relevant decision of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, the district court appropriately turned to rulings of state appeal
courts, here relying almost exclusively on the decision of one in Pieno.... We note that the
Louisiana Supreme Court declined review in Pieno, as well as in the Murphy case on which
Pieno relied.
Id.; see also Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 F.3d 303, 317 (5th Cir.
2002) (holding that decisions of the intermediate state courts are "not to be disregarded by a federal court
unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise");
Murphy v. Gilsbar, Inc., 834 So.2d 669, 670 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
1506. Navratil, 445 F.3d at 407.
1507. Id. at 404.
1508. Pieno, 892 So.2d 664-65.
1509. Id.
1510. Navratil, 445 F.3d at 405.
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representing Prudhomme in the matter all the way to verdict.151 1
Second, Navratil suggested and the federal district court agreed that
ARIC's decision to terminate Navratil's representation-before the Louisiana
lower court entered a final judgment on the verdict in the underlying lawsuit-
equitably estopped ARIC from commencing a legal malpractice action. 1512 But
the Fifth Circuit disagreed. 51 3 Again, making an Erie guess, the court of
appeals declared:
We are ... convinced that the Supreme Court of Louisiana... would
distinguish Pieno and hold that ARIC's settlement of the underlying case did
not have the preclusive effect of barring the client from bringing an
independent action for legal malpractice.... [T]he Supreme Court of
Louisiana... would [not] apply equitable estoppel under the instant facts....
[We] reverse the summary judgment dismissal of ARIC's malpractice suit
against Navratil... [and] hold that ARIC's decision not to pursue an appeal
under these circumstances does not equitably estop [the insurer] from
prosecuting its malpractice action against Navratil. 51 4
V. A BRIEF STATISTICAL REVIEW OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S REPORTED 2005-
2006 INSURANCE-RELATED OPINIONS
On another occasion, this commentator discussed the merits using simple
statistics to help practicing attorneys and others to understand questionable and
often conflicting judicial decisions that traditional legal analyses might explain
fully. 5 15 Fairly often, judges of all persuasions intentionally or unintentionally
allow so-called extralegal factors-like plaintiffs' legal status or types of
insurance contracts-to influence the disposition of cases. 1516  Courts are
statistically and significantly more inclined to rule in favor of defendants
rather than plaintiffs, even after a statistician removes or controls for the
influence of other legal and extralegal variables. 5'7 More disturbing, such
1511. Id.
1512. Id.
1513. Id. ("Contrary to the suggestion of Navratil's argument, there is no indication that the Pieno
court would have applied equitable estoppel to bar a malpractice action against the attorney if the judgment
in that case had been final.").
1514. Id. at 404, 406-07.
1515. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Decisions-A Survey and An Empirical Analysis, 35 TEX. TECH.
L. REv. 947, 1026-28 (2004).
1516. See, e.g., Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over Whether Liability
Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical and Empirical
Review of Federal and State Courts' Declaratory Judgments-1900-1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1169-
94, 1202-18 (1998) (chronicling intra-jurisdictional conflicts and arguably biased rulings, and reporting that
defendants are more likely to prevail in federal and state declaratory judgment actions).
1517. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128, 133-34 (2000) (finding that when controlling for the possibility of
other influences or predictor variables, federal courts are still significantly more likely to decide
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judicial bias often accounts for the ever increasing number of highly
conflicting, unduly complicated, and arguably unfair rulings."518
Certainly, this Part does not attempt to present an elaborate statistical
analysis of the Fifth Circuit's 2005-2006 insurance decisions, as the court
reported just twenty-four cases for publication. 51 9 That relatively tiny number
of cases precludes a more sophisticated analysis--one that would explain more
completely and fittingly the concurrent influence of legal and extralegal
variables on the likelihood of insureds and insurers' winning or losing in the
Fifth Circuit.
Still, analyzing frequencies and percentages, along with a case-by-case
legal analysis of courts' rulings, can enhance one's understanding of
questionable summary and declaratory judgments. Moreover, simple statistics
can also uncover important or unexpected patterns among judicial opinions.
Therefore, given these positive benefits of statistical research, this
commentator performed a content analysis of the twenty-four cases and
reported a series of simple descriptive statistics in three tables, as follows.
First, Table A presents frequencies and percentages for some selected
demographic attributes of insurers and insureds that petitioned the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals for relief during the 2005-2006 session.
overwhelmingly in favor of defendants).
1518. See generally Rice, supra note 664, at 1040-72, 1074-95 (chronicling inconsistent and biased
rulings, and reporting that defendants are more likely to prevail in federal and state declaratory judgment
actions).
1519. Texaco Exploration and Prod., Inc. v. AmClyde Eng'rd Prod. Co., 448 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. May
2006); St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 445 F.3d 820 (5th Cir. Apr. 2006);
Wallace v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 444 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006); Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v.
Navratil, 445 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006); Motiva Enters., LLC v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 445
F.3d 381 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006); Dale v. Colagiovanni, 443 F.3d at 425 (5th Cir. Mar. 2006); EMCASCO Ins.
Co. v. Am. Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519 (5th Cir. Jan. 2006); Stewart v. W. Heritage Ins. Co.,
438 F.3d 488 (5th Cir. Jan. 2006); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. Jan. 2006);
Gallup v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 434 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. Dec. 2005); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Ace Prop. &
Cas. Co., 429 F.3d 120 (5th Cir. Oct. 2005); Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 428 F.3d 193
(5th Cir. Oct. 2005); Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 426 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. Sept. 2005); Minter v. Great Am.
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 423 F.3d 460 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005); Times-Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,
421 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005); Thyssen, Inc. v. Nobility Mv, 421 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005);
Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. Aug. 2005); Coleman v. School
Bd. of Richland Parish, 418 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. July 2005); Wentwood Woodside I, LP v. GMAC
Commercial Mortgage Corp., 419 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. July 2005); Lifecare Hospitals, Inc. v. Health Plus of
La., Inc., 418 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. July 2005); Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 415 F.3d
474 (5th Cir. July 2005); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 415 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. June 2005); United Teacher
Assocs. Ins. Co. v. Union Labor life Ins. Co., 414 F.3d 558 (5th Cir. June 2005); La. Patients' Comp. Fund
Oversight Bd. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 411 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. June 2005).
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TABLE A. SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURANCE
LAW LITIGANTS WHO PETITIONED THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS FOR REVIEw-2005-2006 1520
Demographic Frequencies Percentages
Characteristics (N = 24) (100.0)




Federal Districts Where Cases Originated:
Louisiana-Eastern District 6 25.0
Louisiana-Western District 5 20.8
Mississippi-Southern District 3 12.5
Texas-Eastern District 1 4.2
Texas-Northern District 4 16.7
Texas-Southern District 3 12.5
Texas-Western District 2 8.3
Types of Plaintiffs:
Insured Corporations 9 37.5
Insured Individuals 5 20.8
Primary Insurers 3 12.5
Excess Insurers 1 4.2
Receivers/State Regulators 3 12.5
Association/Partnership 2 8.3
Employer 1 4.2









1520. Willy E. Rice, TABLE A. SOME SELECTED DEMOGRAPHic CHARACTEmiSTICS OF INSURANCE
LAW LITIGANTS WHO PETITIONED THE FIFTH CIRcurr COURT OF APPEALS FOR REviEw-2005-2006 (2006)
[hereinafter Table A].
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Types of Insurance Complaints:
First party Complaints 9 37.5
Third-Party Complaints 15 62.5
Nearly forty-six percent (45.8%) of the cases originated in Louisiana, and
litigants filed the remaining cases in district courts located in Mississippi and
Texas, 12.5% and 41.75%, respectively.
More revealing, nine federal district courts are distributed across
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. Among the present twenty-four cases,
however, nearly eighty-seven percent (86.7%) of the lawsuits began in only
five federal district courts: the Eastern District Court of Louisiana (25.0%), the
Western District Court of Louisiana (20.8%), the Southern District Court of
Mississippi (12.5%), the Northern District Court of Texas (16.7%), and the
Southern District Court of Texas (12.5%).
While a diversity of persons petitioned the Fifth Circuit to review adverse
declaratory judgments, summary judgments, and other rulings, the
overwhelming majority of plaintiffs were insured corporations (37.5%),
insured individuals (20.8%), primary insurers (12.5%), and receivers and state
regulators (12.5%). Unlike 2002-2004 insurance litigants, the distribution of
2005-2006 petitioners who filed first and third party complaints in the Fifth
Circuit was skewed. 52 Just thirty-eight percent (37.5%) of the underlying
cases involved the insureds' first party claims and actions. On the other hand,
an impressive sixty-three percent (62.5%) of the cases involved third party
insurance claims and causes.
Among first party actions, disgruntled insureds quarreled with their
respective insurers over whether insurers had a duty to pay various claims or
to indemnify insureds under several types of personal insurance policies: flood
(16.6%), property (12.5%), health/HMO (8.3%), marine (4.2%), and life
(4.2.8%) insurance contacts. In contrast, among the cases in which third party
victims sued insureds, insureds and subrogees clashed with insurance
companies over whether insurers had a duty to defend, settle, or indemnify
under several types of insurance contracts: comprehensive, commercial,
educators', employers', environmental-impairment and general liability
insurance contracts (37.5%), excess automobile liability insurance contracts
(12.5%), and professional liability insurance contracts (4.2%).
Table B presents frequencies and percentages for several pertinent
variables surrounding litigants' theories of recovery, the types of remedies that
litigants sought, the types of remedies that the Fifth Circuit awarded, and the
1521. Compare Table A, supra note 1524, with Rice, supra note 1519, at 1026-31, and Rice, supra
note 822, at 1017-23, and Rice, supra note 5, at 899-905.
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general distribution of the claims and actions in the district courts and in the
court of appeals.
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TABLE B. THEORIES OF RECOVERY, REMEDIES, AND THE DISPOSITION OF
INSURANCE LAW ACTIONS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS AND
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS-2005-2006
1522
Theories of Recovery, Remedies, Frequencies Percentages
and Outcomes (N = 24) (100.0)
Types of Actions:
Individual Actions 23 96.0
Class Actions 1 4.0
tPetitioners' Legal Theories (Causes):
Breach of Contract 11 45.8
Declaratory Judgment 9 37.5
Negligence/Bad-Faith 7 29.0
Equitable Subrogation 3 12.5
Fraud 2 8.3
Unfair Business Practices 2 8.3
Federal RICO 1 4.2
tRemedies Sought:
Indemnification 21 87.5
Declaratory Relief 13 29.2
Actual/Punitive Damages 5 20.7
Legal Defense 4 16.6
Grounds for Disposing Cases in Federal
District Courts:
On the Merits 15 62.5
Procedural 9 37.5
Disposition of Cases in Federal District Courts:
Plaintiffs-Insureds Won 10 41.7
Defendants-Insurers Won 14 58.3
Disposition of Cases in the Fifth Circuit Court:
Plaintiffs-Insureds Won 8 33.3
Defendants-Insurers Won 16 66.7
1522. Willy E. Rice, THEORIES OF RECOVERY, REMEDIES, AND THE DISPOSMON OF INSURANCE LAW
ACTIONS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS AND IN THE FIFrH CIRCuIT COURT OF APPEALS-2005-2006 (2006)
[hereinafter Table B].
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Litigants' Success-Failure Rate Before the
Fifth Circuit:
Affirmed for Insurers-Defendants 3 12.5
Affirmed for Insureds-Plaintiffs 5 20.8
Reversed Against Insureds-Plaintiffs 6 25.0
Reversed Against Insurers-Defendants 3 12.5
Affirmed and Reversed in Part 7 29.2
t Multiple causes of action appeared in several cases; therefore, the reported percentages
can exceed one hundred percent.
First, Table B illustrates that litigants raised and sought relief under an
assortment of legal theories. In nearly forty-six percent (45.8%) of the cases,
insureds and other plaintiffs filed breach-of-contract actions against the
insurers. In nearly thirty-eight percent (37.8%) of the cases, both insurers and
insureds commenced declaratory judgment actions, asking the courts for
declaratory relief under a variety of insurance contracts. Furthermore, in
twenty-nine percent (29.0%) of the cases, various complainants filed common
law bad-faith and negligence-based actions against insurers. In addition,
aggrieved parties filed equitable subrogation actions in nearly thirteen percent
(12.5%) of the cases. An equal number of complainants, 83%, filed common
law fraud and deceptive trade practices-statutory actions-against insurers.
Unlike the 2002-2004 litigants, the 2005-2006 petitioners asked the lower
courts and Fifth Circuit to award a relatively small variety of remedies. First,
in nearly eighty-eight percent (87.5%) of the filings, complainants asked the
courts to declare that various defendants had a duty to indemnify--either
insureds or insurers. In twenty-nine percent (29.0%) of the controversies,
complaining parties asked the courts for declaratory relief. Aggrieved parties
also asked federal courts to award various damages and declare that insurers
had a duty to defend insureds in underlying third party actions. The reported
percentages are 20.7% and 16.6%, respectively.
What were the win-loss ratios for the 2005-2006 plaintiffs-insureds and
defendants-insurers in the district courts and in the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit? The results are consistent and incontrovertible: Federal courts
in the Fifth Circuit display a small amount of empathy for insureds-plaintiffs'
predicament or legal arguments. Specifically, federal district courts ruled in
favor of insurers-defendants about fifty-eight percent (58.3%) of the time. But
more impressive, insurers-defendants' likelihood of prevailing on appeal was
even larger. Put simply, the Fifth Circuit decided in favor of the insurers-
defendants nearly sixty-seven percent (66.7%) of the time. Again, these 2005-
2006 outcome percentages are similar to the 2002-2004 findings.
The last displayed percentages in Table B present some additional
information about the way the Fifth Circuit disposed of the federal district
courts' rulings. First, the Fifth Circuit affirmed nearly thirteen percent (12.5 %)
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of the district courts' decisions in favor of the insurers. But more telling, the
court of appeals reversed, in favor of the insurers, twenty-five percent (25.0%)
of the district courts' pro-insureds rulings. On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed nearly twenty-one percent (20.8%) of
the district courts' pro-insured decisions, while reversing nearly thirteen
percent (12.5%) of the district courts' pro-insurer decisions. For sure, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed and reversed in part twenty-nine percent (29.2%) of the
lower-courts' rulings. The greater beneficiaries of those rulings, however,
were defendants, who were primarily insurance companies.
Again, the small number of cases in this brief study prevented the author
from applying more elaborate statistical measures to analyze the data.
Therefore, as has been the case in previous years, this analysis cannot provide
a definitive answer to the Fifth Circuit and district courts' substantially greater
tendency to decide in favor of defendants-insurers. 523 Still, the percentages
reported in Table C show some trends among the small sample of data.
Table C illustrates the disposition of the insurance cases among federal
district courts and in the Fifth Circuit. The reported percentages show the
relationships between three selected background variables and the litigants'
likelihood of success.
1523. Compare Table B, supra note 1526, with Rice, supra note 1519, at 1027 n.793, and Rice, supra
note 822, at 1022-23, and Rice, supra note 5, at 901-04.
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First, the types of insurance complaints slightly influenced whether
insureds-plaintiffs or insurers-defendants prevailed. Among the district court
cases, insurers-defendants triumphed just forty-four percent (44.4%) of the
time when the underlying lawsuits involved a first party claim. Conversely,
in federal district courts, insurers prevailed in nearly sixty-seven percent
(66.7%) of the cases when the underlying lawsuits involved third party claims.
Generally, in the latter cases, insureds sued insurers for allegedly breaching a
contractual duty to settle or defend insureds against third party lawsuits.
Furthermore, after the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district courts' rulings,
insurers won seventy-three percent (73.3%) of the cases when the underlying
lawsuits involved third party claims. More interesting, insurers also won the
majority of disputes on appeal-nearly fifty-six percent (55.6%)-when
insureds petitioned the Fifth Circuit to determine whether insurers had a duty
to pay a first party claim.
Additionally, among the cases resolved in the federal district courts,
insureds had a greater probability of winning only if they (1) resided in
Louisiana (54.6%) or in Mississippi (100%), (2) filed their actions in the
Eastern District Court of Louisiana (66.7%), or (3) commenced their suits in
the Southern District Court of Mississippi (100.0%). Under all other
circumstances, however, insurers had the greater likelihood of prevailing in
federal district courts. Insurers experienced a greater rate of success if they
were practicing the business of insurance in Texas-90.0%.
When considering the litigants' domicile and the origination the actions,
the percentages show that insurers' likelihood of winning improved in the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. First, as reported above, insurers-defendants
who resided in Texas won an impressive 90.0% of the cases in the federal
district courts. On appeal, however, those same Texas insurers won only fifty
percent (50.0%) of the cases. Still, the overwhelming majority of insurers
doing business in Louisiana and Mississippi prevailed before the Fifth Circuit.
The reported percentages are 81.8% and 66.7%, respectively.
Furthermore, only one instance occurred in which insureds-plaintiffs'
success rate exceeded that of the insurers-defendants: Insureds who filed their
complaints in the Northern District Court of Texas won every case (100%) in
the court of appeals. But the general trend is incontrovertible: Under all other
circumstances, insurers-defendants had an appreciably larger likelihood of
prevailing in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals regardless of the federal
district court in which the case originated.
In light of the results reported in the 2002-2004 studies and the findings
reported here, evidence strongly suggests that some systemic bias exists in the
Fifth Circuit's decisions. Little, if any, legal justification exists to explain
insurers-defendants' persistently higher likelihood of success before that
tribunal. But again, these brief annual studies will never prove definitively that
bias is present. That proof will have to wait until we conduct a larger study-
using more a appropriate methodology, statistical tool, and representative
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sample of cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
The quality of the Fifth Circuit's application of legal principles and
general analysis in twenty-four insurance law decisions was extremely mixed
during the 2005-2006 session. For the most part, the Fifth Circuit's opinions
were intelligible and well-reasoned. In addition, this term the Fifth Circuit
panels were more likely to apply Louisiana's, Mississippi's, and Texas's
settled principle fairly and thoughtfully. But more impressive, the Fifth Circuit
was more likely to certify difficult or novel questions to the respective state
supreme courts rather than embracing Erie guesses to resolve insurance related
disputes.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit panels did not consistently apply the
traditional rules of contract construction and interpretation,15 25 the doctrine of
plain meaning, 15 2 6 the adhesion doctrine, 1 27 the doctrine of ambiguity, 1528 and
the reasonable expectations doctrine 15 29 when interpreting the rights and
1525. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Concord Gen. Corp., 665 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (La. 1996) (holding that an
insurance policy is an agreement between the parties and should be interpreted by using ordinary contract
principles); Sessoms v. Allstate Ins. Co., 634 So. 2d 516, 519 (Miss. 1993) (embracing the position that
"insurance policies which are clear and unambiguous are to be enforced according to their terms as
written"); Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. 1998) (reiterating that insurance
contracts are subject to the same rules of construction as other contracts).
1526. See, e.g., La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759, 763 (La. 1994)
(holding that the parties' intent must "be determined in accordance with the general, ordinary, plain and
popular meaning of the words used in the policy"); Blackledge v. Omega Ins. Co., 740 So. 2d 295, 298
(Miss. 1999) (holding that courts must give terms used in insurance policies their ordinary and popular
definition"); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 337 S.W.2d 284, 288 (Tex. 1960) (reiterating that
courts must give words appearing in insurance contracts their plain meaning when no ambiguity exists).
1527. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 747 So. 2d 656, 674 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999)
(observing the well-settled notion that "insurance policies are generally contracts of adhesion"); J & W
Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 551-52 (Miss. 1998) (concluding that
insurance policies are contracts of adhesion and as such ambiguities are to be construed liberally in favor
of the insured and against the insurer); Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. 1987) (concluding without deciding definitively that insurance contracts are adhesion contracts
because they "arise[] out of the parties' unequal bargaining power... [and] allow unscrupulous insurers to
take advantage of their insureds' misfortunes").
1528. See, e.g., Succession of Fannaly v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 805 So. 2d 1134, 1138 (La. 2002)
(repeating that an "ambiguous contractual provision is construed against the insurer who furnished the
contract's text and in favor of the insured"); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So.2d 658, 662 (Miss.
1994) (embracing "the general rule that [ambiguous] provisions of an insurance contract are to be strongly
construed against the insurance company"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d
552, 555 (Tex. 1991) (reaffirming that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be construed in
favor of the insured).
1529. See, e.g., La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630 So. 2d 759, 764 (La. 1994)
(holding that a court should construe an insurance contract "to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the
parties in the light of the customs and usages of the industry"); Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Miss.,
Inc., 427 So. 2d 139, 141 n.2 (Miss. 1983) (adopting the principle that the "objectively reasonable
expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
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obligations of insureds and insurers. Again, a significant percentage of the
panels rarely cited, mentioned, or applied the five doctrines, even when the
facts warranted such applications.
If the Fifth Circuit panels applied, for example, the plain meaning and
ambiguity doctrines more often, rather than attempting to decipher
questionable phrases or trying to define arcane words in insurance contracts,
the intelligibility of the decisions would improve greatly. Put simply, some
panels invest an awful amount of judicial resources trying to explain the
meaning of words and phrases. Very often, however, their definitions and
explanations conflict with prior or contemporaneous panels' definitions and
explanations. To be sure, such conflicts are not helpful and should be avoided.
But more important, if the panels applied consistently the laws of the
various states rather than the law of the Fifth Circuit or the law of the panel,
the predictability of their insurance law decisions would definitely improve
immensely. In many instances, the panels relied on the law of the panel, rather
than the laws of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. This practice creates
needless strained, conflicting, and often questionable decisions.
honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations");
Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1986) (permitting an
innocent victim whose property had been destroyed to collect under an insurance contract for loss
reasonably expected to be covered). But see Forbau v. Aetna life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 145 n.8 (Tex.
1994) (observing that Texas law does not recognize the doctrine of reasonable expectation as a basis to
disregard unambiguous policy provisions).
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